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ABSTRACT  
Economic, technological, informational, social and political factors are driving 
organisations to pursue different forms to enable them to respond more quickly to a 
dynamic and changing environment. The relationship between business organisations and 
stakeholders has been evolving. The internationalisation of firms requires the development 
of skills and knowledge to enable them to compete through cooperation in the form of 
strategic alliances.  
The energy industry is high profile in many countries as natural resources are considered to 
be of national or public interest. The development of activities in this sector are highly 
influenced by economic, political and social factors. In the energy sector, which is different 
from other industries, the formation of strategic alliances has been normal practice. In order 
to face the challenges of an industry where cooperation is essential, the expectation is that 
their relevance as part of business practice will only increase. 
Despite their popularity, strategic alliances have a high failure rate. Consequently, there is a 
need to understand how and why strategic alliances succeed or fail in order to enhance the 
understanding of their performance. Research in the field is extensive but fragmented and 
there is insufficient literature on strategic alliances which takes a process theory approach. 
Conventional processes for the development of strategic alliances fail to integrate the wider 
elements which influence the alliance’s performance. Therefore, the research aim is to gain 
an in-depth understanding of the performance of strategic alliances in the energy sector. 
This is achieved through a qualitative study conducting comprehensive, semi-structured 
interviews with those with experience in strategic alliance development.  
Findings and literature show that each strategic alliance is unique - there is no a single 
definition. There are different types of strategic alliance and this could contribute to 
viewing strategic alliances as complex. In a dynamic and uncertain environment there is a 
need for flexibility and the capacity to adapt and accommodate change. The selection of the 
type of strategic alliance influences the degree of freedom to manage them. This highlights 
the degree of influence of the individual over the organisation and suggests considering this 
in the light of institutional theory, and around agency theory.  
 
	
	
xiii	
Performance measurement is complex and requires a multi-perspective approach which 
includes softer metrics and taking stakeholders’ preferences into consideration. Partnering 
is complex; managing more that one organisation is difficult as they have different cultures 
and ways of working. The sense of equity of rewards for each partner impacts performance. 
Change is natural and complex, expectations, interests and objectives shift and failure could 
be merely a perception. 
Managers in alliances are constrained by the structure selected. In addition, they can face a 
dilemma over a conflict loyalty to the parent organisation and have some concerns about 
the future of their career. Furthermore, they expect endorsement from executives who 
influence the alliance through their decisions on structure and selection of management. 
The skills of managers are, therefore, important in enhancing performance within each 
alliance. The likelihood is that strategic alliances, and the rationale for implanting them, is 
going to continue to be relevant. The increasing participation of communities in these 
complex business decisions is also an important factor for consideration.  
My contribution to theory lies in developing a holistic dynamic multi-perspective process 
model of strategic alliances, integrating different theoretical approaches, the literature 
review, the findings of this research, and, finally, my personal experience in the field. The 
model created in this thesis utilises the explicated data themes to provide a framework in 
which strategic alliances can be analysed and performance understood. This framework 
also has practical implications which assists in the prevention of problems and poses 
possible solutions to make strategic alliances in the energy sector work more effectively. 
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CHAPTER 1 ‘INTRODUCTION’ 
The purpose of this introduction is to present the background to the research undertaken in 
this thesis. The thesis seeks to understand the performance of strategic alliances in the 
energy sector. This introductory chapter explores the context, the research problem in the 
existing literature, the conceptual approach, aim of the research and contribution, the 
methodology and methods implemented and finally outlines the structure of the thesis.  
Background  
This PhD thesis intends to makes four contributions to the literature, theory and practice on 
strategic alliances in the energy sector. Firstly, a cultural approach is taken (Reichie et al 
2010; Giorgi et al 2015) to developing a new process theory to understand the performance 
of strategic alliances and how and why they succeed or fail (Langley et al. 2013).  As a 
second contribution, this research integrates hitherto fragmented literature on strategic 
alliances and provides new data on how strategic alliances are developed through the lens 
of experienced practitioners in the energy sector.  Thirdly, it provides an agenda for future 
research into strategic alliances from a process perspective.  The fourth contribution is the 
provision of a holistic dynamic multi-perspective process framework that will assist 
practitioners in managing and improving the performance of strategic alliances in the 
energy sector. 
I will now outline the background to this work by examining the global drivers and 
expectations for the development of strategic alliances. 
Economic, technological, informational, social and political factors are driving 
organisations to pursue different forms in order to respond more quickly to an increasingly 
dynamic and changing environment. They need to be flexible if they want to increase their 
chances of success in a field where rigidity and bureaucracy impose serious challenges that 
can jeopardise the future of organisations. This dynamic organisational environment 
necessitates the search for innovation in structures, processes and boundaries. Cost 
reduction, learning and knowledge transfer, technological development, innovation 
management, the emergence of knowledge-based economies and deregulation of state 
control are consequences of globalisation (Pettigrew et al. 2000). 
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The management of relationships with stakeholders is increasing in importance. 
Knowledge, capability development at intra and inter-organisational level is required to 
manage the change in relationships with suppliers and customers. Organisations are 
focussing on core competencies, so acknowledging that they cannot be effective across the 
board. Tasks are designated to partner organisations to harness their capabilities potentially 
through strategic alliances. International firms are strengthening internal networks among 
functions, divisions, countries and regions in order to speed the transfer of knowledge and 
skills. They are investing in alliances and other partnerships to compete through co-
operation (Pettigrew, Massini et al. 2000). Co-operative strategies are a means to engineer 
strategic change; the influence of strategic alliances in so doing is expected to continue 
(Harrigan 1988; Harrigan 2015). 
For some industries, strategic alliances are regarded as a new form of organisation and 
recent decades have seen an increase in the pace of growth. Early studies indicated an 
increase in their relevance, and the more recent studies available confirm this trend. For 
example, total revenue from alliances of USA firms in 1980 was 2%; in 1997 it had grown 
to 21% and it was expected to rise to 35% in 2002 (Das and Teng 1999). ‘Many of the 
world’s largest companies had over 20 percent of their assets tied up in alliances. Many 
others depend on alliances for 30-50 percent of their research expenditures or annual 
revenues’ (Ernst 2003, p. 19). Moreover, ‘a study by partner alliances reported that over 
80% of Fortune 1000 CEOs believed that alliances would account for almost 26% of their 
companies’ revenues in 2007-08 (Kale et al. 2009, cited in Kale and Singh 2009 p.45). 
Context for strategic alliances in the energy sector 
 
In contrast with other industries, strategic alliances are not a new phenomenon in the 
energy sector (Kent 1991). This sector, particularly in the petroleum industry, has been 
characterised as high-risk, for two reasons. Firstly, due to the technical challenges 
embedded in the nature of the activity and secondly because of geopolitical issues related to 
the location of natural resources.  Since the time first oil wells were discovered in America 
and brought to production, companies have collaborated to raise the capital required for 
investment purposes. Through collaboration, they also gain from specialisation, with some 
partners focusing on finance while others dealt with the learning and innovation processes 
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associated with the industrial process (Yergin 2012). ‘The practice of sharing capital costs 
between competitors is characteristic of the upstream oil industry, and is not common in 
other industries’ (IFP 2004, p.213). 
Companies in the sector also collaborated with others in cognate industries to gain 
competitive advantage.  Thus, for example, Rockefellers’ Standard Oil Company began to 
collaborate with the rail companies with the objective of controlling the market. He 
vertically integrated by acquiring refineries and collaborating with other companies where 
he had ownership, with the main objective to control the market (Chandler 1977; Yergin 
2012). 
As the growth in demand outpaced supply, American companies expanded overseas. They 
were looking for additional resources in new markets in developing countries, seeking to 
establish new forms of collaboration and at times partnering with Governments. For 
instance, strategic alliances in the form of joint ventures were necessary to share the risks of 
exploration in the Middle East. For strategic reasons, the Oil Majors  (the so called Seven 
Sisters) were among the first energy companies to implement joint ventures. Following 
this, the Oil Majors utilised joint ventures in order to facilitate the participation of Middle 
East Governments in order to achieve stability in their relationship (Sampson 1991).  
Strategic alliances in the industry have continued, for example with the oil major, Shell. A 
public multinational and one of the top 10 energy companies (Forbes and Platts ranking 
2012), Shell reported that from their major projects on stream and under construction the 
common factors were that the projects are global, take place in different parts of the world, 
face technical challenges and the majority are developed through strategic alliances (Shell, 
2014). Moreover, its former CEO Peter Voser stated that: ‘Partnerships would be more 
important and needed, between NOCs and IOCs but also with Government's and 
Stakeholders’ (Voser 2013).  
The development of activities in the energy sector are strongly influenced by political, 
economic and social factors as natural resources are a matter of national or public interest 
(IFP 2004; Duval et al. 2009; Yergin 2012). The future holds challenges for the energy 
industry and it is difficult to see that these can be overcome without collaboration among 
countries and companies.  According to the International Energy Agency, in the world 
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energy outlook 2014 in their central scenario energy demand will grow by 37% by 2040, 
and the main drivers are population and GDP growth. Investment to meet energy demand 
will be relevant. For example, in upstream oil and gas development it is estimated that $900 
billion per year will be required by the 2030s to meet demand. However, there are serious 
concerns as to whether investment will be readily available, due to factors such as the 
complexity and capital intensity of Brazilian deepwater; challenges in developing the shale 
industry outside USA; uncertainty of Canadian oil sands production; and political sanctions 
on Russia constraining access to technology and financial resources. Concerns over gas 
security have arisen due to the conflict between Russia and the Ukraine. Other factors 
which add to the complexity are that nuclear energy has an uncertain future, electricity is 
inaccessible to many people, there has been a continued rise in global greenhouse-gas 
emissions and an increase in air pollution in the world’s fast-growing cities (International 
Energy et al. 2014). 
The Energy industry is a dynamic environment where change is permanent. - this can be 
seen as a ‘business as usual’ situation, the current scenario for the next 20 years confirms 
this. There will be changes in the market flow of the oil because the development of the 
shale industry in USA, regionalisation of the liquefied natural gas markets; continuation of 
the change in the energy mix, where renewables, unconventional fossil fuel and gas 
increase their share (BP 2015). In certain regions, the evolution of the industry is 
demanding coordination and collaboration among its different actors in order to maximise 
the economic recovery of their resources, as with the UK Continental Shelf (Wood 2014). 
Current technological breakthroughs are presenting new opportunities for collaboration. 
Shale gas is changing the flow and structure of the markets and is offering new 
opportunities for countries and companies. To achieve the development and 
implementation of new technologies requires collaboration with stakeholders in order to 
gain support from communities and government, amongst others (Various 2012). The 
rationale is that no one company can effectively operationalise every economic opportunity 
it is presented with, thus Dubin (2005) predicted that strategic alliances would increase.  
According to KPMG, the proportion of global corporate revenues grew from only 2% in 
1980 to its current 35% directly from alliances. In the next five years it is expected that 
International Oil Companies (IOCs) will move from 30% to 70-80% of their business into 
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joint ventures (Van Grondelle 2012). In order to face future challenges, energy companies 
will need to adapt, control their capital and costs and act strategically (BP 2015). Strategic 
alliances will continue to be a viable option in the energy industry. 
Research problem  
Despite their popularity, the failure rate for strategic alliances in most industries is 
traditionally high (Dacin et al. 1997; Das and Teng 1999; Langfield Smith 2008; Walter  et. 
al 2008; Kale and Singh 2009; Gulati et al. 2012). 
From early to more recent studies, research shows that there is no consensus on the rate of 
failure of strategic alliances; various authors have reported different rates. Some authors 
found that the failure rate was high, around 50-60%, and attributable to a lack of 
compatibility among partners. These authors suggested a need to look at the differences and 
commonalities among partners (Dacin et al. 1997). Other authors argued that failure rates 
of strategic alliances could range from 37% to 70% (Geringer and Herbert 1991), or 50 to 
80 per cent (Janis, 1982; Harrigan, 1988; Kogut, 1989; Park and Ungson, 1997; Yan and 
Zeng, 1999, cited in Walter et al. 2008). Still other researchers have suggested the failure in 
strategic alliances is between 30% and 70% because they do not achieve their goals or 
obtain the expected benefits. Some others argued that termination rates could be higher than 
50 (Kale and Singh 2009; Gulati et al. 2012). Despite there not being consensus in the 
figure, there is a common understanding that the failure rate of strategic alliances is high. 
There are some firms that appear to be successful in the development of strategic alliances, 
but the failure rate has been reported as higher than the success rate. In their early study, 
Varadarajan and Cunnigham (1995) identified a need to better understand why some 
strategic alliances succeed and others fail. This would improve the management and 
performance of alliances by understanding problems related to systems, structures, and 
control. However, in the energy sector this gap remains; there are no existing studies which 
focus on the performance of strategic alliances.  
Although there is extensive research in the field of strategic alliances, the research is 
fragmented. A variety of theories have been used to study strategic alliances, but there is a 
dearth of literature which takes a process approach and helps to understand the performance 
of strategic alliances in the energy sector (Ariño 2003, Mainela 2008). The weakness of 
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most of the studies on performance in strategic alliances is that they have taken a variance 
theory approach to understanding the ‘what’ of strategic alliances, e.g. antecedents, 
dependent variables and outcomes and do not consider the ‘how’ or implementation. 
Variance theory deals with co-variations among variables. It tends to ignore time by 
compressing it into variables, thus reducing its role in comparative statistics and missing 
the temporal flow of organisational life (Langley et al. 2013). Conventional processes for 
the development of strategic alliances fail to integrate the wider elements which influence 
the alliance’s performance. Therefore, I employed both a cultural (Giorgi et al. 2015) and a 
process theory approach in order to understand why and how phenomena (such as strategic 
alliances) change or remain stable over time.   
Conceptual approach 
Strategic alliances are considered as hybrid organisations which involve resources or 
governance structures from at least two organisations (Borys and Jemison 1989). This 
makes them more complex to manage than a single organisation because of differences in 
culture, language, ways of working and expectations (Ring and Van de Ven 1994, Li et al. 
2002). This complexity is illustrated in the following figure.  
Figure 1-1.- Complexity of strategic alliances 
 
 
 
The above diagram represents at least two organisations entering into a strategic alliance. 
The arrow on the right shows how complexity increases as the number of organisations 
involved in the alliance increase.  
The development process of strategic alliances is conventionally described in in four stages: 
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partner selection, governance design, implementation and management  (Jiang 2008, Kale 
and Singh 2009). However, this model provides insufficient understanding of the 
complexity of strategic alliances’ performance. It could, therefore, be expanded into a 
multi-perspective model by taking a cultural approach and utilising process theory to 
understand how strategic alliances emerge, change, unfold and evolve over time (Langley 
1999; Langley et al. 2013; Giorgi et al 2015). The narrative surrounding strategic alliances 
can also aid an understanding of their performance by constructing cultural visions among 
different individuals who has been involved in their development (Reichie et al 2010, 
Giorgi et al 2015). 
This is illustrated in the following figure:  
Figure 1-2.- Multi-perspective conventional model for strategic alliances 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Jiang 2008 and Kale and Singh 2009 
The multi-perspective model presents at least two organisations with their own internal 
processes entering a strategic alliance. A new multi-perspective model for the strategic 
alliance needs to be developed - a holistic process model that considers other fundamental 
elements of the processes, thereby understanding the performance of strategic alliances in 
the energy sector. A strategic alliance framework, based on a cultural and processual 
approach and constructed from the perspective of individuals with experience in alliances 
in the energy sector, can help to understand how strategic alliances work in the energy 
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industry. (Young 2004, Small et al., 2010; Smets et al., 2012,).  
As presented in the discussion chapter, this research proposes a new holistic dynamic multi-
perspective model. 
Methodology and Methods Approach 
The aim of my research was to gain an in-depth understanding of the performance of 
strategic alliances in the energy sector. A qualitative study was therefore developed and the 
following research questions were posed:  
• How and why have strategic alliances been developed in the energy sector? 
• How and why do they appear to succeed or fail? 
• Why do firms engage in strategic alliances despite success rates not being high? 
• How can we make strategic alliances in the energy sector work more effectively? 
 
These research questions provided the foundation to address the problems associated with 
strategic alliances, and by so doing accomplished the main purpose of this research - to 
understand the performance of strategic alliances from a process theory approach. The four 
questions follow a sequence that help understand strategic alliances: firstly, by seeking to 
understand how and why strategic alliances have developed in the energy sector; secondly 
by considering the failure rate of strategic alliances, exploring how and why they succeed 
or fail; thirdly, why firms engage in strategic alliances despite low success rates; and, 
finally, how more effective strategic alliances in the energy sector can be created. The 
findings of these research questions gave shape to the process represented in a holistic 
dynamic multi-perspective framework. This framework will assist practitioners in 
managing and improving the performance of strategic alliances in the energy sector. 
 
This thesis attempted to understand the performance of strategic alliances from the 
perspective of those with experience in their development. Therefore, an idealist 
ontological assumption and consequently a constructionism epistemological assumption 
were taken, where participants informed their knowledge of strategic alliances by making 
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sense of their experience, acknowledging that every participant produced independent 
knowledge (Blaikie 2009).   
An abductive approach on the reasons for the failure or success of strategic alliances was 
taken to obtain data that was sufficiently detailed. This richness would promote an 
understanding by exploring, identifying and explaining themes and patterns regarding the 
performance of strategic alliances in order to integrate these in an overall conceptual 
framework (Blaikie 2009). 
As strategic alliances deal with organisational theory and management far too complex to 
be explained by laws in the same way as physical sciences (Saunders 2012, Sekaran and 
Bougie 2013), the research philosophy selected was interpretivism. 
This research was mainly developed by primary data, within a semi-natural setting where 
individuals with experience in the development of strategic alliances talked about their 
perspective of the energy sector (Blaikie 2009). 
The sample is non-probability in a single stage as sampling is complicated in the area of 
strategic alliances. Information on details and perceptions of people working in strategic 
alliances are not available in public sources, sampling methods used were judgemental and 
snowballing.  The sample is small to allow resources to be focussed intensely on the 
subjects of the research. The sample in this qualitative study is unrepresentative though the 
data is deeper and more detailed (Blaikie 2009).  
In-depth interviews, developed in the form of semi-structure interviews, were employed. 
These gave me the opportunity to get closer to the meanings and interpretations, accounts, 
perspectives and experiences of those involved in this field (Blaikie 2009).  
Thesis outline 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters, where chapter one presents the introduction, 
chapter two the literature review, chapter three the methodology-methods, findings are 
presented in chapter four, five, and six, chapter seven is discussion and chapter eight 
conclusions. 
This introductory chapter presented the current understanding and background to the 
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research undertaken and its intended contribution. It also presented the research problem, 
the conceptual approach, explained the methodological approach and finally outlined the 
structure of the dissertation. 
Chapter two presents the literature review in the field of strategic alliances. It firstly applies 
a systematic literature review approach in the field of strategic alliances, followed by 
material on the context for the research. I discuss research themes that have been of interest 
in the field, including the meaning, types and motives of strategic alliances. This is 
followed by a description of the process of alliances.  I then analyse the issues related to 
performance, the literature on alliance portfolios, outline gaps found in the literature and 
how my research will fill these. 
Chapter three explains the methodology and methods followed in this thesis, in terms of my 
research design and the rational behind this selection. It provides detail on the decisions 
made and justification for the research topic and problems, research questions, research 
strategy considering the ontology, epistemology and axiology, research paradigms, 
concepts, data sources, methods of data collection, data reduction and analysis and ethics.  
The findings’ chapters are organised according to the general themes explored during the 
interviews: concept, process, performance, influence, and prospects of strategic alliances. 
Chapter four presents the findings on the first two themes: concept and process, chapter 
five the findings on performance, while chapter six presents the findings on influence and 
prospects of strategic alliances. 
The discussion in Chapter seven presents the interpretation and critical evaluation of the 
findings of previous chapters in the light of my literature review. I begin by revisiting the 
research purpose and the research questions that were posed in chapter 3 ‘Methodology-
Methods’ and describe how the findings have contributed to answer these. Key findings are 
then presented, followed by connecting these to the literature. This chapter continues by 
describing the contribution of this research to theory and practice and presenting some 
suggestions for further research. Finally, Chapter eight presents the conclusions of this 
thesis. 
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Conclusions 
Economic, technological, informational, social and political factors are driving 
organisations to pursue different organisational forms to respond more quickly to a 
dynamic and changing environment. The relationship with stakeholders has been evolving 
and the internationalisation of firms requires the development of skills and knowledge 
around how to compete through cooperation in the form of strategic alliances. 
The energy industry is relevant to countries as natural resources are considered to be of 
national or public interest. The development of activities in the sector are highly influenced 
by economic, political and social factors. In the energy sector, which is different from other 
industries, strategic alliances have been normal practice. The expectation is that their 
relevance as part of business practice is going to increase in order to face the challenges of 
an industry where cooperation is essential. 
Despite their popularity, strategic alliances have a high failure rate. There is a need to 
understand how and why strategic alliances succeed or fail in order to enhance the 
understanding of their performance. Research in the field is extensive but fragmented and 
there is a dearth of literature on strategic alliances which takes a process theory approach. 
Conventional processes for the development of strategic alliances fail to take account of the 
wider elements which influence the alliance’s performance. Therefore, by a cultural 
approach and utilising process theory, the research aim is to gain an in-depth understanding 
of the performance of strategic alliances in the energy sector. It develops a qualitative study 
through in-depth, semi-structured interviews with those with experience in their 
development. This research also contains practical implications for preventing problems 
and posing possible solutions to make strategic alliances work more effectively. 
The next chapter presents a systematic literature review in the field of strategic alliances. 
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CHAPTER 2 ‘CREATING, MAINTAINING AND DISRUPTING 
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES: A LITERATURE REVIEW ’ 
	
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the literature review undertaken in the field of 
strategic alliances. It firstly describes the development of a more systematic approach 
(Tranfield, Denyer et al., 2003) to reviewing the literature on strategic alliances, and the 
chapter then presents material on the context of the research. I begin with research themes 
that have been of interest in the field, including the meaning, types and motives of strategic 
alliances, followed by describing the stages of alliances.  I then analyse the issues related to 
performance, literature on the portfolio of alliances, outline the identified gaps in the 
literature and how I propose to fill these gaps with my research. 
Towards a Systematic Literature Review 
I undertook a literature review to assist in understanding the difficulties in developing 
strategic alliances. Following my reading of Tranfield et al. (2003), I attempted to develop 
a more systematic approach to the literature review, while at the same time applying some 
flexibility in approach so as not to constraint the ‘capacity to explore and develop ideas’ 
(Tranfield et al., 2003 p. 213). I also employed an adaptable method to incorporate or 
exclude information in order to accommodate the dynamic needs of the research as it was 
being conducted. 
A literature review is best described as a three stage process. Firstly, I began by searching 
for sources that allowed me to understand the problems with strategic alliances. I secondly 
identified both topics of interest for the literature review and papers that review the 
literature of strategic alliances. This allowed me to identify topics of interest and relevant 
sources from the perspective of other authors. From the identification of the review papers, 
I was able to construct a database of sources with references. This was useful to confirm the 
papers that I have already reviewed and also to add new sources, which were then included 
or excluded. The third stage involved a continuous search for new papers conducted via 
search engines and subscribing to the alerts of professional associations which produce 
papers in this field. 
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To provide greater detail, the literature review was undertaken by identifying key words: 
strategic alliances, problems, motives, performance, success, failure, literature review and 
theories. I searched in electronic databases available in the University, including Scopus 
and EBSCO and the search engine Google Scholar. Citations and abstracts were exported to 
the reference software End Note. The inclusion criteria for papers was based on firstly 
reading the abstract of the paper, looking at the journal and the number of citations. I then 
analysed the source and looked at specific elements, for example concepts, ideas and 
theories used, epistemological and ontological grounds, main questions and problems 
addressed, methodology used and further research suggested  (Hart 1998).  
Literature Review on Strategic Alliances 
Failure rate of Strategic Alliances 
The popularity of strategic alliances as a method of organising is high among national and 
international firms and the activity of strategic alliances has increased (Hoffmann 2007, 
Walter, et al. 2008). The pace of growth of alliances in recent decades has accelerated, with 
Das and Teng (1999, p.50) in their seminal paper claiming: 
 ‘the alliance activities of the thousand largest U.S. firms are expected to account for 35 
percent of their total revenue by 2002—up from less than two percent in 1980 and 21 
percent in 1997. The number of alliances has been growing at a rate of 25 percent per year 
since 1985’.  
The trend towards growth in strategic alliances is similar across the globe, with research 
reporting that ‘many of the world’s largest companies had over 20 percent of their assets 
tied up in alliances. Many others depend on alliances for 30-50 percent of their research 
expenditures or annual revenues’ (Ernst 2003, p. 19). Moreover, ‘a study by partner 
alliances reported that over 80% of Fortune 1000 CEOs believed that alliances would 
account for almost 26% of their companies’ revenues in 2007-08 (Kale et al. 2009, cited in 
Kale and Singh 2009, p.45). 
According to KPMG, the proportion of global corporate revenues directly from alliances 
grew from only 2% in 1980 to 35% currently. In the next five years it is claimed that 
International Oil Companies (IOCs) will move from 30% to 70-80% of business into Joint 
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Ventures (Van Grondelle 2012). 
Despite their popularity, however, the success rate for strategic alliances in most industries 
is not high (Das and Teng 1999; Walter et al. 2008; Kale and Singh 2009; Gulati et al. 
2012).  Unfortunately many of the alliances formed are terminated; strategic alliances 
involve particular risks that jeopardise performance and seem to be the cause for the high 
rate of failure (Das and Teng 1999). 
From early to more recent studies, research shows that the failure rate is attributable to a 
variety of reasons and that there is no consensus on the failure rate of strategic alliances; 
various authors reported different rates. Some authors found that failure was high (around 
50-60%) and attributable to a lack of compatibility among partners. These authors 
suggested that there was a need to look at the differences and commonalities among 
partners (Dacin et al. 1997). Another group of authors argued that failure rates could be 
from 37% to 70%  (Geringer and Herbert 1991) or in the range of 50 to 80 per cent 
(Harrigan 1988; Janis 1982; Kogut 1989; Park and Ungson 1997; Yan and Zeng 1999, cited 
in Walter et al. 2008). Yet other researchers have suggested it is between 30 and 70% as 
strategic alliances either do not meet their goals or get the benefits expected. Some others 
argued that termination rates could be higher than 50% (Kale and Singh 2009; Gulati et al. 
2012).  Despite the fact that there are a variety of figures cited, these different studies all 
point to high failure rates. 
Reasons for failure rates 
There are some firms that seem to be successful in the development of strategic alliances, 
but overall, failure rates are reported to be higher than success rates. There is a need to 
better understand why some strategic alliances succeed and others fail in order to improve 
their management and performance by understanding problems related with systems, 
structures, and control (Varadarajan and Cunnigham 1995). 
Among the reasons cited for failure were: the misaligned incentives of self-interested 
agents; that conflict among partners decreased commitment and so damaged the 
relationship (Gulati et al. 2012); and an overall lack of commitment (Shah and 
Swaminathan 2008). 
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Despite alliances being a source of competitive advantage, there is a high level of failure. 
This could be related to a lack of cooperation among partners because of competition or 
opportunistic behaviour (Suen 2002). There may also be differences between partners’ 
objectives and interests (Langfield-Smith 2008). Some alliances also fail because 
companies do not implement their alliance strategy (Suen 2002). The success rate of 
strategic alliances is significantly lower compared to non-alliances. This discounts 
acquisitions and subsidiaries as they are different entities entirely (Das and Teng 1999).  
Das and Teng (1999, p.50) claimed that ‘although many firms have benefited from strategic 
alliances, many others have been disappointed by poor performance, and still more are 
sceptical about what an alliance could achieve for them. Strategic alliances are generally 
seen as a risky strategy whose success is often unrelated to an individual partner firm's 
efforts’.  Their case study highlighted that managing alliances is much more complicated 
and difficult than managing single firms because the partner firm also needs to be managed.  
There could be a variety of explanations for the termination of alliances: some of them 
could be related to exogenous factors and others to endogenous.	  External factors can 
include natural disasters or change in political policies. As regards internal factors, Ring 
and Van de Ven  (1994, p. 108) examined four reasons for the dissolution of cooperative 
interorganisational relationships: (a) excessive legal structuring and monitoring of the 
relationship, (b) conflict between roles and interpersonal behaviours of organisational 
parties, (c) conditions for violations of trust, and (d) escalating commitments to failing 
transactions.’ 
 
The failure rates and main reasons expressed by a variety of authors are summarised in the 
following table. 
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Table 2-1.- Failure rates 
Failure rate Main Reasons for Failure Author(s) 
30-70% Goals not met or expected 
benefits not realised 
Kale and Singh 2009 
>50% Misaligned incentives of 
self-interested agents 
Gulati et al. 2012 
50-60% Partners’ incompatibility Dacin  et al. 1997 
50-80% Not achieved objectives or 
not recovered financial costs 
(Bleeke and Ernst 1991) 
Various in Walter et al. 
2008 
High Unique risks inherent in 
strategic alliances 
Differences between 
partners objectives and 
opportunistic behaviour 
 
Das and Teng 1999 
 
Groot and Merchant, 2000; 
Dekker 2004, in Langfield-
Smith 2008 
Source: Adapted from various Authors. 
 
Despite failure rates for strategic alliances varying according to author, we have seen that 
they are high. The reasons for failure can be attributable to inherent risks in strategic 
alliances, incompatibility of partners’ objectives, the potential for opportunistic behaviour, 
self-interested goals or no implementation of the alliance strategy. Despite this, strategic 
alliances are on the rise and are going to be used more frequently. Given this, it is necessary 
to develop a greater understanding of the reasons for their failure. 
 
Themes raised in previous research into strategic alliances 
Various authors have reviewed the literature on strategic alliances (Lyons 1991, Parkhe 
1993, Robson et al. 2002, Combs and Ketchen 2003, Hillebrand and Biemans 2003, Combs 
et al. 2004, Petrovic et al 2006, Nippa et al. 2007, Street and Cameron 2007, Culpan 2009, 
Ren et al. 2009, Wassmer 2010, Meier 2011, Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos 2011, 
Christoffersen 2013, Shi et al. 2012, Gomes et al. 2014). Gomes et al. (2014), during his 
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22-year review of strategic alliance research in leading management journals, usefully 
categorised and identified the themes of research interest in the field. This is summarised in 
the following table: 
Table 2-2.- Previous research identified by Gomes (2014)  
Research 
Categories 
Themes Authors 
Pre-
agreement 
phase 
• Motives for collaboration, joint ventures as 
strategic choices, partner selection and 
negotiations and contract 
Doz, 1996; Doz et al. 
2000; Glaister & Buckley, 
1996; Parkhe, 1993b 
Post-
agreement 
phase 
• The effective management of alliances, 
cross cultural understanding and company 
performance 
Brouthers & Bamossy, 
2006; Buckley et al., 
2009; Christoffersen, 
2013; Lee et al., 2013; 
Luo, 2001; Reuer et al., 
2002; Slater and Robson, 
2012. 
Topical 
areas 
• Franchising or licensing Combs et al., 2011; 
Combs & Ketchen, 2003; 
Jiang, 2012; Shane, 1998; 
Xia, 2011 
• Strategic alliances and organisational 
strategy 
 
Datta et al., 2009; Nielsen 
& Gudergan, 2012; Poulis 
et al., 2012; Ripolle’s et 
al., 2012; Yu et al., 2013 
• The relationship between internal and 
external cooperation 
Hillebrand & Biemans, 
2003; Mudambi & 
Tallman, 2010; Stettner & 
Lavie, 2013 
• Small business alliances and networks 
 
Gulati et al., 2000; Koka 
& Prescott, 2008; Lee et 
al., 2012; Min & 
Mitsuhashi, 2012 
• Knowledge and learning 
 
Dussauge et al., 2000; 
Inkpen, 2000; Kale & 
Singh, 2007; Park & Lee, 
2012 
• Impact of governance on alliance Albers et al., 2013; 
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effectiveness 
 
Barkema et al., 1997; Lui 
& Ngo, 2012; Park & Lee, 
2012 
Emerging 
aspects 
• The temporal dimension Shi et al., 2011 
• Managing alliance portfolios 
 
Das & Teng, 2002; 
Vapola et al., 2010; 
Wassmer, 2010 
• Risk, trust and control 
 
Anderson et al., 2013; 
Costa e Silva et al., 2012; 
Das & Teng, 2001; 
Inkpen & Currall, 2004; 
Liu, 2012; Roy, 2012 
• Knowledge management 
 
Dyer & Hatch, 2006; 
Inkpen, 2008; Inkpen & 
Beamish, 1997; Kale et al. 
2000; Meier, 2011; 
Shenkar & Li, 1999; 
Simonin, 2004 
• Organisational justice 
 
Luo, 2005, 2008 
Started to 
receive 
more 
attention 
• Cultural understanding  Shi et al., 2012 
 
Source: Built from Gomes (2014) 
Gomes (2014) classified the evolution of the interest in strategic alliances research under 
five categories.  Earlier studies were interested in the pre-agreement phase of strategic 
alliances; interest then moved to the post-agreement phase, topical areas and emerging 
aspects.  More recently, cultural understanding is receiving more attention, although this 
literature is still fragmented. According to Gomes’ study sample the interest in alliance 
performance has been the second most popular topic of interest among researchers (11.3% 
of total) and is growing. Qualitative analysis as a method of research (15% of total) has 
been less common than quantitative research - 53% of the studies sample was empirical. 
More research has been conducted in the industrial  (35.7 %) and mostly developed on 
semi-conductors, automobiles, pharmaceuticals, bio-technology and electrical goods. The 
area of performance has also attracted a high level of interest among researchers, but very 
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little qualitative research has been conducted.  
However, before I analyse some of these themes, we need to define what we mean by 
strategic alliances. The following section discusses the various definitions of strategic 
alliances as found in the literature. 
Definition of Strategic Alliances 
The identification of a single definition of strategic alliances is a very challenging task. 
Authors define strategic alliances in different ways, and classifications on how to consider a 
strategic alliance varied. Some authors consider strategic alliances as different from joint 
ventures; some others saw joint ventures as part of the strategic alliance (Anderson 1990, 
Kale and Singh 2009). Furthermore, some authors introduced terms which expand the types 
of relations among organisations. For example, the term inter-organisational relationship 
includes strategic alliances, partnerships, coalitions, joint ventures, franchises, research 
consortia and various forms of network (Ring and Van de Ven  1994).  
Early studies differentiated strategic alliances and joint ventures. Anderson (1990) used the 
terms ‘joint venture’ and ‘strategic alliances’ separately. He defined ‘joint venture’ as ‘at 
least two companies pooling resources to create a new organisation’  (p.19), while strategic 
alliances were ‘long -term supply contracts and joint research and development’. Anderson 
argued that strategic alliances ‘while they do not create a separate business entity, have 
much in common with joint ventures. They can and should be evaluated in the same 
manner’ (p.29). It seems that, from Anderson’s perspective, the main difference between a 
joint venture and a strategic alliance is in the creation of a separate entity. However, he 
acknowledged a similarity in the characteristics of a joint venture and those of a strategic 
alliance. This implies that the principles of his study are applicable across both terms. The 
argument regarding the similarities between joint ventures and strategic alliances is 
considered relevant in order to allow an extension of the research for some areas of study - 
for example performance, where the main focus of research has been on joint ventures in 
the international arena.  
Broader definitions for strategic alliances are evident from the literature. Some authors 
refer to them as collaborations involving the participation of multiple firms (at least two) or 
setting a long-term commitment of resources in the alliance with the purpose of achieving 
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strategic goals (Christoffersen 2013). Others stress knowledge or resource-sharing.  For 
example, Gulati (1995, cited in Kale and Singh 2009 p. 46) described a strategic alliance as 
one that ‘involves the exchange, sharing, or co-development of resources or capabilities to 
achieve mutually relevant benefits’.  Similarly, Das and Ten (1999) suggested that strategic 
alliances were ‘inter-firm cooperative agreements with the purpose of achieving 
competitive advantage for the partners’ (p. 50). Porter (1986) used the term ‘coalitions’ to 
describe alliances as a way to bring competitors together to coordinate or share value 
chains, thus broadening the scope of the chain to the benefit of the parties involved.  
In defining joint ventures, Contractor and Lorange (1988) claimed that the joint venture 
‘often implies the creation of a separate corporation, whose stock is shared by two or more 
partners, each expecting a proportional share of dividends as compensation’ (p. 7). They 
also acknowledged that some firms could develop joint activities without creating a new 
entity, agreeing instead on the governance mechanisms to allocate tasks, costs, and 
revenues. Nippa et al (2009) defined international joint ventures as cooperative 
arrangements between at least two parties from different countries. 
Joint ventures have also been considered under a broader classification. Oliver (1990) 
defined interorganisational relations as ‘enduring transactions flows, and linkages that 
occur among or between an organization and one or more organizations in its environment’ 
(p. 241). She went on to identify six types: trade associations, agency federations, joint 
ventures, social service joint programs, corporate-financial interlocks and agency-sponsor 
linkages. 
 Some authors have connected the term ‘strategic’ with the duration of the alliance. Shapiro 
(1985, cited in Glaister and Buckley 1996, p. 303) gave meaning to the term strategic ‘in 
the sense that strategic decisions involve long-lasting commitments as distinct from tactical 
decisions which are short terms responses to current environment’.  
The definition of strategic alliances has evolved over time; there is no a single standard 
definition, authors have different perceptions of the meaning. Moreover Bleeke and Ernst 
(1991) argued that all alliances are different from each other. Considering the various 
definitions of strategic alliances from the literature, and for the purpose of this thesis it can 
be argued that strategic alliances are collaborative agreements made by at least two firms 
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for the purpose of achieving goals through common interest.  
The following section will discuss the various types of strategic alliances found in the 
literature. 
Types of Strategic Alliances 
Different theoretical approaches have been utilised to study preferences in the selection of 
governance structures. These include transaction cost economics, social exchange, resource 
dependence, strategic behaviour, bargaining theory and the resource-based view (Das and 
Teng, 2001). Various authors have attempted to develop typologies of strategic alliances. 
Early studies, such as the one developed by Contractor and Lorange (1988), categorised 
them under the term ‘cooperative arrangements’, where the range spanned a spot 
transaction to a merger. The legal form and the strategic impact on the global operations of 
the partners were also used as a basis for differentiation. Among these arrangements were 
technical training/start-up assistance agreements, production/assembly/buy back 
agreements, patent licensing, franchising, know-how licensing, managements/marketing 
service agreement, non-equity cooperative agreement in exploration, research partnership 
and development/coproduction and equity joint venture. Joint R&D and product 
development are considered as intensive alliances (Kummar 1998, p. 365). Dacin, et al., 
(1997) suggested that within strategic alliances, both equity and non-equity joint ventures 
are considered collaboration agreements in manufacturing, marketing, distribution, and 
research and development. 
There are different opinions as to how strategic alliances should be classified and whether 
mergers and acquisitions are considered as strategic alliances. Porter (1986, p.315) claimed 
that ‘coalitions are long-term alliances with other firms that fall short of outright merger, 
such as joint ventures, licenses and supply agreements’. Ariño (1998, p.323) considered 
strategic alliances as within ‘the extremes of a spot market contract and a merger or 
acquisition’. Bleeke and Ernst (1991) suggested that acquisitions are a more effective 
choice when growing core businesses, but when expanding into new geographic regions or 
new businesses, cross border alliances perform better. The rational is that when partners 
develop business in the same market, conflict can result due to competitive interests (Borys 
and Jemison 1989). Most scholars consider that acquisitions are not strategic alliances 
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because of the difference in control, ownership, and independence of the firms involved 
(Kale and Singh 2009). However, Borys and Jemison (1989) coined the term ‘hybrid’ to 
refer to agreements where resources or governance structures are used from at least two 
organisations; these authors developed a typology of five, among them mergers and 
acquisitions and joint ventures. There is some diversity shown in literature in categorising 
mergers and acquisitions as strategic alliances. For the purpose of this research, and taking 
scholarly opinion into account, mergers and acquisitions will not be considered as strategic 
alliances. 
Buckley (1992, cited in Glaister and Buckley, 1996 p. 301) defined an alliance as an ‘inter-
firm collaboration over a given economic space and time for the attainment of mutually 
defined goals’. Contrary to the conventional view, Glaister and Buckley (1996) claimed 
that alliances excluded some inter-firm co-operative forms (such as licensing and 
franchising) because parties had disparate goals. Some other authors classified strategic 
alliances as joint ventures, licensing agreements, distribution and supply agreements, 
research and development partnerships, and technical exchanges (Inkpen and Currall 2004). 
Hennart (1988, cited in Dussauge et al., 2004 p. 701-2) developed a typology for strategic 
alliances in terms of scale and link. Scale alliances are related by similar contributions 
along the value chain in order to achieve economies of scale which can be joint R&D, and 
joint production. Partners in link alliances contribute different skills and resources, for 
example in market alliances a partner gains access to a market bringing different products. 
In his review of the literature, Dussage et al., (2004) when looking at scale and link 
alliances, concluded that volatility is less for the former.  
Some authors have developed a more simplistic typology for strategic alliances. For 
instance Culpan (2009) divides them into and non-equity equity alliances. Here, equity 
alliances could be joint ventures or block equity ownership and non-equity alliances is a 
generic term which accommodates various types of alliances. Culpan also classifies them 
according to the number of participating partners; dyadic relationships involve two partners 
and multiple relationships involve more than two. Culpan usefully illustrates this in the 
following figure 
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Figure 2-1.- Strategic alliances among partners 
 Equity commitments Non-equity commitments 
 
 
Dyadic Relationships 
• Joint ventures with two 
partners 
• Equity block ownership 
• Licensing 
• Franchising 
• Supplier agreements 
• Outsourcing 
• R&D Partnership 
• Marketing partnership 
Multiple relationships • Joint ventures with 
multiple partnership 
• Networks community of 
firms 
Source: Culpan 2009 
The commitment dimension refers to the amount of equity allocated by partners. Network 
alliances are developed when multiple firms share resources in order to achieve a common 
goal. (Culpan 2009) 
Das and Teng (2001) claimed that one of the key features of strategic alliances is the type 
of governance structure which can be applied to cater for differences. He usefully classified 
the most typical strategic alliances into the following types (See Table 2-3).  
Table 2-3.- Common types of strategic alliances  
Kind of alliance Alliance type Description 
Equity alliances (1) Joint venture A separately incorporated entity jointly owned 
by the partners.  
(2) Minority equity 
alliance 
 
The terms of the alliance include an acquisition 
of equity shares, by either one or more partners. 
Bilateral contract 
based alliances 
(3a) Joint 
production 
The partners share manufacturing 
responsibilities and supply each other with 
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 products that are marketed by the partners under 
their own brand names (Yoshino and Rangan, 
1995, p. 135). 
(3b) Joint 
marketing and 
promotion 
 
The partners market the same product under the 
same or different brand names. 
(3c) Joint R&D The partners combine their R&D efforts and 
share the rights to the product/service. 
(3d) Enhanced 
supplier 
partnership 
 
The supplier not only provides a particular type 
or line of goods/services, but also becomes an 
integral part of buyer's operation through 
extensive cooperation. A higher level of 
reciprocal interdependence than the traditional 
buyer-supplier relationship (Borys and Jemison, 
1989, p. 246). 
Unilateral 
contract-based 
alliances 
(4a) R&D contract 
 
One partner provides funds to another partner for 
specified R&D activities, and in return receives 
or shares market rights to the resulting 
product/service. 
(4b) Licensing 
agreement 
 
An agreement ‘by which one firm buys the right 
to use an asset for a period of time…, typically 
involve a narrow purpose and limited time 
frame…’ (Borys and Jemison, 1989, p. 245). 
Source: Das and Teng (2001) 
Das and Teng developed this typology to expand beyond the conventional classification of 
equity alliances and non-equity alliances. They defined unilateral contract-based alliances 
‘when there are well-defined transfer of property rights… the key feature of these alliances 
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is that individual firms carry out their obligations independently of each other.’ (p. 15). On 
the other hand, bilateral contract-based alliances ‘involve the sustained joint creation of 
property and knowledge for the partners, requiring them to bring in resources and work 
together on a constant basis… these alliances require partners to put in resources and work 
together constantly’ (p. 15-16). One of the main differences between unilateral and bilateral 
alliances is the level of integration; in the unilateral based alliance integration is lower. 
The following diagram illustrates the various forms of strategic alliances according to Das 
and Teng. 
Figure 2-2.- Types of strategic alliances  
 
Source: Adapted from Das & Teng 2001  
Thus it can be seen that while most researchers classify strategic alliances according to their 
legal form, others examine them from a strategy perspective. The legal form is influenced 
by both the competitive conditions and by the conditions faced in a foreign market (legal 
and tax considerations). There is no simple relationship between the legal form and the goal 
a strategic alliance wishes to achieve; the legal form does not tell us too much about the 
contribution of a partner (for instance cash, staffing, management, knowledge, among 
others) (Porter 1986). On the other hand, the organisational form is critical to the strategic 
alliance’s evolution and performance; the structural choice supports coordination, learning 
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and trust in the alliance (Albers et al., 2013). Moreover, the selection of a strategic 
alliance’s form is part of a strategy formulation process which is influenced by subjective 
forces, such as behavioural, political and emotional elements (Das and Teng 2001).  
Das and Teng (2001) suggested that the selection of the form was also influenced by the 
perception of relational and performance risk, where relational risk is related to the 
probability and consequences that a partner does not behave according to expectations and 
performance risk is concerned with the probability and consequences of not achieving the 
strategic objectives, even if the partner cooperates, due the external environment. These 
authors suggested that the level of engagement, in terms of equity and investment, 
differentiates the type of alliance. Joint ventures and minority-equity alliances, being a 
more engaging form, require more investment and are more difficult to end because of the 
amount of commitment and cost involved. On the other hand, in unstable markets it seems 
that non-equity alliances could have an advantage due to their greater flexibility, and 
because it is easier to reconfigure or terminate them (Varadarajan and Cunnigham 1995). 
In the petroleum industry, the fiscal consequences influence the selection of an appropriate 
structure. In international petroleum agreements, operations are usually developed in the 
form of a joint venture. Companies from particular countries carefully determine the 
structure to avoid the joint venture being considered as a taxable entity in terms of a 
corporation or a tax partnership. For example, American companies seek to maximise 
deductions and the creation of joint operating agreements are preferable to an incorportated 
legal entity (Duval et al., 2009). 
Strategic alliances in the form of joint ventures are frequently developed in the oil and gas 
industry. In general there are three types of joint ventures - the full asset joint venture the 
full business joint venture and the marketing alliance. Full asset is usually in the upstream 
section of the value chain and organisations ally to obtain or develop specific assets. 
Among the assets that could be included are fields, pipelines, refineries and LNG projects. 
Full business joint ventures seek to combine resources to create marketing, supply chain, 
production and scale synergies. These are usually developed upstream by oil field services 
companies, but can also take place in midstream, downstream and in the chemicals 
industries. A marketing alliance is a joint venture with the sole purpose of marketing 
products, such as in motor fuel retailers and convenience stores (Ernst and Young 2011). 
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As can be appreciated from the literature related to types of strategic alliances, there are 
different perceptions among authors on how to classify strategic alliances. The chosen form 
influences the relationship among partners, thus potentially influencing the performance of 
the strategic alliances. The following section discusses the motives and rationale to embark 
on strategic alliances. 
Motives for the Formation of Strategic Alliances 
The question regarding reasons for forming strategic alliances can be addressed from 
different points of view. In one of the earliest studies of joint international business 
ventures, Friedmann and Kalmanoff (1961) identified the motives underlying entering into 
a joint venture. These included ‘the achievement of capital savings and the reduction of 
risks, the obtaining of management skills and the maintenance of employee morale, the 
facilitating of sale, the improvements of government relations, and the achievement of good 
public relations’ (p. 2). Tomlinson (1970) discussed the ideologies for and against the 
development of joint ventures, exposing what authors described at the time as the 
‘simpliste’ school. Under this doctrine, where freedom was of primary importance a joint 
venture should not be developed. On the other hand philanthropists and developmental 
idealists favour joint ventures on the basis of their openness to promote international 
cooperation. A third school, named the strategic pragmatists, emphasised the rationality of 
engaging in joint ventures. This school highlighted their benefits, in terms of market 
penetration or development, international integration, and an adequate return of investment.  
Later studies pointed out that the idea of cooperation was largely neglected, despite the fact 
that cooperation and competition were options in corporate strategy. The traditional 
position tended towards the sole pursuit of organisational strategy, thus relegating 
cooperation to a ‘second best’ option for larger firms.  Cooperation was enforced by 
‘external mandates such as government investment laws or to cross protectionist entry 
barriers in developing and regulated markets’ (Contractor & Lorange, 1988, p. 3). As the 
use of strategic alliances increased, they were perceived as a vehicle by which to enter 
markets more quickly, achieve economies of scale and gain competitive advantage (Larsson 
1998). This section presents theoretical explanations that have been used to understand the 
motives for entering strategic alliances, the motives identified in the literature and, finally, 
the link between theory and motive. 
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Theoretical explanations of motives for entering strategic alliances 
There are various theoretical approaches that help us understand the motivation of firms in 
entering a strategic alliance.   Building on the work of Varadarajan & Cunnigham (1995) 
and other authors who have studied motives in this area, I have summarised the theoretical 
approaches in Table 2-4 below. 
 
Table 2-4.- Theories of motives for forming strategic alliances  
Theoretical perspective Features Key Author(s) 
Domesticated Markets 
(DM) 
As an attempt to influence the firms’ 
environment (main advantage of 
domesticated markets: reduction of 
uncertainty of operations, reduction of 
transactional costs, synergy of 
combining complementary operations) 
(Arndt 1979) 
Market Attractiveness and 
Organisational Power 
(Transaction cost, strategic 
behaviour and 
organisational theory) (MA 
& OP) 
Motivations for establishing 
cooperative relations could be due to 
the following factors: i) evasion of 
small numbers bargaining and 
opportunism, asset specificity result in 
high switching costs (based on 
transaction cost theory), ii) 
enhancement of competitive positions 
(based on strategic theory), iii) transfer 
of organizational knowledge 
(organizational theory) 
(Kogut 1988); 
(Williamson, 1981)  
Interorganisational 
Exchange Behaviour and 
Resource Dependency (IEB 
& RD) 
Organisations need from each other 
because few are self sufficient with 
respect to critical resources; this 
consideration drives organizations to 
depend on each other through 
(Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978) 
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cooperation. 
Interorganisational 
relatioships (IOR) 
There are six determinants for 
collaboration: necessity, asymmetry, 
reciprocity, efficiency, stability, and 
legitimacy. 
 
(Oliver 1990) 
Resource Based View 
(RBV) 
It links the resources and sustained 
competitive advantage. Firms should 
bring into the strategic alliance 
resources that improve efficiency 
and/or effectiveness.  
(Barney 1991) 
Source: built from various authors 
Domestic markets are administered markets that are conducted by inter-organisational 
systems such as conglomerates, franchising, vertical and horizontal integration, joint 
ventures, joint product development and marketing contracts, joint physical distribution 
plans and labour-management peace agreements. In these markets, transactions are 
conducted inside a company, or group of companies, who are bound by a long-term 
agreement. The motivation to enter a domestic market is in order to gain control over 
supply and demand. At the same time, cooperative schemes allow gaining economies of 
scale and take advantage of excess capacity ‘by sharing resources in production, access to 
supplies, distribution, financing, and general management. Moreover, membership in a 
cooperating group is an alternative to large corporate size for realizing political economies 
of scale to shape and control markets and influence government’ (Arndt, 1979 p. 71).  
However, there is also a risk of eliciting anti-trust issues.   
Transaction cost theory differs from strategic behaviour in terms of the objectives of firms. 
The objective of transaction cost theory is to minimise production and transaction costs, 
whereas the objective of strategic behaviour is to maximise profits by improving the 
competitive position of a firm  (Kogut 1988). The transaction cost approach involves three 
levels of analysis applicable when studying organisations. Firstly, the overall structure of 
the organisation determines the scope of operations and their inter-relatedness. Secondly, 
the analysis focuses on the operating parts. It identifies the activities that need to be 
performed, and the rationale to develop these either within or outside the organisation. In 
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other words, the operating boundary of the organisation. Thirdly, where in the organisation 
human resources are deployed (Williamson 1981).  Organisational knowledge and learning 
can contribute to understanding the motivation for strategic alliances outside economic 
bases, where organisations come together in order to exchange or facilitate knowledge. 
(Kogut 1988) 
Inter-organisational Exchange Behaviour and Resource Dependency are based on the 
principle that an organisation is not self-sufficient. Support, therefore, to cover deficiencies 
has to come from its environment. Dependency derives from the lack of control and 
presence of uncertainty in achieving desired outcomes by an organisation. Thus, there is a 
need for organisations to coordinate and cooperate to achieve their mutual goals. 
Interdependence is not constant among organisations and changes over time. Dependence 
on a partner is based on three factors: the importance of the resource, the amount of 
discretion over the resource from an interested party and, finally, the number of alternatives 
available for the interested group. The importance of the resource has two dimensions - the 
relative magnitude of the exchange and the criticality of the resource for each organisation. 
Discretion over the resource is based on the capacity to decide the distribution or use of a 
resource, in other words, the amount of control which can be exercised over the resource. 
This could be through possession, access, actual use and who actually controls the resource  
(Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). From the resource dependence perspective, strategic alliances 
are developed as a way of minimising risk and uncertainty (Das and Teng 2001). 
The theoretical perspective of interorganisational relationships has a broader classification. 
This classification includes joint ventures and departs from the assumption that there is a 
trend towards an increasing connection among organisations; thus, the performance of an 
individual organisation is dependent upon the ties developed with other organisations. 
There are six contingencies that are considered critical for the formation of inter-
organisational relationships: necessity, asymmetry, reciprocity, efficiency, stability and 
legitimacy. Necessity to comply with law, regulation or mandates from authorities. 
Asymmetry refers to the power that can be exercised over other organisations. Reciprocity 
promotes cooperation, coordination and collaboration in the search for a common benefit. 
Efficiency is more internally oriented, and is a way for an organisation to improve its 
operations. Stability is considered as a way to deal with uncertainty through developing 
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relationships with other organisations. Legitimacy is related to being in harmony with 
norms, rules, beliefs or expectations of other stakeholders. All these contingencies could 
interact as imperatives for an organisation to pursue the development of strategic alliances 
(Oliver 1990). 
The resourced-based view considers the assumption that a firm’s resources may be 
heterogeneous and immobile. It assumes that these resources are valuable (improves 
efficiency and effectiveness), rare, imperfectly imitable and have no substitutes. By 
acquiring these attributes firms can develop a sustainable competitive advantage (Barney, 
1991).  Caves (1980, cited in Wernerfelt 1984, p. 172) defined resources as the tangible or 
intangible assets that are part of a firm during a certain time. These assets can include 
brands, knowledge, human resources, commercial contracts, equipment, procedures and 
capital, amongst other things. Eisenhard & Schoonhover (1996, cited in Park et al., 2004 p. 
9) argued that resources from partners in an alliance could be a source of competitive 
advantage.  
These theories are based on different drivers for alliance formation, which are: market 
uncertainty, increased efficiency, resource dependency, skill and resource heterogeneity 
and imperfect factor markets. However, the common factor, as suggested by Varadarajan 
and Cunnigham (1995), is the pursue of competitive advantage.  
An organisation has a competitive advantage ‘when it is implementing a value creating 
strategy not simultaneously being implemented by any current or potential competitor’ 
(Barney, 1991 p. 102). Competitive advantage is the value a firm can create over and above 
the cost of developing a product or service. Porter’s (1985) classic analysis initially 
identified two basic types of competitive advantage: cost leadership and differentiation. He 
argued that competitive advantage could be achieved by coordinating value chains in 
related industries through interrelationships. The firm has two choices in achieving a 
broader scope - either in developing it internally or in forming coalitions with other firms 
(Porter 1985).  
Some authors believed that organisations enter strategic alliances in the search for 
competitive advantage  (Larsson et al., 1998) and acknowledged that strategic alliances are 
not new. However, there is a renewed interest in this topic due to the development of global 
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markets (Langfield-Smith 2008). Strategic alliances have become increasingly important as 
part of a firm’s portfolio of strategies and as a source of competitive advantage (Suen 
2002). They facilitate the management of uncertainty in a better way than their competitors, 
exploring new business and developing new resources which limit risk in investments 
(Hoffmann 2007). Alliances are, therefore, a way to extract greater value from the market 
place (Shah and Swaminathan 2008).  
 
Strategic alliances have become prolific as methods of inter-organisational partnership. 
They enable firms to cope with the increasing complexity of learning and of building new 
sources of competitive advantage to compete successfully in the global economy (Lei 1997; 
Walter et al. 2008). Companies engage in strategic alliances to accomplish growth and 
develop competitive advantage. Their competitive position is positively affected by 
increasing efficiencies, accessing new or critical resources or capabilities and by gaining 
access to new markets (Kale and Singh 2009). 
The literature also cites other reasons for the formation of strategic alliances. Research has 
shown that entering international markets has become one of the most common reasons to 
develop strategic alliances (Dacin, et al. 1997). Strategic alliances allow access to required 
capabilities, gaining knowledge and seeking competitive advantage (Cummings and 
Holmberg 2012). For example, in the pharmaceutical industry accessing capabilities is key 
to success (Diestre and Rajagopalan 2012). The acquisition of knowledge is another reason 
to enter into a strategic alliance; organisations form intensive alliances (R&D) to develop 
their capabilities and aid economic value creation (Kummar and Nti 1998).  
Strategic alliances can be an attractive option when concern centres around relevant costs, 
the time it takes to develop internal capabilities and the risks associated with mergers and 
acquisitions (Cummings and Holmberg 2012). Among the reasons for formation are the 
reduction of risk, the search for economies of scale, technology, the market and as reaction 
to government pressure (Porter 1986). 
 
Advantages of having various alliances can be the use of shared resources without having 
to make sizeable investment in order to grow (Hoffmann 2007).  The motives to enter into 
cooperation are to share investment risk or to pursue a variety of operational, commercial, 
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technological or reputational benefits (Gulati et al. 2012). Reasons for collaboration can be 
related to accessing new technologies, facing competition, the need to focus on core 
business, risk sharing and market opportunities (Akintoye and Main 2007). 
 
Other reasons to form an alliance are: product development, market access and power and 
learning. Advantages include time to market; lower cost; inexpensive and flexible 
acquisition of required competences; access to distribution channels; and customer 
intelligence (Callahan and MacKenzie 1999).  The motivation is to improve 
competitiveness and to access complementary competencies that are difficult and time-
consuming to achieve alone (Langfield-Smith 2008). 
 
Some strategic motives are also identified, such as: risk sharing, product rationalisation and 
economies of scale, the transfer of complementary technology or exchange patents, 
manipulating competition, to conform to host government policy, to facilitate international 
expansion and vertical linkages. A relationship between the motives to enter a strategic 
alliance and its contractual form has not been found (Glaister & Buckley 1996). Other 
authors have mentioned knowledge as a motive to form a strategic alliance, in terms of the 
creation, transfer or combination of knowledge among partners (Meier 2011). 
In the energy sector, the most common reason to develop strategic alliances (mainly in 
large projects) is to share risk. However sometimes political motivations could exist as way 
to provide an insurance policy which ensures the successful development of a project. For 
example, Total selected partners in Iran as a way of reducing political risk. More and more, 
alliances are developed between international and national companies (IFP 2004). 
I have developed the following table in an attempt to link theories for alliance formation, 
different authors’ views and motives. 
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Table 2-5.- Classification of motives according to different theories 
 
Formation motives Author Theoretical fit 
DM MA& 
OP 
IEB 
&RD 
IOR RBV 
Entering to international 
markets 
Dacin et al. 1997 
 
 X    
Development of the 
global markets, improve 
competitiveness 
Langfield-Smith 2008  X X  X 
Accessing needed 
capabilities, gaining 
knowledge and seeking 
competitive advantage 
Cummings and 
Holmberg 2012 
 
 
X X X X X 
Firm’s portfolio 
strategy, source of 
competitive advantage 
Suen 2002 X X   X 
Mimetic pressures DiMaggio and Powell 
1983 
 X    
Pace of technological 
developments, access to 
new technologies, fierce 
competition, focus on 
core business, risk 
sharing and market 
opportunities 
Akintoye and Main 
2007 
X X X X  
Manage uncertainty, 
explore new business 
and develop new 
resources 
Hoffman 2007 
 
 
X X  X X 
Share investment risk, 
pursue benefits 
Gulati et al. 2012 X X  X X 
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Product development, 
market access and 
power, learning 
Callahan and MacKezie 
1999 
X X  X X 
Build new sources of 
competitive advantage, 
compete successfully in 
the global economy 
Lei et al., 1997 in 
Walter et al., 2008 
 X   X 
Increase efficiencies, 
access resources and 
new markets 
Kale and Singh 2009  X X  X 
Source: Adapted from various authors 
However, it is worth noting that the reasons to enter strategic alliances, as claimed by 
different authors, could be grounded in more than one theory. Kogut (1988) acknowledged 
that perspectives of transaction costs, strategic behaviour and organisational learning could 
explain the motivation to form joint ventures, but at the same time these reasons could 
overlap. Assuming that the main goal for alliance formation is to achieve a competitive 
advantage (as Varadarajan and Cunnigham (1995) suggested) the common link for a 
theoretical fit would be based in its pursuit. 
 
In the energy sector, one of the most common reasons for alliance is to share the risks in 
large projects. However, political motives are also important. Certain partners can be an 
‘insurance policy’ and increase the chances of success. For example, Total chose to partner 
in Iran primarily because of economic reasons, but also to reduce political risk. Strategic 
alliances are a way of acquiring new skills and gaining access to sectors or countries. In 
recent years, the dynamic of alliances between international corporations and national 
companies has increased in oil-producing countries (IFP 2004). 
Alliances in the oil and gas industry have been searching for competitive advantage through 
different strategies such as economies of scale, economies of scope and as a way to control 
costs. Strategic alliances are not new in the energy sector - several examples are seen in the 
industry’s history, such as when BP and Mobil combined operations in Europe to reduce 
costs and develop synergies and when Texaco and Shell Oil combined their refining 
operations in the USA in a joint venture   (Das and Teng 1999). 
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In order to understand how the process of forming strategic alliances has been studied and 
developed, the next section presents a review of the literature pertaining to stages of 
strategic alliances. 
 
Stages of Strategic Alliances 
The literature points to the existence of a number of different stages in the development of a 
strategic alliance. Specific problems are faced at each of these stages, which acknowledge 
the evolving nature of the alliance process. While researchers agree that alliances do have 
different stages, there is no a common understanding on these (Jiang 2008). Furthermore, 
the question as to how the process of development of strategic alliances occurs has not 
received much attention from researchers, focussing instead on the antecedents’ conditions 
or structural properties of strategic alliances. Transaction cost and agency theory has been 
used to compare alternative transaction governance structures. Through organisational 
sociologists, attention has been turned towards explaining the formation and structure of 
strategic alliances. They have examined environmental conditions and contingent factors 
and left aside the opportunity to go beyond the understanding of inputs, structure and 
outputs. An understanding of the process of strategic alliances has therefore not been 
developed, thus ignoring the implications for performance and the influence in motivations 
and decisions on the continuation of strategic alliances along its life cycle (Ring and Van de 
Ven, 1994).  
While some scholars have acknowledged the relevance of the sociological and dynamics 
aspects of collaboration, there has not been much attention paid to developing research on 
the evolution of strategic alliances. Different models, including strategic alliances, have 
been developed in order to explain the process of inter-organisational relationships, such as 
those by Ring and Van de Ven (1994), Doz (1996), Ariño and De la Torre (1998), Larsson 
et al. (1998) and Kumar and Nti (1998). The following table summarises some of the 
models found in the literature and taken as a reference to analyse the different stages and 
interests of researchers in their development. 
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Table 2-6.- Models of alliance in the literature 
Authors Approach 
Ring and Van de Ven 
(1994) 
Formal, legal and informal social-
psychological processes 
Doz (1996) Process of learning 
Ariño and De la Torre 
(1998) 
Departed from Ring and Van de Ven (1994) 
and Doz (1996) 
Larsson et al (1998) Organisational learning, collective action and 
game theory 
Kummar and Nti (1998) Partners’ interaction and absorptive 
capacities 
Das and Teng (1999) Risk management 
Jiang et al (2008) Stability 
Kale and Singh (2009) Success factors 
 
The main characteristics of these models are described in the following paragraphs. Jiang et 
al’s and Kale and Singh’s models are presented in more detail as, in my view, the 
description of their stages covers the full cycle of the alliance process. These stages are also 
used as a reference to elaborate on the challenges that face alliances during the process. 
Ring and Van de Ven (1994) proposed a cyclical model based on formal, legal and informal 
social-psychological processes which argues that strategic alliances do not follow a 
sequential model. The authors proposed three stages: negotiations, commitments and 
execution, all three connected to assessment based on efficiency and equity. They claimed 
that strategic alliances are maintained through a balance of formal and informal processes. 
In acknowledging that their propositions required further elaboration, they considered the 
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attributes of different contexts where strategic alliances are developed. These included firm 
strategy, industry structures and the stage in technology and product life cycle. They also 
acknowledged that context is more complex for international strategic alliances due to 
differences in factors such as culture and language. Ring and Van de Ven did not elaborate 
on the conditions where outcomes were considered efficient and equitable (Ariño 1998).  
Doz (1996) developed a framework to analyse the evolution of strategic alliances which 
was based on the process of learning from a grounded theory approach. His model 
considered four evolutionary cycles: initial conditions (task definition, partners’ routines, 
interface structures, expectations of performance, behaviour and motives); learning 
(environment, task, process, skills, goals); re-evaluation (efficiency, equity and 
adaptability); and revised conditions (review of the initial conditions).  Doz concluded that 
successful alliances were highly evolutionary and had a sequence of interactive cycles of 
learning, revaluation and readjustment; conversely, alliances that failed were highly 
inertial, with little learning.  
Ariño and De la Torre (1998) proposed a model of collaboration in inter-organisational 
arrangements based on the previous work of Ring and Van de Ven (1994) and Doz (1996). 
This cyclical model considered four stages: initial conditions (negotiation and 
commitment), execution (learning), re-evaluation (efficiency and equity) and revision 
(negotiation and commitment). Initial conditions were defined as the outcome of 
negotiation and commitment; efficiency as ‘if there is no other alternative arrangement that 
would leave one party better off without the other being worse off’ (p. 307); equity 
conditions as being when reciprocity agreements are achieved. The authors stated that a 
company would continue in an alliance as long as it was perceived that conditions of 
efficiency and equity were met.  
Larsson et al (1998), interested in contributing to the advancement of understanding how 
the process of learning develops in strategic alliances, developed a framework. This dealt 
with the dilemma between being a good partner and winning the ‘race to learn’ and also 
with the trade-offs between collective learning and how the outcomes of this learning are 
shared among partners. This learning enhanced the understanding of failure and success in 
strategic alliances. The authors believed that the learning process influences the 
performance of strategic alliances. Based on Hamel’s work (1991) on the receptivity and 
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transparency dimensions of interpartner learning and on Thomas’s (1976) conflict 
behaviour model, the authors developed a typology of five strategies. These were: 
collaboration (highly receptive and highly transparent); competition (highly receptive and 
non-transparent); compromise (moderately receptive and transparent); accommodation 
(non-receptive and highly transparent); and avoidance (neither receptive nor transparent). 
Here, ‘receptive’ refers to the absorption of knowledge and ‘transparency’ to the openness 
toward partners. The framework is based on the theories of organisational learning, 
collective action and game theory. The authors did not incorporate partner selection issues 
in their framework in order to simplify their analysis.  
Kummar and Nti (1998) proposed a dynamic model based on the interaction among 
partners. The authors were interested in examining the implications of firms’ differences in 
absorptive capacities in intensive alliances (joint R&D and product development) where the 
objective was ‘to create economic value and acquire knowledge to enhance competencies’ 
(p365). The model considered the pattern of interaction connected to the discrepancies in 
outcomes and processes. It also fedback from discrepancies to patterns of interaction. The 
pattern of internal interaction was composed by the collaborative strategies chosen by the 
partners in addition to the managerial mechanisms implemented to control the alliance.  
Das and Teng (1999) developed a framework based on risk management and how it 
impacts performance. The authors identified two components for risk - relational risk (in 
terms of commitment and opportunistic behaviour) and performance risk (failure, despite 
commitment, because of internal or external factors). They suggested four stages of alliance 
management: selecting partners, structuring the alliance, operating the alliance, and 
evaluating the alliance. Partners were selected by analysing the risk emanating from the 
strategic resource fit. Structuring the alliance was developed by considering the risk from 
the balance between flexibility and rigidity. Operating the alliance looked at the risk from 
the balance between cooperation and competition. The evaluation stage was related to the 
risk of the balance between short term and long term orientation. The authors proposed that, 
if there was not a good fit in the selection of partners, it was better not to pursue the 
alliance. If there was not balance among the components in the other stages, alliances 
would be driven to perform poorly. 
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Jiang et al (2008) proposed a dynamic model which focussed on the dimension of stability 
(see Figure 2-4) - in doing so, the authors considered the previous work of Das and Teng 
(1999). Jiang et al defined stability as ‘the degree to which an alliance can run and develop 
successfully based on an effective collaborative relationship shared by all partners’ (p. 
178). I have enhanced this diagram by adding an arrow with the text ‘Decide to go for a 
strategic alliance’. This is to illustrate that, prior to the life cycle of a strategic alliance, a 
decision process has to be developed as to whether or not to enter a strategic alliance. I 
considered it was important to include the decision process to enter a strategic alliance as 
relevant in order to understand the rational of the alliance. The diagram also includes some 
arrows moving backwards in order to indicate a dynamic process where stages have to be 
reviewed to take changes during the development of the strategic alliance into account.  
Figure 2-3.- Stages in strategic alliances 
Source: Adapted from Jiang 2008 
The above diagram illustrates the four stages considered by Jiang et al. The partner 
selection stage is considered to be critical - it searches for resource complementarity among 
partners, assesses their reputation in terms of fairness and performance and their track 
record where previous experience with partners facilitates relationships. The structuring 
and negotiation stage relates to the selection of the form of governance in terms of equity. 
Equity influences the behaviour of partners. For complex relationships, where there is an 
increased risk of opportunistic behaviour, it is suggested that alliance scope should deal 
with the number of activities to be developed in the alliance and that division of labour 
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demands a clear allocation of roles and responsibilities. In the implementation stage, 
evolutionary factors can have a critical influence on the outcome of the alliance and 
relational and performance risks can emerge. Relationship management has to be promoted 
to maintain the development of the alliance, encouraging cooperation and diminishing 
conflict. Control mechanisms are employed as a tool to organise, coordinate and regulate 
the dynamics of the alliance. Performance evaluation, where the assessment of objectives 
takes place, is the final stage. I will elaborate more on performance in the next section 
(performance evaluation, page 46).  
An alternative way to understand the stages of strategic alliance is to look at what have 
been seen as the key success factors in evaluating the successful completion of each stage.  
Kale and Singh (2009) identified a number of such factors important to consider in the 
evolution of the strategic alliance.  These include factors: in the formation phase, where a 
firm decide to enter into a strategic alliance and therefore select a partner; in the design 
phase, where the partners agree the appropriate governance; and in the post formation 
phase, where the alliance is managed in order to realise value. The stages are illustrated in 
the following figure. 
Figure 2-4.-  Key success factors 
	
Source: Kale and Singh (2009)  
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The stage of alliance formation, as related to partner selection, has been the subject of 
extensive research. It has three elements - partner complementarity (resource contribution 
to the alliance), partner compatibility (working styles and cultures) and partner commitment 
(willingness to allocate resources in uncertain environments). The alliance design phase 
deals with choice and implementation of the governance; equity sharing or ownership 
(alignment of interest through equity, hierarchical supervision, share returns); contractual 
provisions (mutual rights and obligations, limit information, termination provisions); and 
reliance governance (reduce transaction costs through trust, less monitoring needed and 
flexibility in adaptation). Post-formation alliance management, coordination mechanisms 
(managing interdependence through programming, hierarchy and feedback); development 
of trust and relational capital. Trust has two components, one structural related to 
opportunistic behaviour and prevented through shared equity or contractual agreements and 
the second component behavioural related with the confidence in a partner (Kale and Singh 
2009). 
As previously discussed, some authors have attempted to develop models to understand and 
represent the dynamics of strategic alliances. There have been moves towards recognizing 
the dynamics and evolutionary nature of alliances; however, no common understanding of 
the stages of strategic alliances exists. The next subsection presents suggested 
considerations during the stages. For this purpose, Jiang et al and Kale and Singh’s models 
are used in a complementary form, as illustrated in the following figure. 
Figure 2-5.- Stages of alliances revisited 
 
Considerations during the process 
 
Partner selection 
 
The selection of a partner is a critical stage; the expectation is to find someone who can fit 
in terms of resources, goals, incentives and strategies (Jiang et al. 2008). The quality of the 
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decisions made at this stage has an influence on the performance along the cycle of the 
alliance; partner selection requires a careful screening of the options available and demands 
time investment (Dacin et al. 1997). Investing time during this stage could contribute to 
overcoming problems in the later stages of the alliance which, even with good managerial 
skills and capabilities, could be very challenging (Cummings and Holmberg 2012).  
 
Elements highlighted as being relevant to partner selection include complementarity, 
compatibility, and commitment (Kale and Singh 2009). Those aspects suggested as critical 
when selecting a partner are: reputation, experience, trustworthiness, capabilities and 
potential contributions to the alliance and the relevance of resource complementarities and 
learning during the process of selection in order to predict the potential behaviour of a 
partner in the following stages (Jiang et al 2008). One reason for the failure of an alliance is 
the difference in skills among partners, making complementarity a relevant factor in 
selection. The performance of the alliance could be jeopardised if one partner does not have 
the appropriate skills to develop an allocated task (Doz 1996). 
 
Other authors have suggested looking at the degree of compatibility in national origins, 
organisational forms and relative organisational status (Gulati et al. 2012). A careful 
examination of differences in national and corporate cultures, past associations, strategic 
interests or intents and organisational norms and structures is necessary (Cummings and 
Holmberg 2012).  
 
Depending on the scope of the alliance, the international or economic development of the 
countries where it takes place could demand attention. For example, international alliances 
require a deeper analysis of cultural differences and distinct ideologies related to economic 
and political structures. Expectations vary according to culture - for example, Asian 
cultures are more long-term oriented and have a higher interest in community benefit 
(Bleeke and Ernst 1991, Dacin et al. 1997). 
Some industries face specific challenges when selecting a partner. In the Biotechnology 
industry, a difference in size and resources among partners could result in issues of value 
appropriation. Prescriptive signals should therefore be considered while selecting a partner, 
such as looking at the incentives and skills of the potential partner for value appropriation. 
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A partner with skills in value creation could be a potential candidate for value appropriation 
(Katila et al. 2008).  
Governance Design 
The purpose of this stage is to design and negotiate the terms and conditions as regards how 
the alliance will operate. The primary challenges are on the degree of flexibility or rigidity 
imposed and on the allocation of roles and responsibilities between the parties involved. 
The extremes could be negative, too much flexibility could result in opportunistic 
behaviour in later stages (Das and Teng 1999).  Having an excessive legal structure and 
excessive monitoring of activities are noted among the reasons for ending an alliance. 
Therefore, during the governance design, some issues could emerge among the parties 
involved in the negotiations form of specialist roles. It is suggested that specialists interact 
with their counterparts according to their specialism as the difference in behaviours relate 
to professional norms. Negotiations are led by managers in order to have more effective 
transactions (Ring and Van de Ven 1994).  
Implementation and Management 
Previous stages are relevant to the implementation and management of an alliance in terms 
of the freedom that managers have to deal with operational situations (Ring and Van de 
Ven 1994). Some of the issues that alliances face include loss of control, the cost and 
difficulty in combining processes and cultures of partner companies and communication 
problems (Callahan and MacKenzie 1999).  
During the operation of the alliance, administrative controls not only affect procedures and 
operational tasks, they also have an impact on the partners’ willingness to collaborate. In a 
dynamic context where strategic alliances develop, relational harmony is important to face 
persistent conflicts and opportunistic behaviours. Excess rigidity or insufficient relational 
harmony could be problematic for the strategic alliance development (Cummings and 
Holmberg 2012). The challenge involves finding the balance between competition and 
cooperation. Private interests are inherent considering that each partner entered the alliance 
to pursue the development of competitive advantage. (Das and Teng 1999). 
A key concern in cooperation is that the partner behaves according to the agreements 
established related to contribution or payoffs. Possible outcomes are either the partner 
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contributes less or claims more in terms of benefit. As a result of this, partners reduce their 
investment in the alliance which deteriorates and drives it to end (Gulati et al. 2012).  
 
Discrepancies among partners and the way these are managed could impact the alliance 
(Kummar and Nti 1998). The continuous involvement of managers is key (Doz 1996) and 
human resource (HR) practices affect strategic alliances. These practices include job 
rotations, site visits, meetings and other activities that facilitate engagement, improve 
learning and aid communication (Cummings and Holmberg 2012). Trust and adaptability 
are fundamental during this stage; changes in the agreement during the implementation 
process are linked to attempts to identify opportunistic behaviour and partners’ change in 
commitment and trust (Gulati et al. 2012). The context then changes, which is perceived 
and impacts in different ways on the parties involved. The dynamics of learning and 
experience throughout this stage are important. These will dictate how partners address and 
renegotiate the adjustment of the alliance in order to accommodate change. Cumulated 
interactions and the perception of equity could determine the path of the alliance (Ariño and 
De la Torre 1998). 
 
Performance evaluation 
One of the challenges in strategic alliances is how to qualify performance. Some authors 
regard a strategic alliance as successful if partners’ objectives have been met and if capital 
costs have been recovered (Bleeke and Ernst 1991).  However, there does not seem to be a 
consensus on the comparability and reliability of performance measures for strategic 
alliances (Geringer and Herbert 1991). Different cultures have distinct perceptions on 
performance expectactions. For example, the Japanese are more long-term oriented and 
include non-financial goals in determining performance (Dacin et al. 1997).  The next 
section elaborates on the various aspects of performance.  
 
Performance of Strategic Alliances 
Performance has been one of the most significant topics of interest for researchers on 
strategic alliances. The literature seems to have been concentrated on international 
management and the secondary area of joint venture. This section will therefore mainly 
focus on research conducted in that area. I will assume that joint ventures are part of 
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strategic alliances. Authors such as Christoffersen (2013) started to introduce the term 
International Strategic Alliances as an umbrella term to include the research conducted in 
the area of joint ventures.  
Anderson’s (1990) study provided an insight to the research interests of joint ventures. In 
earlier studies (prior to 90’s), he stated that he had reviewed articles and books over the 
previous two decades. He found that the topics of interest included reasons to undertake a 
joint venture, narratives of specific joint ventures and selection of partners. He also found 
there were few studies on performance assessment and so concluded that the formation of 
joint ventures received more attention than their performance (1990).  
Research interest in strategic alliances has evolved over time. Christoffersen (2013) 
usefully conducted a review of research on the performance of international strategic 
alliances, stating that early studies had focused on the broader aspects, such as motivation 
to collaborate and mode of entry. Some of them considered performance using as 
antecedents: number of partners, joint venture location and control. Parkhe (1993, cited in 
Christoffersen 2013 p. 66) criticised these studies, arguing that constructs came from hard 
data and thus setting aside the soft concepts such as trust, forbearance, reciprocity and 
opportunism. Later studies included non-equity alliances and performance and its 
antecedents. In his review study on factors influencing international joint venture 
performance, Robson (2002, cited in Christoffersen 2013 p. 67) found that behavioural 
factors (trust, commitment and conflict) had a relevant impact on performance. Nippa et al. 
(2007 cited in Christoffersen 2013, p. 67), in their review, integrated existing concepts into 
a framework of broad headings concerning success factors: parent attributes, parent fit, 
relationship management, governance and external environment. Ren et al. (2009, cited in 
Christoffersen 2013, p. 67) ‘explored a larger number of potential performance antecedents: 
bargaining power, commitment, control, trust, conflict, co-operation, cultural distance, 
justice, goal compatibility and conflict resolution mechanisms’. The evolution of research 
specifically related to performance shows that interest has moved towards including and 
increasing soft elements in the understanding of performance. 
One of the strongest criticisms of international joint venture performance research is that it 
is fragmented and has not been able to provide an explanation for the success of failure of 
international joint ventures (Ren et al. 2009). 
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It seems that researchers will remain interested in the performance of strategic alliances. 
Gomes et al. (2014) argued that company performance in the post-agreement phase of 
strategic alliances has captured research attention and was the second most researched 
theme in top management journals. The authors believed that performance would remain an 
attractive topic due to the intensity of competition and the high level of failure. This 
provides some insight as to the attention focused on researching the performance of 
strategic alliances. It is firstly important to look at the meaning of performance and how it 
can be measured - this is presented in the following subsection. 
Definition of performance 
The definition and measurement of performance is complex and different views and 
interpretations as to its meaning exist (Dussauge and Garrette 1995). When talking about 
performance, there is an immediate temptation to think about success and failure. Hatfield 
et al. (1998) in their review found that some authors have tried to identify success factors, 
however there has not been agreement reached as to the meaning and measurement of 
performance. 
Yan and Zeng (1999, cited on Ariño 2003, p. 67) believed that there was no a common 
understanding of strategic alliance performance. Some authors have attempted to develop 
different interpretations of its meaning. Christoffersen (2013) defined performance ‘as the 
net present value that partners obtain from participating in the alliance’ (p. 4).   
At this point, is useful to define performance, performance indicators, success and failure. 
According to the Oxford International Business Dictionary (Market house, 1998), 
performance is an ‘act process, or manner of performing or functioning’ (p. 641). 
Performance indicators are ‘indicators that measure a company’s performance, often 
divided into strategic, operational, behavioural, and ethical’ (p. 641). Success is the 
‘accomplishment of an aim; favourable outcome… attainment of wealth, fame, or 
position… successful thing or person’ (p. 852). Failure is defined as ‘lack of success; 
failing… unsuccessful person or thing… non-performance… breaking down or ceasing to 
function… running short of supply’ (p. 300). As can be seen from this, some of the 
dictionary definitions for performance are not precise. The definition is explained by using 
the same words and is subjective.   Performance indicators include four dimensions that can 
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be interpreted as objective and subjective measures. Success is defined in terms of 
achievement, while failure is defined as being opposite to success. 
 Krishnan et al. (2006, cited in Ren 2009) argued that performance could be measured in 
terms of survival, financial output (return on investment, market share), overall satisfaction, 
achievement of individual or joint goals and learning. 
According to Commons (1931), performance was considered as one of the three 
dimensions of choice and defined as ‘the exercise of power over nature or others… 
performance means either rendering a service, compelling a service, or paying a debt’ (p. 
654).  
Das and Teng (2001), defined performance in terms of achievement of the objectives of the 
partners. They believed that the success of a firm depended on the actions taken in a 
competitive environment - and additionally, for a strategic alliance, on the actions of each 
of its partners. The authors defined performance risk as the factors that diminished the 
chances of achieving the strategic objectives, despite full cooperation of the partners. 
Relational risks were defined as those resulting from the relationship between partners.  
One of the issues in measuring performance in terms of objectives is that partners could 
have different expectations (Glaister and Buckley 1996). Das and Teng (2001) identified 
factors that influence the achievement of objectives. These included the external 
environment, where the influence of government and political risk should be considered, 
competition and the actions of competitors and the internal environment where competence 
and being able to work together could impact objectives. Some authors have attempted to 
measure performance; this is presented in the following subsection. 
The Measurement of Performance 
The principle of measuring performance departs from the idea that ‘if you can measure 
something, you can’t talk about it’ (Tomlinson 1970, p. XV). However, if it can be 
assumed that there are difficulties in reaching a common agreement on the meaning of 
strategic alliances and performance, it is to be expected that the question as to how to 
measure performance will not have a simple answer. A simplistic approach would be to 
suppose that joint ventures’ performance can be measured in the same way that a division 
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of an organisation is assessed, i.e. to follow the traditional approach of financial metrics. 
However, a division and a joint venture are inherently different. Joint venture’s need to 
balance multiple interests and there could often be conflict of interest between parents; they 
are developed in uncertain and risky environments, organisational politics play a more 
unbalanced role for joint ventures. The visibility of managers at the parent level in a joint 
venture is less than in a division (Anderson 1990, p. 20).  
One way to shed some light on how to assess performance of a joint venture would be to 
consider how organisations assess performance with the intention of setting a baseline. 
Unfortunately, measurement of organisational performance has been seen as controversial. 
The controversy was rooted in a lack of clarity, both as regards what should be considered 
as an indicator or output of performance and also what inputs determine performance. It 
seemed that researchers and managers tended to confuse inputs and outputs. In addition, the 
controversy was related to the organisational context and its stage in its life cycle. 
(Anderson 1990). 
Despite the issues surrounding performance, there is a common understanding that it has 
three dimensions. These are: stability vs flexibility; well-being of individuals vs that of the 
organisations; process vs outcome. However the challenge was how to separate and define 
inputs and outputs. Fortune Magazine developed a study on how business people think of 
performance. It identified a range of metrics, mostly financial, along with a desire to have 
stable management. The latter is a more subjective and long-term performance metric. This 
reflects the expectation to have a ‘package of inputs and outputs, weighted over time’ 
(Anderson 1990 p. 22). Several researchers agreed with the idea of having a package but at 
the same time acknowledged it was ‘cumbersome, difficult and subjective’ (p. 22). Another 
study of a Conference Board survey of top executives concluded that financial 
measurement is just one part of the assessment. There was also a need to include qualitative 
factors, something that takes us back to the difficulty of setting the metrics and also 
highlights subjectivity where issues are value-based (Anderson 1990). What it can be 
concluded is that theory and practice share the view that a ‘package’ approach is required. 
Anderson developed a classification of performance measurement according to an input-
output progression and a long-short term orientation. This is illustrated in the following 
figure. 
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Figure 2-6.- Input-Output continuum  
 
  
 
Source: Anderson (1990) 
Input is a measurement of the health and viability of the organisation, which are not the 
most common goals. Output is defined in terms of results which are mostly articulated as 
hard metrics. An organisation may perform well from an output perspective, but input 
metrics should be considered in the long term for a good performance to be sustainable 
(Anderson 1990). 
Hatfield (1998) usefully identified different approaches to measure the performance and 
success of joint ventures in existing research. This research included the work of Harrigan 
(1988) on duration and survival in measuring success; and Killing (1983) who divided 
performance measures into managerial assessment, liquidation and major reorganisation. 
Killing considered joint ventures as failures if they were liquidated or suffered a major 
reorganisation due to poor performance. Beamish (1987) considered that performance was 
measured in terms of the satisfaction of partners.  
Another way to interpret performance is to borrow from strategy literature. This, considers 
three levels of performance related to goals - financial performance, operational 
performance and organisational effectiveness. Financial performance is relevant if partners 
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have explicit financial goals. Operational performance focuses on key operational success 
factors. Organisational effectiveness is achieved when organisational goals are 
accomplished, taking multiple interests into consideration. This third goal is considered the 
most comprehensive as it can accommodate financial or operational performance; however, 
how to measure it remains an issue. (Ariño 2003)  
Several authors have attempted to measure performance in different ways, such as financial 
measurement, survival and duration. One of the issues in applying financial measurement is 
that joint venture financial information is often not available, being embedded in the 
consolidated financial statements of an organisation. On the other hand, survival and 
duration are affected by non-performance factors (Hatfield 1998). Gomes-Casseres (1987) 
identified reasons for termination of a joint venture which are not related to its 
performance.  Hatfield (1998) developed a study which evaluated the adequacy of using 
partner satisfaction or goal achievement as a way to measure performance. Goal 
achievement was found to be the most adequate metric as partner satisfaction is determined 
by both partner goal achievement and by survival. 
Christoffersen (2013) identified five performance measures and tier antecedents within the 
literature on performance. Performance measures were: subjectivity, stability, accounting, 
cumulative abnormal returns, and external evaluation. Subjective measures can be divided 
into overall satisfaction and achievement of the partners (Ariño 2003, Geringer and Hébert 
1991). According to Christoffersen, the problem with this division is that some subjective 
measures can be classified under both categories.  Stability considered measures related to 
exits from markets, changes in equity, contracts, takeovers from one of the parents or a 
third-party and alliance dissolutions. Accounting measures could be in terms of percentage 
growth or financial ratios.  Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) refers to how markets react 
to the announcement of the alliance and how the perception of creation or destruction of 
value is judged. External evaluation is the assessment developed by parties outside the 
alliance. The antecedents were: behavioural attributes (commitment, trust, co-operation and 
conflict), dissimilarities, national cultural distance, organisational cultural distance, 
relatedness and experience.  
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As discussed in the meaning of success, people understanding the term differently, 
especially in strategic alliances. For instance, Bleeke and Ernst (1991) claimed that, to be 
considered successful, an alliance requires the partners to achieve their respective 
objectives and recover their costs. A successful alliance therefore has to pass two tests: 
‘both partners achieved their ingoing strategic objectives and both recovered their financial 
costs of capital’ (p. 130). The study developed by Bleeke and Ernst relates both tests to 
financial results. The first test, related to the achievement of strategic objectives, can be 
viewed either objectively or subjectively. 
 
One of the challenges in qualifying success or failure is to have a common understanding of 
performance and the way it is measured. Different ways to measure performance have been 
attempted using objective and subjective measures. Geringer and Herbert (1991) usefully 
consolidated different measures used by various authors for International Joint Ventures. 
These included: profitability, growth, cost position, survival, duration, instability of 
(significant changes in) its ownership and renegotiation of the joint venture contract. 
Problems with these measures are that often data is not reported, unavailable or included in 
consolidated corporate data. It is also acknowledged that financial measures evaluate only 
one dimension of performance. Furthermore, measuring performance in terms of parents’ 
satisfaction is imprecise and biased.  Bamford et al (2003) suggested that, due the 
complexity and variability of strategic alliances, it is better to define and agreed the 
meaning of success or failure and the way performance is going to be measured on a case-
by-case basis. 
 
There are other factors that need to be considered when measuring performance. Das and 
Teng (1999) identified the sources of performance risk as being environmental factors, 
changes in government policies, war and economic recession, competition and demand 
fluctuations; and internal factors such as lack of competence and, sometimes, just bad luck. 
Das and Teng (1999) argued that a practical approach in measuring performance is to 
assess if the partners have achieved their objectives. They distinguished between short-term 
and long-term metrics - the more focus placed on results, the more pressure for the alliance 
and the greater the chances of termination. Short-term metrics were related to financial and 
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market while long-term metrics promote cooperation and consider soft metrics. 
Larsson et al. (1998) challenged the use of termination as an effective performance metric. 
He argued that this can be misleading, as alliances demonstrating a good performance could 
still be terminated for other reasons, such as achievement of the original goals at a faster 
pace than expected, or because the partners’ interests changed. Gulati (1998) suggested that 
strategic alliances sometimes continue because the exit costs are high, but this does not 
equate to good performance.  Larsson et al. suggested paying more attention to the learning 
process, arguing that partners needed to overcome various challenges through cooperation 
before the alliance takes place. Stonehouse and Snowdon (2007) believed that knowledge 
creation is part of the learning process and thus a way to improve performance. In their 
study, Chan et al. (1997) found that horizontal alliances related with transfer or pooling 
technical knowledge seemed to create more value than marketing alliances. This suggests 
that organisations which focus on their business and complement operations with the 
technical skills of a partner create more value. 
Kale and Singh (2009) argued that one way to increase the chance of success is by having 
complementarity among partners from a resource-base perspective. However, Beamish 
(1987 cited in Kale and Singh 2009) considered that, for alliances to perform better, 
compatibility and commitment were also required. 
Harrigan (1988, cited in Contractor & Lorange) observed and analysed three dimensions in 
the measurement of performance: survival, duration and success.  
Dissimilarities play an important role in the performance of strategic alliances. For 
instance: experience, age, strategic scope, strategic content, goals, ownership type and 
reputation, size and cultural dissimilarities (at national or organizational levels) and 
relatedness. Size dissimilarities relate to the complexity, structures and styles of 
organisations and damage alliance performance because they ‘give rise to a host of other 
dissimilarities’ (Christoffersen 2013 p. 74). Joint ventures between large and small firms 
experience difficulties because of idiosyncratic incentives for partners, cultural variations 
and asymmetric policies in information distribution. Relative size affects administrative 
protocols which in turn leads to problems in understanding. This increases the risk of 
opportunistic behaviour, diminishing the incentive for cooperation (Christoffersen 2013). 
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A common belief among scholars is that performance measurement has been studied in a 
fragmented way. A better understanding of the reasons for success or failure is therefore 
required (Ren 2009).  
The performance of a strategic alliance seems to be a complex area and when organisations 
enter into more than one alliance, this complexity seems to increase. According to Hoffman 
(2007), the most relevant issue for an organisation in several alliances is the performance, 
in terms of success or failure, of the alliance portfolio. A review of the literature in alliance 
portfolio is presented in the following sections. 
Alliance Portfolio 
Some authors have attempted to define the term alliance portfolio or network. It can, for 
example, be considered as a series of alliances with two or more partners (Das and Teng 
2002). However, other authors have encountered difficulties when conducting research 
related to the definition and understanding of an alliance portfolio. One issue concerns the 
level of analysis. It questions, from a strategic management approach, if the alliance 
portfolio should be positioned at the business or corporate level.  A second issue arises if a 
portfolio includes active and inactive alliances. It is important to acknowledge that 
managing a transnational alliance portfolio requires increased management competences 
and more resources (Vapola et al., 2010). 
Wassmer  (2010) conducted a review of the literature on alliance portfolios, and usefully 
identified the various theoretical approaches taken. These included social network theory, 
organizational learning in general, exploration/exploitation framework, a resource-based 
view of the firm, dynamic capabilities, knowledge-based view, relational view, 
evolutionary economics, transactions cost economics, agency theory, contingency theory, 
coevolutionary perspective, contract theory, real options and resource dependency theory.  
Wassmer (2010) organised the literature into three areas: the emergence, configuration and 
management of alliance portfolios. Emergence was related to the reasons to build and 
maintain a portfolio; amongst these reasons were the management of risk and uncertainty, 
the learning process from multiple alliances and access to network resources. From a 
network viewpoint, more opportunities could be identified with current or new partners, 
and from a competitive perspective to build a portfolio as a way to develop offensive and 
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defensive strategies. Wassmer (2010) found that the rationale to build a portfolio could 
have two perspectives, the firm level or the manager level. The firm level is related to the 
strategic position of the company and agency issues could occur at the manager level. The 
portfolio configuration has several dimensions such as size (in terms of number of alliances 
and partners); structural (breadth, density and redundancy); relational tie (strength of 
alliances); and partner characteristics.  Configuration was perceived as a complex concept 
and there was debate around the importance of size. Some authors believed that the bigger 
the better, while others argued that size increased the complexity of the portfolio. The 
management of an alliance portfolio had two paths, the creation of capabilities and the tools 
to manage a portfolio. Alliance capability referred to the ability to identify partners and to 
initiate and engage in the management of the alliances. Alliance experience was considered 
relevant in developing capabilities, but also required having a good learning process where 
experiences could be shared among alliances. The tools to manage a portfolio required 
having a more integrated approach to the portfolio as a whole and taking other factors such 
as partner/portfolio fit, into consideration. 
Vapola et al. (2010), in their study of the options to manage an alliance portfolio for 
multinational companies (MNC), found three approaches based in two dimensions. These 
were partner integration and partner heterogeneity and the authors argued that the selection 
of an option is related to the international strategy of the MNC. The proposed options for 
portfolio management were: a) highly integrated global alliance portfolio management; b) 
local demand multi-domestic heterogeneous alliance portfolio management; and c) dual-
focused transnational alliance portfolio management.  
According to Vapola et al. (2010), highly integrated global alliance portfolio management 
is motivated by economies of scale, having standardised solutions and processes, with high 
levels of control and centralisation of the decision making process. and as a second best 
option to a full internalization of the business, thus requiring a high level of integration 
with partners and a low level of heterogeneity. The local, demand-oriented, heterogeneous 
alliance portfolio management option’s purpose was to meet the needs of local markets. 
Solutions and processes were particular to the markets, as were the selection of partners. 
The portfolio was consequently characterised by partner diversification and a low level of 
integration and simple financial controls.  The flexibility of this option allowed for a high 
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degree of responsiveness to local opportunities. The dual-focused transnational alliance 
portfolio management option had a disperse configuration of assets and capabilities and 
allowed different contributions from partners. Joint knowledge was developed among 
partners and expanded to the MNC. Because of the diversity, a complex process for 
cooperation and coordination was required, in addition to a shared decision making process.  
Some authors suggested that the assessment of a portfolio should be systematic, continuous 
and developed at the individual alliance, business unit and corporate level (Wassmer 2010). 
Kale and Singh (2009) suggested that in order to increase the success of a portfolio, three 
elements were required - alliance experience, a dedicated alliance function in charge of the 
portfolio and a learning process to facilitate knowledge exchange among the alliances in the 
portfolio. The authors also suggested that further research into portfolio alliances was 
necessary. Alliance portfolio is another fundamental element which needs to be considered 
in the development process of strategic alliances. 
Gaps and opportunities in research 
According to various authors, the failure rate of strategic alliances is high (Dacin et al. 
1997; Das and Teng 1999; Langfield Smith 2008; Walter et al. 2008; Kale and Singh 2009; 
Gulati et al. 2012). The failure rate can be attributed to underperformance and there is 
therefore a need to better understand the performance of alliances (Hong 2009).  
There are several gaps in the literature of strategic alliances that have been identified as 
opportunities to develop research in this area, which, according to some authors, remains 
fragmented (Oliver 1990, Hong 2009, Ren 2009).  More attention has been paid to certain 
types of strategic alliances such as joint ventures, with much less research into non-equity 
alliances (Culpan 2009). Thus, there is a need for a more integrated and inclusive approach 
that could focus on the development process of strategic alliances (Ren 2009, Doz 1996, 
Larsson 1998, Gulati 1998).   
Insufficient literature on strategic alliances takes a process approach (Ariño 2003, Mainela 
and Puhakka 2008), but process theory can assist in understanding how and why strategic 
alliances have been developed in the energy sector (Langley et al. 2013). The narrative 
surrounding strategic alliances can also aid an understanding of their performance by 
constructing cultural visions among different individuals who has been involved in their 
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development (Reichie et al 2010, Giorgi et al 2015). 
As has been shown by the review conducted in this chapter, there are different 
understandings and perceptions of the fundamental parts of strategic alliances in terms of 
meaning, types, process and performance; the common factor is variety and subjectivity. 
Conventional processes for the development of strategic alliances fail to integrate the wider 
elements which influence alliance performance. There are fundamental elements that have 
not been included in the research of strategic alliances, such as the decision to enter the 
strategic alliance and the alliance portfolio. It seems that the effect of these elements on the 
performance of strategic alliances has not been adequately considered.  A qualitative 
approach could help better understand the performance of strategic alliances. This could 
provide new or complementary insights into the development and processes of strategic 
alliances (Culpan 2009, Christoffersen 2013, Parke 1993) by increasing qualitative studies 
in the field (Gomes 2014).  
Furthermore, I have not found a specific study which attempts to understand the 
performance of strategic alliances in the energy sector. This presents a new challenge due 
to the idiosyncrasies and influences of the energy industry (Doz 1996). The development of 
activities in the energy sector are strongly influenced by political, economic and social 
factors as natural resources are a matter of national or public interest (IFP 2004; Duval et 
al. 2009; Yergin 2012). There is, therefore, a need for empirical research to enhance the 
understanding of strategic alliances through the lens of participants involved in the strategic 
alliance processes (Doz 1996). This research would capture their view and concerns in the 
field (Jiang et al. 2008), taking up the challenge to strengthen the relationship between 
academia and practice (Gulati 1998). It would also improve understanding which would be 
useful in the improvement of managerial practice in the energy sector (Ariño 2003, Corley 
and Gioia 2011). 
In summary, success rates in strategic alliances are not high. Current literature does not 
contain studies of these topics within the energy sector. This presents an opportunity to 
understand and learn how strategic alliances are conducted and how they can work better in 
order to increase their chances of success.  
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Filling the gap 
As seen previously, there is a need to understand the performance of strategic alliances in 
the energy sector. Research in the field is extensive but fragmented; different theories have 
been used to study strategic alliances, but, so far, process theory has not been applied in the 
energy sector. Therefore, I propose to develop a study to understand the performance of 
strategic alliances in the energy sector. This will take a cultural and a process theory 
approach as a method of analysis through accounts of individuals with experience in the 
development of strategic alliances in this sector. A process theory approach is applied to 
understand why and how phenomena (such as strategic alliances) change or remain stable 
over time.  The weakness found in most of the studies of performance in strategic alliances 
is that these have taken a variance theory approach to understanding the ‘what’ of strategic 
alliances, e.g. antecedents, dependent variables and outcomes. They do not consider the 
‘how’ or implementation dimensions. Variance theory deals with covariations among 
variables; it tends to ignore time by compressing it into variables, reducing its role in 
comparative statistics and therefore ignoring the temporal flow of organisational life 
(Langley et al. 2013).  
Alliances are dynamic systems of adaptation and evolution: they are suitable for co-
evolutionary study because, over the course of their life cycle, they are exposed to many 
types of destabilizing factors, regardless of how well they were conceived (Inkpen and 
Currall 2004). Therefore, strategic alliance research requires an understanding of strategic 
change. Strategic change is a continuous process which possesses a consistent pattern 
regardless of the context. One typical feature of the process dimension is that strategy does 
not move forward in a direct, linear way. It is not an easily identifiable number of 
sequential phases, it is a continuous, iterative and uncertain pattern (Whipp and Pettigrew 
1992). 
Considering trust as a key element in the development of a strategic alliance, and using 
Mollering’s (2012) definition of trust, a difference between ‘an alliance’ and ‘to ally’ can 
be suggested. The latter is a process, and can be studied in its own right. This changes the 
focus of interest to organisational process rather than organisational state (Möllering 2012). 
The focus could be complemented by the difference between collaboration and 
collaborative alliances, where the former refers to the process and the latter to 
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organisational forms (Gulbrandsen and Moe 2005).  
Process research is focused on understanding how things evolve over time and why they 
evolve in this way (Langley 1999, Langley et al. 2013). Taking this into consideration, 
there is an opportunity to study the process followed in the development of strategic 
alliances in the energy sector, trying to understand how they are developed and why they 
fail. 
The development process of strategic alliances is conventionally described in in four stages: 
partner selection, governance design, implementation and management  (Jiang 2008, Kale 
and Singh 2009). However, this model provides insufficient understanding of the 
complexity of strategic alliances’ performance. It could, therefore, be expanded into a 
multi-perspective model by taking a cultural approach and utilising process theory to 
understand how strategic alliances emerge, change, unfold and evolve over time (Langley 
1999; Langley et al. 2013; Giorgi et al 2015).  
This would contribute to the understanding of the performance of strategic alliances.  
My contribution lies in taking a cultural approach and utilising process theory to focus 
much more explicitly the performance of strategic alliances into a holistic process model. 
Process theory will be applied to look at how strategic alliances are developed. The 
research subjects will consist of experienced managers in the energy sector; the aim will be 
to elicit perspectives on the temporal progressions of activities in developing strategic 
alliances (Langley et al. 2013).  
The role of people with experience in strategic alliances is relevant to the study because, as 
argued by Powell and DiMaggio (1991, p.254), ‘without actors, without subjectivity, there 
is no way to account for change’ 
Finally, the study has practical implications for preventing problems and presenting 
possible solutions to make strategic alliances work more effectively in the energy sector. 
Conclusions 
Organisations enter strategic alliances for different reasons - one attribute of strategic 
alliances is that each of them is unique. Despite there being no consensus among 
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researchers on the rate of failure of strategic alliances, the general understanding is that 
failure is high.  
Developing the literature review found that strategic alliance is a form of collaboration 
among companies to develop competitive advantage and better face the challenges 
attributable to competition, knowledge and technology. More often the collaborative 
business model is used, but despite the popularity of strategic alliances, the success rate is 
not high. Thus, there is a need to understand strategic alliances in order to increase their 
probability of success. Measuring strategic alliances’ performance is a difficult task. This is 
due to measuring performance primarily from a financial perspective. Due to strategic 
alliance heterogeneity, it is suggested that performance measurement is agreed on a case-
by-case basis. Where organisations enter into more than one strategic alliance, the success 
of any single alliance is not sufficient to understand the performance of an organisation’s 
network or portfolio.  
As explored in this literature review in the field of strategic alliances, meaning, types, 
process and performance have different meanings and interpretations amongst scholars. On 
the one hand, this is a reflection of the complexity embedded in the arena of strategic 
alliances and, on the other, highlights the relevance of the subjective element in research 
into strategic alliances. This increases the need to understand strategic alliances from the 
perspective of people with practical experience in the field within the energy sector. 
There is insufficient literature on strategic alliances which takes a process theory approach. 
Conventional processes for the development of strategic alliances fail to take account of the 
wider elements which influence the alliance’s performance. Therefore, a study taking a 
cultural and process theory approach to work much more explicitly the performance of 
strategic alliances into a holistic process model, could contribute to the understanding of 
performance in strategic alliances within the energy sector. 
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CHAPTER 3: Methodology and Methods  
	
	
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the methodology and methods followed in this 
thesis in terms of my research design and the rationale behind its selection. A variety of 
sources related to methodology and methods were reviewed. A methodological framework 
developed by Blaikie (2009) was selected as the foundational philosophical underpinning 
for this thesis, focusing as it does on rational research design. The chapter begins by 
describing the framework used to develop the research design which is adapted from a 
framework by Blaikie (2009) and recommendations by Saunders (2012). This adapted 
framework is used to set the context of this research and to explain the decisions I made 
and my justifications for making these.  
Research Design 
My process followed various iterations; initial decisions were reviewed and these changes 
impacted later decisions. This proved to be useful to confirm consistency with the research 
philosophy (Blaikie 2009). 
The research design was how I planned to answer the research questions. It contains the 
objectives derived from these questions, specifies the sources from which data was 
collected, how it was collected and analysed and presents ethical considerations (Saunders 
2012).  
The research design incorporates the decisions made for: the selection of the research 
problem and the researcher’s motives and goals (aims); the research questions; the research 
strategy, based on ontological and epistemological assumptions, and axiology; the research 
paradigms; relevant concepts, theories, hypotheses and models, data types, forms and 
sources; selection from data sources, data collection and timing; and finally a section on 
ethics (Blaikie 2009, Saunders 2012). The research design framework is illustrated in the 
following figure:  
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Figure 3-1.- Research design framework 
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Source: Adapted from information of Blaikie (2009) and Saunders (2012)	
 
This framework begins with the research topic and problem. Already discussed in the 
introduction, here I focus from the second step (‘research questions’) of the framework 
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onwards. This, along with the following steps, are explained in the following sections. 
Research Questions  
Following Blaikie’s recommendations for the development of research questions, a seven-
step process was used: 
 
Figure 3-2.- Research questions – the development process 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Blaikie 2009 
 This process was used to identify, analyse, organise and select the research questions. I 
began by writing down the questions related to the research problem which came from my 
experience in the field and the literature review. At this stage, the questions remained 
uncensored, although they were reviewed, grouped and consolidated. The questions were 
articulated according to what, why and how. The possible assumptions of each question 
was reviewed and some others added, and their scope was examined in light of time and 
resources available. Questions were then separated into major and subsidiary, a 
categorization which assisted reflection as to the aim of the research and building a 
framework. Finally, the following research questions were identified (more details can be 
found in Appendix 3-1):  
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• How and why have strategic alliances been developed in the energy sector? 
• How and why do strategic alliances succeed or fail?  
• Why do firms engage in strategic alliances despite low success rates? 
• How can we create more effective strategic alliances in the energy sector? 
These research questions were the foundation to address the problems associated with the 
issues of strategic alliances, and by so doing to accomplish the main purpose of this 
research that is to understand the performance of strategic alliances from a process theory 
approach. The four questions follow a sequence that help to understand strategic alliances, 
first by seeking to understand how and why strategic alliances have been developed in the 
energy sector, then considering the failure rate of strategic alliances to explore how and 
why they succeed or fail, why firms engage in strategic alliances despite low success rate, 
and finally how we can create more effective strategic alliances in the energy sector. The 
findings of these research questions gave shape to the process represented in a holistic 
dynamic multi-perspective framework that is presented in the discussion chapter. 
 
Research Strategies 
Research strategies are pivotal as they direct how the research questions are framed  
answered. The differences among them are termed the logic of enquiry and its particular 
combination of ontological and epistemological assumptions. (Blaikie 2009)  
The decision to use a research strategy was shaped in particular by the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions underpinning the questions. At this point, it is useful to 
establish an understanding of the concepts of ontological and epistemological assumptions. 
This relates to the development of the knowledge and the nature of it (Saunders 2012). 
‘Ontological assumptions are concerned with the nature of social reality; these assumptions 
make claims on what kinds of social phenomena do or can exist, the conditions of their 
existence, and the ways in which they are related. Epistemological assumptions are 
concerned with what kinds of knowledge are possible – how can we know these things – 
and with criteria for deciding when knowledge is both adequate and legitimate’. (Blaikie 
2009, p. 92).  
The following table presents different options for ontological and epistemological 
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assumptions in order to provide more detail for the rationale of the selection of assumptions. 
Table 3-1.- Ontological and epistemological assumptions 
Ontological Assumptions 
Shallow realist - Existence of phenomena independent. 
- Only what is observed is relevant to science. 
- Challenge for science is to discover patterns or sequences and 
describe them. 
Conceptual 
realist 
- Reality is independent of human minds. 
-  It is not the property of any individual or the construction of a social 
community. 
- It is a collective consciousness, or structure of ideas, and is not 
directly observable. 
Cautious realist - Reality has an independent existence. 
- It cannot be accurately observed directly .   
- A cautious and critical attitude must be adopted. 
Depth realist - Reality has 3 domains: Empirical (what can be observed); Actual 
(what exists independently of the observer; and Real (structures and 
mechanisms that may not be readily observed). 
- Reality is stratified and has ontological depth. 
Idealist - Reality is a representation created by the human mind. 
- Social reality is made up of shared interpretations that social actors 
produce and reproduce as they go about their everyday lives. 
- Reality has various forms: it exists independently of socially 
constructed realities; external reality placing constraints or providing 
opportunities; and construction of reality different (multiple) 
perspectives on an external world. 
Subtle realist - Reality exists independently of social scientists 
- Cultural assumptions prevent direct access to this world. 
 
Epistemological Assumptions 
Empiricism - Knowledge is produced and verified by the use of the human senses. 
- A neutral trained observer, who has undistorted contact with reality, 
can arrive at reliable knowledge. 
- Certainty of knowledge depends on its accuracy of the external 
world representation. 
Rationalism - Knowledge comes from the direct examination of the structure of 
human thought. 
- Evidence for an unobservable collective consciousness can be found 
in the consequences it has on people’s lives, or in thought processes 
and structures of the mind itself. 
- Logic and mathematics provide the standards for judging knowledge 
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claims. 
Falsificationism - Knowledge produced by a process of trial and error, theories are 
proposed and tested against empirical evidence. 
- Because of inability to observe reality directly, tests of theories must 
be directed towards trying to falsify rather than confirm them. 
- Not possible to establish whether knowledge is true, it must be 
regarded as tentative, therefore open to revision. 
Neo-realism - Knowledge of the causes of observed regularities is derived from the 
structures and/or mechanisms that produce them. 
- The discovery of these structures and/or mechanisms may 
necessitate the postulation or selection of entities and processes that 
go beyond surface appearances. 
- This view of causation allows for the possibility that competing or 
cancelling mechanisms may be operating when no event or change 
is observed. 
Constructionism - Everyday knowledge is the outcome of people having to make sense 
of their encounters with the physical world and other people; 
socially constructed knowledge is the outcome of social scientists 
reinterpreting this everyday knowledge into technical language. 
- Because it is impossible for fallible human beings to observe an 
external world unencumbered by concepts, theories, background 
knowledge and past experiences, it is impossible to make true 
discoveries about the world; all social enquiry reflects the standpoint 
of the researcher and all observation is theory-laden. 
- There are no permanent, unvarying criteria for establishing whether 
knowledge can be regarded as true. 
Conventionalism - Scientists create scientific theories as convenient tools for dealing 
with the world. 
- Theories do not describe reality; they determine, what is considered 
by the scientist to be real. 
- Decisions about what are good theories, or which is the better of two 
competing theories, is a matter of judgement, not proof. 
Source: Adapted from Blaikie 2009 
 
The above assumptions are not independent, meaning that for each ontological assumption 
there is a connected epistemological assumption. The only case that does not work in 
combination is the subtle realist ontology and the epistemology of conventionalism (Blaikie 
2009). 
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Table 3-2.- Normal combinations of ontological and epistemological assumptions 
 
Ontology 1  Epistemology 
Shallow realist 1  Empiricism 
Conceptual realist 1  Rationalism 
Cautious realist 1  Falsificationism 
Depth realist 1  Neo-realism 
Idealist 1  Constructionism 
 
Source: Blaikie 2009 
 
Considering the aim of the research towards understanding performance of strategic 
alliances and taking account of the characteristics of each of the assumptions, it seemed that 
an idealist ontological assumption and a constructionism epistemological assumption fitted 
with the aim. An idealist assumption because reality is constructed from the human mind, 
interpretations and multiple perspectives of people with experience in strategic alliances in 
the energy sector and a constructionism assumption because knowledge would be the 
outcome of people with experience in strategic alliances and the consideration that 
knowledge cannot be regarded as true. As Blaikie (2009) pointed out, idealist and 
constructionist assumptions are a complementary combination.  
Following choosing the ontological and epistemological assumptions, the selection of the 
research strategy came next. There are four main research strategies. These can answer 
different types of research questions and purposes and are normally associated with a 
research paradigm - however, they can be used with more than one paradigm (Blaikie 
2009). Blaikie developed the following table of ‘the logic of four research strategies’: 
Table 3-3.- The logic of four research strategies 
 Inductive Deductive Retroductive Abductive 
Aim Establish 
descriptions of 
characteristics 
and patterns 
Test theories, 
eliminate false 
ones and 
corroborate the 
survivor 
Discover 
underlying 
mechanisms to 
explain 
observed 
regularities 
Describe and 
understand 
social life in 
terms of social 
actors’ 
meanings and 
motives 
Ontology Cautious, depth 
or subtle realist 
Cautious or 
subtle realist 
Depth or subtle 
realist 
Idealist or 
subtle realist 
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Epistemology Conventionalism Falsificationism 
Conventionalism 
Neo-realism Constructionism 
Questions What Why Why What & Why 
Purpose Exploration & 
Description  
Explanation Explanation Understanding 
Start Collect data on 
characteristics 
and/or patterns 
Produce 
descriptions 
Identify a 
regularity that 
needs to be 
explained 
Construct a 
theory and 
deduce 
hypotheses 
Document and 
model 
regularity 
Describe the 
context and 
possible 
mechanisms 
Discover 
everyday lay 
concepts, 
meanings and 
motives 
Produce a 
technical 
account from 
lay accounts 
Finish Relate these to 
the research 
questions 
Test hypotheses 
by matching 
them with data 
explanation 
Establish which 
mechanism(s) 
provide(s) the 
best 
explanation in 
that context 
Develop a 
theory and 
elaborate it 
iteratively 
Source: Blaikie 2009 
The above table shows why the ontology and epistemology assumptions have been chosen. 
Idealist and constructionism respectively, fit with the purpose of this research with the 
abductive strategy, which aims to understand social life, in this case, strategic alliances, in 
terms of social actors’ (people with experience in strategic alliances), meanings and 
motives. This table complemented the type of questions related to this strategy and the 
social purpose of the research. The abductive strategy comprises the ‘what’ and ‘why’ 
questions and the social purpose seeks to understand. This theory proved useful in 
confirming the research design and helping to verify the consistency of these decisions.  
 
By using the abductive strategy, instead of moving from theory to data (as in deduction) or 
data to theory (as in induction), it moves back and forth. This, in effect, combines 
deduction and induction, as stated in the work of Suddaby (2006, cited in Saunders 2012 p. 
149) ‘This matches what many business and management researchers actually do. 
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Abduction begins with the observation of a ‘surprising fact’; it then works out a plausible 
theory of how this could have occurred.’  
 
Furthermore, in applying an abductive approach to this research, the reasons for failure or 
success of strategic alliances would mean obtaining data that was sufficiently detailed and 
rich. This would allow to understanding by exploring, identifying and explaining themes 
and patterns regarding the performance of strategic alliances. I would then integrate these 
explanations in an overall conceptual framework, thereby building up a theory for the 
development of strategic alliances in the energy sector. This would be tested using evidence 
provided by existing data and new data and revised as necessary. (Blaikie 2009) 
Since values or axiology is not considered in Blaikie’s research design framework, I 
thought it important to supplement his framework by drawing on the work of Saunders 
(2012). This had synergy as my values have influenced the choice of topic, research 
questions, data collection method and what I choose to report or not report. According to 
Saunders (2012) ‘Axiology is a branch of philosophy that studies judgements about value. 
Although this may include values we possess in the fields of aesthetics and ethics, it is the 
process of social enquiry with which we are concerned here. The role that your own values 
play in all stages of the research process is of great importance if you wish your research 
results to be credible’ (p.137). Heron (1996 cited in Saunders 2012, p.139) argued that  ‘our 
values are the guiding reason of all human action… that researchers demonstrate 
axiological skill by being able to articulate their values as a basis for making judgements 
about what research they are conducting and how they go about doing it’ (p.139). Thus, the 
researcher demonstrates his values through all the stages of the research process. For 
instance, when selecting interviews in preference to questionnaires, it suggests that the 
researcher values personal interaction. This is an important element as I considered that, for 
this research, it was preferable to have interaction with people experienced in strategic 
alliances; interviews therefore became more appealing. 
Research Paradigm 
According to Blaikie, ‘research Paradigms can be chosen as sources of ideas and 
assumptions for use where appropriate’ (p. 97). The selection of a research strategy does 
not commit to choose a research paradigm, but the converse does. In the words of Saunders 
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(2012, p. 141) ‘A paradigm is a way of examining social phenomena from which particular 
understandings of these phenomena can be gained and explanations attempted’. 
Different authors have different views on the classification of paradigms. Blaikie (2009) 
classified these in two main categories: classical paradigms and contemporary paradigms, 
while Saunders (2012) labelled them as research philosophies.  
Saunders suggested that in order to select a philosophy/paradigm, three elements should be 
explored: the nature of reality, if it is external or socially constructed, objective or 
subjective; qualification of acceptable knowledge (observable phenomena or subjective 
meanings; law-like generalisations or details of specifics); and the role of values (value-free 
or value-bound). 
Saunders compared the research philosophies in business and management research in 
terms of ontological and epistemological assumptions, axiology and data collection 
techniques. This comparison was useful in order to explain the selection of the 
interpretivism philosophy/paradigm for this research, as illustrated in the following table. 
Table 3-4.- Comparison of four research philosophies in business and management research  
 Pragmatism Positivism Realism Interpretivism 
Ontology 
(researcher’s 
views of the 
nature of reality 
or being) 
External, 
multiple, view 
chosen to best 
enable 
answering of 
research 
question 
External, 
objective and 
independent of 
social actors 
Objective. 
Independent of 
human thoughts, 
beliefs or 
knowledge of 
their existence 
(realist), but is 
interpreted 
through social 
conditioning 
(critical realist) 
Socially 
constructed, 
subjective, may 
change, 
multiple 
Epistemology: 
researcher’s 
Observable 
phenomena 
Only observable 
phenomena can 
Observable 
phenomena 
Subjective 
meanings and 
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view on what 
constitutes 
acceptable 
knowledge. 
and/or 
subjective 
meanings can 
provide 
knowledge 
dependent upon 
the research 
question. Focus 
on the practical 
applied 
research, 
integrating 
different 
perspectives to 
help interpret 
the data. 
provide data, 
facts. Focus on 
causality and 
law-like 
generalisations, 
reducing 
phenomena to 
simplest 
elements. 
provide credible 
data, facts. 
Insufficient data 
means 
inaccuracies in 
sensations 
(direct realism). 
Alternatively 
phenomena 
create sensations 
which are open 
to 
misinterpretation 
(critical 
realism). Focus 
on explaining 
within a context 
or contexts. 
social 
phenomena. 
Focus upon the 
details of 
situation, a 
reality behind 
these details, 
subjective 
meanings 
motivating 
actions. 
Axiology: the 
researcher’s 
view of the role 
of values in 
research. 
Values play a 
large role in 
interpreting 
results, the 
researcher 
adopting both 
objective and 
subjective point 
of view. 
Research is 
undertaken in a 
value-free way, 
the researcher is 
independent of 
the data and 
maintains an 
objective 
stance. 
Research is 
value laden; the 
researcher is 
biased by world 
views, cultural 
experiences and 
upbringing. 
These will 
impact on the 
research. 
Research is 
value bound, 
the researcher is 
part of what is 
being 
researched, 
cannot be 
separated and 
so will be 
subjective. 
Data collection 
techniques most 
Mixed or 
multiple 
designs, 
Highly 
structured large 
samples, 
Methods chosen 
must fit the 
subject matter, 
Small samples, 
in depth 
investigations 
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often used. quantitative and 
qualitative. 
measurement, 
quantitative, but 
can use 
qualitative. 
quantitative or 
qualitative. 
qualitative. 
Source: Saunders 2012 
It has been determined that the nature of reality is socially constructed and subjective. With 
acceptable knowledge considered as subjective and with me being part of the research, this 
means that it can be considered as value bound. This shows that the selection of an 
interpretivist philosophy is a ‘best fit’; moreover the table provides some initial information 
for the selection of data collection techniques pointing to in-depth qualitative studies with 
small samples.   
 
Thus, the underpinning research philosophy here is interpretivist.  Strategic alliances deal 
with organisational theory and management far too complex to be explained by laws 
similar to those in physical sciences (Saunders 2012, Sekaran and Bougie 2013). From the 
intellectual traditions of interpretivism, I selected phenomenology because this research 
explored how people with experience in strategic alliances in the energy sector made sense 
of the field. This is also considered appropriate to management research (Saunders 2012). 
 
The purpose of this section was to determine the research paradigm. Different authors have 
different viewpoints on the classification or analysis in the research paradigm. Blaikie’s 
classification points to the traditional interpretevism paradigm while Saunder’s research 
philosophy contributes to strengthen the stance by confirming the ontology, epistemology 
and axiology analysed in the previous section. Saunders’ information of research 
philosophies also provided some initial thoughts for data collection.  
 
Concepts, Theories, Hypothesis and Models 
The purpose of this section is to provide explanations on decisions made as regards 
concepts, theories, hypothesis and models in this research. The main consideration was that 
‘the nature of research questions, and the choice of research strategy or strategies, will 
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determine how concepts are used, whether hypotheses are used, and the role of theory and 
models’. (Blaikie, 2009 p. 110)  
Concepts 
Concepts were used in this research as a way to represent ideas in words or diagrams and to 
provide an input for using theories to explain the relationships between concepts. (Blaikie 
2009) 
The following table summarises the connections between conceptual traditions and research 
strategies and is useful to support the decisions on the selections made.  
Table 3-5.- Conceptual traditions and research strategies 
Tradition Meaning Research 
strategy 
Notes 
Ontological • Concepts identify 
the basic features of 
some social 
phenomenon and the 
relationships 
between them. 
Deductive • Provides a background to all 
research. 
• Find conceptual schemes very 
useful as source of variables. 
 
Operational • Concepts are 
translated into 
variables by 
devising ways to 
measure them. 
 Inductive • Concepts need to be selected, 
defined and operationalised 
Deductive  • Hypotheses are deduced from 
theory and concepts in an 
hypothesis are measured in 
order to test whether or not a 
hypothesized relationship 
exists. While it is possible to 
test hypotheses using other 
methods, this research 
strategy has been dominated 
by the operationalising 
tradition. 
Sensitizing Concepts provide initial 
ideas of what to look 
for and these ideas will 
be refined as the 
research proceeds. 
Inductive & 
Deductive 
• In an exploratory phase when 
relevant concepts and their 
definitions are being sought. 
Abductive • Can be used in different 
branches, but not most 
appropriate. 
Hermeneutic  Concepts that a 
researcher uses to 
describe and understand 
Abductive • Resist the imposition of top 
down schemes and prefer to 
generate their own concepts 
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any social phenomenon 
are derived from 
everyday concepts and 
meanings. 
in a hermeneutic, bottom up 
manner. 
• Hermeneutic is most 
appropriate, because the 
generation of technical 
concepts from lay concepts is 
a hermeneutic process. 
 
Retroductive • Concepts are not 
operationalised in this 
research strategy; rather, 
structures and mechanisms 
are hypothesized and 
discovered by direct and 
indirect observations and 
experiments. Of course, to 
hypothesize the existence of a 
structure or mechanism 
requires the use of language, 
you have to have some idea 
of what you are looking for. 
This may involve adopting or 
adapting an existing concept, 
or inventing a new one, to 
identify it. 
Adaptive 
alternative 
• Concepts that bridge 
aspects of individual 
social agency and 
reproduce social 
relations and 
practices. In other 
words, these 
concepts integrate 
agency and structure 
as well as the micro 
and macro levels of 
social analysis. 
Abductive 
 
 
 
• Linking the hermeneutic and 
the abductive with structural 
and general concepts can lead 
to a more productive theory 
generation. 
 Deductive  • The incorporation of both 
behavioural and structural 
concepts, and the bridging of 
social actors’ and sociological 
concepts in the context of 
general theory, can only lead 
to more productive theories to 
test using the Deductive 
strategy. 
 
Source: Adapted from Blaikie 2009 
 
The abductive research strategy chosen influenced the selection of the sensitizing, 
hermeneutic and adaptive alternative conceptual traditions from the five traditions available 
in the literature. The sensitizing tradition provided ideas of what to look for at the outset 
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and process ideas were refined during the research. The hermeneutic tradition allowed me 
to be reflexive and reflective, considering concepts with an evolving meaning. I learnt from 
the participants and gained an understanding as to how they saw the world in terms of 
strategic alliances. The hermeneutic tradition also allowed me to define concepts as a 
starting point, but to incorporate changes through the research development. For example, 
following the literature review on the meaning of strategic alliances in chapter two, I 
considered various definitions and perspectives. I finally arrived at a definition for the 
purpose of an initial understanding. In the process of obtaining the perspective of the 
participants, this meaning was revisited. However, an adaptive alternative strengthened this, 
and provided more input for theory development. ‘Layder’s concern in ‘the development of 
an adaptive alternative is how establishing concepts that bridge aspects of individual social 
agency and reproduce social relations and practices. In other words, he wanted concepts 
that integrate agency and structure as well as the micro and macro levels of social analysis.’ 
(Blaikie 2009, p. 120-1) 
Consistency with process theory was achieved by employing the adaptive alternative. This 
thesis seeks to understand the relationship amongst the organisations participating in a 
strategic alliance and their influence on performance. In line with most process scholars, I 
began with some ideas about the process of strategic alliances which came from my work 
experience and the literature reviewed. During the process, I attempted to find the balance 
between deduction and induction, thus following an abductive approach (Pettigrew 1997). 
More details are provided in the following sub-section on ‘Theories’.  
The core areas of theory and knowledge which emerged from the literature review and the 
subsequent framing of the research questions were: (1) the meaning of strategic alliance, (2) 
types of strategic alliance, (3) motivators, (4) how decisions to enter a strategic alliance are 
made, (5) the selection of partners, (6) portfolio management, (7) performance 
measurement, (8) problems, risks, critical factors and perception of success and failure, (9) 
the influence of external factors, the role and influence of executives and managers  on 
performance, (10) future prospects of strategic alliances and the challenges they might face. 
This sequence is derived from relevant topics identified in the literature review in 
conjunction with elements which need to be included in the development of strategic 
alliances due to their impact on performance. I explored all of these concepts with 
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participants during the interviews in order to gain insight on the practice of strategic 
alliances. 
Theories 
As explained in the introduction and literature review chapters, this research took a cultural 
and process theory approach of the performance of strategic alliances. Through the lens of 
those with experience in the energy sector, process theory examined how strategic alliances 
were developed. Acknowledging that social reality is a dynamic process, the insights of key 
informants were fundamental in capturing their views of the development of strategic 
alliances in the energy sector (Pettigrew 1997). By using process theory, temporal 
progressions of activities would be incorporated as elements of explanation and 
understanding of strategic alliances (Langley et al. 2013).  
I chose to employ a cultural and process approach to observe the process in action from the 
perspective of people with experience, therefore describing how strategic alliances change 
over time (Pettigrew 1997). Strategic alliances in the form of stories can help to understand 
their performance by constructing cultural visions among different key informants who 
provide insights of the development of strategic alliances in the energy sector (Reichie et al 
2010, Giorgi et al 2015) 
The process approach was iterative. This allowed me to increase learning about pattern 
acquisition and pattern recognition, firstly by identifying where to look and secondly 
identifying similarities and differences within the data analysed (Klag 2013). This process 
was fundamental in presenting the findings and in building the holistic model for the 
development of strategic alliances which is presented in the discussion chapter. 
Hypotheses 
This research did not have hypotheses as they ‘play a limited role in social research, only 
being relevant to the answering of ‘why’ research questions with the Deductive research 
strategy’ (Blaikie 2009, p. 111). This decision provided flexibility in conducting the 
research and I considered it more useful to focus on answering the research questions and 
to being open to the perspectives and experiences provided by the interviewees. ‘How’ 
questions do not require hypotheses. The ‘why’ component of the research questions were 
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not considered necessary to have hypotheses as this research did not involve either the 
measurement of concepts or the statistical testing of relationships  (Blaikie 2009). 
Models 
Models were used in this research as I considered them an effective means to organise, 
analyse and synthesise information and a valuable way to communicate the findings 
(Blaikie 2009).  
Blaikie established seven types of model: Abstract descriptions, synonym for theory, 
conceptual models, theoretical models, analogue mechanisms, diagrammatic 
representations and mathematical representations. These are illustrated in the following 
table which establishes the relationship among research strategies, the nature of theory and 
the use of models. 
Table 3-6.- Research strategies, theory and models 
 
Research strategy Nature of theory Use of models 
Inductive Form: Generalizations 
Networks of propositions 
Abstract descriptions 
Mathematical representations 
Process: Generated by induction 
from data 
Conceptual frameworks 
Deductive Form: Deductive argument 
produces hypotheses 
Theoretical models 
Process: Hypotheses tested by 
matching against data 
Diagrammatic representation 
Mathematical representation 
Retroductive  Form: Generative structures and/or 
mechanisms 
Abstract descriptions 
Process: Modelling of hypothetical 
mechanisms 
May involve use of analogies 
Abductive Form: Social scientific accounts Abstract descriptions 
 Process: Generated from everyday 
accounts 
Ideal types 
 
Source: Blaikie 2009  
 
Abstract description models were selected because they better assisted the purpose of this 
research. As they are used in an abductive strategy, these models are an attempt to establish 
a ‘bridge between the meanings of social actors used in everyday activities and the meaning 
the social scientist must attribute to these activities to produce an adequate theory’ (Blaikie 
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2009, p. 149). 
Taking both the conventional model of strategic alliances (Jiang 2008, Kale and Singh 
2009) and the concepts of interest that emerged from the literature review into 
consideration, I inserted the concepts around the conventional model to demonstrate the 
need to take a more holistic process approach to integrate other areas of concern that 
influence the performance of strategic alliances.  
Strategic alliances are influenced by the different cultural contexts in which they are 
deployed, from the corporate to the international context and different cultural levels from 
the individual, and organizational to the societal level, from the micro to the macro level 
(Reichie et al 2010; Giorgi et al 2015). This is illustrated in the following figure: 
Figure 3-3.- Concepts of interest and conventional model of SAs 
 	
 
 
Source: Adapted from Jiang (2008) and Kale and Singh (2009) 
This figure illustrates the process and areas of concern of strategic alliances, where 
performance is the focus of attention and the areas of concern are: meaning, types and 
motives, decision making process to enter a strategic alliance, partner selection and alliance 
portfolio; the way performance is measured, the problems, risks and critical factors; the 
influence of external and internal factors; and, finally, the prospect in terms of the future 
and challenges for strategic alliances. These provide the foundation for the development of 
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the holistic multi-perspective model which is presented in the discussion chapter. 
Data Types, Forms and Sources 
This section explains the kind of data that will be collected for this research, where it comes 
from and how it was selected. 
This research mainly focussed on face-to-face interviews employing a conversational, 
flexible style designed to elicit experience-based narrative. The form of data was 
transcripted text, taking into consideration that non-numerical data is now more acceptable 
than in the past. This is due to the shift in the perception that text can be considered both 
precise and reliable (Blaikie 2009).  
A conversational setting was chosen for this research. Individuals with experience in the 
development of strategic alliances talked about their perspective and understanding of the 
energy sector through semi-structured interviews providing ‘added descriptive realism’ 
(Robson 2006, p.603). Data was gathered, taking into consideration how social actors in 
strategic alliances in the energy sector view and perceive the development of them, ‘social 
participants’ knowledge, perceptions and experience’. This had an influence on the research 
strategy and its position (Blaikie 2009, p. 171), as was explained in previous sections. 
Selection from Data Sources 
In terms of data selection, the population of interest for this research is people with 
experience in strategic alliances in the energy sector, where their knowledge, insights and 
perspectives were considered fundamental to this research (Flick 2014). The sample is non-
probability, in a single stage. Despite the complexity of sampling, this was chosen in order 
to deal with the limitations of time and resources (Blaikie  2009). 
The use of sampling in the area of strategic alliances is complicated as information on 
details and perceptions of people working in strategic alliances is not available in public 
sources. Therefore the use of a non-probability sample is justified - ‘it is better to have 
some knowledge that to no have knowledge of the topic at all.’ (Blaikie 2009, p. 176). 
Taking the intensive use of resources in a qualitative study into consideration, a small 
sample will be used as a way of obtaining more in-depth, detailed data in an 
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unrepresentative sample (Blaikie 2009). 
The sampling methods used in this research were judgemental sampling and snowball 
sampling. The former due to the interest in obtaining the knowledge, experience, and 
perspective of persons involved in the development of strategic alliances which could result 
in in-depth investigation. Snowballing was used in order to locate participants through 
recommendation or referral (Blaikie 2009). In order to identify potential participants, I 
spoke with people I knew from the industry and attended several conferences and seminars 
as a way to meet people and find further potential participants. I approached those with 
experience in the energy industry and in strategic alliances to have conversations about the 
industry, strategic alliances and my research project. I followed up these conversations and 
kept contact with them, providing further details of the research project to the potential 
participants in the form of a Participant Information Sheet (Appendix 3-2), Informed 
consent form (Appendix 3-3), and the Interview briefing (Appendix 3-4). 
Some participants were referred by the people I interviewed, thus creating the snowball 
effect as previously mentioned. 
Data was collected through in-depth semi-structured interviews with 15 participants from 
the period of January to December 2014. Each of these people has more than 20 years of 
industry experience. They have different backgrounds: Engineering, Economics, Law, 
Political Science, Environment, Geology, Geography, Physics, and Accountancy. Most of 
them have completed postgraduate studies in areas such as Management, Political Science, 
Environment, and Law. This element enriched the information through gaining a 
multidisciplinary perspective. The following table shows their demographic information, 
presented here in limited fashion so as to maintain confidentiality.  
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Table: 3-7 Demographics of participants 
 
Participant Education Work experience 
1 Chemical engineer, 
Masters 
Oil & Energy Consultancy, Integrated oil 
Companies 
2 Accountant 
 
Financial & Strategy Consultancy, Power 
companies, Independent Companies 
3 Political Science, PhD 
 
Oil & Energy Consultancy, Integrated oil 
Companies, Government 
4 Chemist, PhD 
 
Technology Consultancy, Technology and 
Engineering Energy Companies,  Petrochemical 
Companies  
5 Engineer, MBA & MSc Consultancy, Integrated Oil Companies 
6 Physics, MBA Consultancy, Integrated Oil Companies 
7 Lawyer, PhD Law Firms Oil and Gas, Consultancy 
8 History & Geology, 
MBA 
Consultancy, Chemical Companies, Government 
9 Chemical Engineering, 
MBA 
Energy and Petrochemical companies 
10 Economist, Advanced 
Management Program 
Consultancy, Oil and Energy Companies 
11 BsC Geography,  
Masters in 
Environmental Law 
Energy and Technology Companies 
12 BsC Environmental 
Sciences, MBA  
Petrochemical companies, Government 
13 Lawyer Law firms Oil and Gas 
14 Economist, MSc 
Operational Research 
Consultancy, Integrated Oil Companies, Energy 
Companies 
15 Chemical Engineer, 
MBA Strategy & 
Management 
Service Oil & Gas Companies, Consultancy, 
Independent Oil & Gas Companies 
 
As can be seen from the above table, participants have worked or are working in, amongst 
others, Integrated Oil Companies, Service Companies, Independent Companies, Energy 
Companies, Consultancies and Law Firms. In their careers, most of them have worked for 
different companies. 
 
An interview briefing was developed which had four purposes: to inform potential 
participants on the scope of the interview by providing general themes; to be used as a 
guide during the interview; to built an incremental engagement in the topic from the start to 
the end of the interview, and to build structure into the data collection process (Pettigrew 
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1997). The content of the interview briefing was derived from the process followed in the 
construction of the research questions as outlined earlier in this chapter. Initial thoughts on 
the elements of the holistic process model for strategic alliances began to emerge while 
building the interview briefing through a process of reflection on the research questions and 
the themes to be explored that emerged from the literature. 
 
Interviews began by examining the participants’ understanding of the meaning and types of 
strategic alliances. They moved on to explore the motives to pursue the development of 
strategic alliances, the external limitations or constraints that were faced, the process, 
looking at decisions to enter a strategic alliance, partner selection and performance 
measurement. The interviews focussed on the problems of strategic alliances by asking 
questions from different perspectives. These questions included difficulties encountered, 
risks and critical factors. This questioning strategy took time to become fruitful within the 
interview setting and eventually elicited new or deeper insights into the problems. For 
example in the understanding of success and failure factors, and the influence of people 
involved; and the perception of the future and challenges for strategic alliances. 
 
Through analysis and reflection, interview themes were adapted both incrementally and on 
an ad hoc basis in response to the live interview. 
 
Along the interview process I was able to establish thematic saturation alongside significant 
variance between the data and the established theoretical underpinnings of the field. It also 
allowed me to shift the interview emphasis toward challenging the established theoretical 
assumptions further to provide a foundation for proposing adaptations to theory and 
creating a substantive opportunity to contribute to the field. This sampling approach is 
theoretical (Silverman 2011), it clearly utilised theoretical propositions to establish how 
many participants were required and how the criteria for selection should be applied. It also 
builds on the work by Strauss and Corbin (1990) in creating a structured, stepped approach 
to building a qualitative sample. The sample size was deemed to be credible as data 
saturation was established. This provides the foundation for generalising the data to the 
theoretical propositions explored later in the thesis. 
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Data Collection and Timing  
Qualitative methods were selected as they demanded more involvement as a researcher and 
brought me closer to the participants. This allowed me an enhanced understanding of the 
issues and challenges of strategic alliances. A qualitative method instead of a quantitative 
one therefore made more sense (Blaikie 2009).  In-depth interviews were used. These were 
developed in the form of semi-structured interviews and gave me the opportunity to get 
closer to the meanings and interpretations of the participants and to their accounts of 
perspectives and experiences in this field (Blaikie 2009). Semi-structured interviews were 
developed as being more suitable to capture views and perceptions than a standardised 
interview (Flick 2014). 
There should be an acknowledgement that both methods, quantitative and qualitative, have 
their own applications and limitations (Blaikie 2009). I was aware of the critics of 
generalisation from qualitative methods - quantitative methods also demand similar 
procedures in order to generalise and there are problems found in both perspectives. In 
qualitative studies, generalisation is restricted to research sites or populations. Statements 
can be applied to other locations where this is indicated in the data. Moreover, a 
quantitative perspective fails to consider the details of a situation and does not reflect on the 
subjective contribution of individuals (Saunders 2012). I therefore considered that a 
quantitative approach was not suitable- the perspective of people with experience in 
strategic alliances was key to this research.  
The research was a retrospective study to understand and collect the particular experience 
and perspectives of those involved in strategic alliances in the energy sector. This decision 
acknowledged Blaikie’s thoughts on the limitation of this type of research, in terms of the 
memory being ‘fallible and its use always involves a possible reconstruction of the past 
under the influence of subsequent experiences’ (Blaikie 2009,  p. 203). 
Qualitative methods were chosen for this research due to their concern with ‘exploring 
social actors’ meanings and interpretations’ (Blaikie 2009, p. 204). This departed from the 
idea that quantitative methods are ‘generally concerned with counting and measuring 
aspects social life’; the approach was from the perspective of strategic alliances in the 
energy sector. As a researcher, by conducting semi-structured interviews, I was removed 
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from the natural setting, but was, at the same time, brought closer ‘to the social actors’ 
meanings and interpretations’. 
The decision to choose a qualitative perspective was supported by looking at the concerns 
of researchers using a quantitative or qualitative approach. Blaikie cited the work of 
Bryman on this matter, which is presented in the following table: 
Table 3-8.-  Quantitative and Qualitative researchers’ concerns 
Quantitative Qualitative 
• Measuring concepts 
• Establishing causality 
• Generalizing 
• Replicating 
• Focusing in individuals 
• Using social actors’ point of view 
• Describing thickly 
• Focusing on social processes 
• Adopting a flexible approach 
• Developing concepts and theory 
Source: Blaikie 2009 
The concerns of researchers confirmed that qualitative features are a better fit with the 
purpose and interest of this research because they used the viewpoint of people with 
experience in this area and attempted to develop concepts and theory (Blaikie 2009). The 
emphasis of qualitative data informs the meanings individuals place on the events, 
processes and structures of strategic alliances. It also connects these perceptions to improve 
the understanding of performance of strategic alliances in the energy sector (Miles and 
Hubberman 1994).  By choosing qualitative research, I acknowledge that I sacrificed scope 
for detail (Silverman 2013), however, I considered that the aim of this research would 
benefit more by having in-depth information on the experience and perspectives of strategic 
alliances provided by interviewees. There was also the opportunity to increase the number 
of qualitative studies in the field of strategic alliances, which Gomes et al. (2014) suggested 
was necessary. 
Data Reduction and Analysis 
The data reduction stage was a continuous process of selecting, simplifying, abstracting, 
and transforming along all the phases of this research (Miles and Hubberman 1994). This 
stage of the research was highly engaging as it was a continuous and iterative process of 
reflection. 
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Having researched Computer Aided Qualitative Data Analysis Softwares, I became 
interested in using software as a way to introduce technology as a tool for analysis. NVivo 
was selected due to its range of features and availability within the University. 
 
Undertaking a learning and doing strategy, I first read extensively about Nvivo, attended a 
course and watched videos in order to gain knowledge about the software. I also contacted 
the company which develops the software to obtain clarification where necessary. 
Interviews were transcribed, and the NVivo CADQAS was used to assist the analysis.  
 
 I engaged in analytic coding following advice from Denscombe and Dawson (2007). I 
determined that the units for coding could be variable and the length should be sufficient to 
illustrate the sense expressed by the participant. What was coded was based on the kind of 
event, type of action, shade opinion, an instance of the use of a particular word or 
expression, or an implied meaning. During the process analysis of key informants, I 
constantly searched for mechanisms that could drive the process of strategic alliances 
(Pettigrew 1997). 
 
The themes identified as a framework for each interview were as follows: 
• Meaning and types of strategic alliances 
• Motives and decision making process to enter 
•  Partner selection 
•  Management of portfolio 
•  Performance measurement  
• Problems 
• Risks 
• Critical success and failure factors 
• Influence of executives and managers 
• Future and challenges that strategic alliances will face  
 
The focal point of the interviews was to elicit participant perceptions through discussing 
and analysing examples from their experience to explore each theme.  
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These themes were used to organise the first thematic coding. The software was utilised 
and the interviews were analysed line-by-line, developing codes which resulted in Sub-
level categories.  
 
Initial themes that could follow the development process of strategic alliances and that were 
considered in the literature review were reorganised into five general themes: Concept, 
Process, Performance, Influence and Prospects. They were then subdivided as follows: 
Concept included: Meaning, Types, and Motives. Process: Decision to enter a strategic 
alliance, Partner Selection, and Portfolio. Performance: Measurement, Problems, Risks, 
Critical Factors, Failure and Success. Influence: External Constraints, and Prospects: Future, 
and Challenges. 
 
In light of these themes, transcripts were organised to develop an auto code in NVivo.  The 
purpose was to have a segmentation of the information, to get a cross-sectional level of the 
themes from the participants’ perspective and to facilitate the analysis. During the process it 
was useful to abstract relevant insights which started to emerge from the findings and to 
display these in the form of boxes and diagrams. While coding the themes, some codes 
were found within other themes and others emerged from the analysis. After reviewing and 
reflecting on the second iteration of findings, the theme of Performance was reorganised in 
accordance with the categories that emerged from the insights of interviewees (see Chapter 
5). 
 
The iterative process injected confidence in the robustness of the method followed. The 
displays and findings chapters were also discussed with one of my interviewees and my 
supervisors and their critique was helpful in the development of this stage. 
 
These themes and subthemes formed a sequential stage in the holistic process model as 
presented in the discussion chapter. They also shaped the sequence on structure in the 
findings and discussion chapters. The five general themes are illustrated in the following 
figure: 
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Figure 3-4.- Five general themes for data analysis 
	
 
 
 
 
Ethics 
This research involved collecting data from people and therefore needed the approval of the 
University of Dundee Research Ethics Committee (UREC). In order to obtain this, the 
University of Dundee Code of Practice for Research Human Participants was followed and  
all the documents required by UREC (such as the Participant Information Sheet (Appendix 
3-2), Informed consent form (Appendix 3-3), and the Interview briefing (Appendix 3-4)) 
were produced. These were submitted and approval was subsequently granted by the 
committee (Appendix 3-5). 
Information was provided to potential participants through the participant information sheet. 
This explained the purpose of the research, time commitment, the option to withdraw from 
the study, risks involved and how confidentiality and anonymity would be preserved. 
Participants who agreed to take part signed the informed consent form. In order to preserve 
confidentiality and anonymity, quotations in the thesis were edited. 
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Conclusions 
Blaikie’s research design framework, complemented by information from other authors, 
guided the choice of methodology and associated research methods. Developing the 
research design was a continuous process that allowed each of the parameters to be 
reviewed and adapted.  
This thesis attempted to understand the performance of strategic alliances from the 
perspective of those with experience in their development. It therefore took an idealist 
ontological assumption and, consequently, a constructionism epistemological assumption 
where participants informed their knowledge of strategic alliances by making sense of their 
experience. This embraces the idea that each participant produces independent knowledge. 
(Blaikie 2009) 
An abductive approach on the reasons for failure or success of strategic alliances was taken 
to obtain data that was sufficiently detailed and rich to allow an understanding of the 
reasons for failure or success. By exploring, identifying and explaining themes and patterns 
regarding the performance of strategic alliances. These explanations were integrated in an 
overall conceptual framework (Blaikie 2009). 
The research philosophy selected was interpretivism because strategic alliances deal with 
organisational theory and management far too complex to be explained by laws similar to 
those in physical sciences (Saunders 2012, Sekaran and Bougie 2013). 
This research mainly was developed by primary data, within a semi-natural setting, where 
individuals with experience in the development of strategic alliances talked about their 
experience and perspectives in the energy sector (Blaikie 2009). 
The sample is non-probability in a single stage as sampling is complicated in the area of 
strategic alliances. Information on details and perceptions of people working in strategic 
alliances are not available in public sources. The sampling methods used were judgemental 
sampling and snowballing.  The sample is small due to the intensive use of resources in a 
qualitative study and in order to have a more in-depth data on an unrepresentative sample 
(Blaikie 2009). 
In-depth interviews were conducted. These were developed in the form of semi-structured 
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interviews and this gave the opportunity to get closer to the meanings and interpretations of 
the people involved in strategic alliances and their accounts, perspectives and experiences 
in this field (Blaikie 2009).  
The literature review, my experience in the field, the process of developing the research 
questions, the development of a interview briefing and the data reduction process combined 
to identify the elements of the holistic process model as presented in the discussion chapter. 
This provided a structure by which to present the findings and discussion according to: 
Concept, Process, Performance, Influence and Prospects. As presented in the following 
chapters. 
 
 
 
 
 
90 
CHAPTER 4 ‘FINDINGS - CONCEPT & PROCESS’ 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this research is to gain an in-depth understanding of the performance of 
strategic alliances in the energy sector. This is achieved by drawing on an in-depth 
qualitative study of the perspectives of those with experience in strategic alliances within 
this sector.  The following three chapters will present the findings of the developed 
qualitative analysis as explained in Chapter 3 preceding, ‘Methodology-Methods’. Taking 
the substantial number of interviewees’ insights into account, the findings are reported in 
separate chapters and accompanied by a linking, separate discussion chapter where findings 
are related to existing literature (Burnard 2008). 
 
The three ‘findings’ chapters are organised according to the general themes of concept, 
process, performance, influence, and prospects. These are the five elements of the holistic 
process model and are presented in the discussion chapter as follows:  
 
Chapter 4: concept and process 
Chapter 5: performance 
Chapter 6: influence and prospects 
 
The following research questions (RQ) were posed in Chapter 3: 
 
RQ1: How and why have strategic alliances been developed in the energy sector? 
RQ2: How and why do strategic alliances succeed or fail?  
RQ3: Why do firms engage in strategic alliances despite low success rates? 
RQ4: How can we create more effective strategic alliances in the energy sector?  
 
 
These findings were used to inform the study’s research questions (Goodson 2013). I have 
sought to assist an understanding of the narrative by presenting the findings using tables 
and diagrams. The format of each section is as follows: Firstly, I have presented a narrative 
of interviewee’s quotations. Secondly, where a table is presented it contains 3 columns 
entitled ‘Key themes’, ‘Quotation’ and ‘RQ’ (Research Question). ‘Key themes’ consist of 
relevant ideas from the ‘Quotation’ and assist the narrative.  The participants’ quotations 
are connected to the research question that they inform, as specified in the column ‘RQ’. In 
sections where tables are not employed, the relevant research question is identified in 
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brackets. Tables are cross-referenced with the relevant subsection of literature; this is 
specified in the title of the table as ‘LR’. The quotations are verbatim except where minimal 
editing was required to preserve confidentiality. Diagrams are presented along the sections 
and subsections to facilitate the understanding of the development of the key findings. 
 
Figure 4-1.- Structure of chapter 4  
 
 
 
 
 
The diagram above highlights the sections and subsections that are presented in this 
chapter. These are: Concept - meaning, types, motives, and Process - Decision to enter a 
strategic alliance, partner selection, and portfolio. 
 
Concept of Strategic Alliances 
 
Meaning, types and motives are grouped under this theme, as they are foundational to the 
understanding and construction of the concept of strategic alliances. This theme is the first 
element of the holistic process model presented in the discussion chapter, the sub elements 
being strategic alliances, types, and motives. 
 
Meaning of Strategic Alliances (RQ1-4) 
 
The meaning of strategic alliances emerged as a core theme from the literature review.  I 
found there was no a single definition for strategic alliances; different authors construe 
different meanings. This point was reinforced by my personal experience in the field, both 
in presenting this research and in having conversations with a variety of people within the 
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industry. In chapter 2 of the literature review, an initial meaning was developed.  
Interviewees were asked about their understanding of the meaning of strategic alliances. 
This section presents the findings as regards meaning and is organised under the 
subsections of: broad term and boundaries; organisations, alignment and competitive 
advantage; strategic component; ‘marriage’, temporal and duration; and concept and 
measurement.  
 
 
Broad Term & Boundaries (RQ1) 
 
Some interviewees pointed out that ‘strategic alliances’ is a broad and diverse term which 
can incorporate different meanings. They also highlighted that there are other types of 
strategic alliances apart from a joint venture, and that the boundaries of a strategic alliance 
fall somewhere between a contract and an acquisition. This can be illustrated in the 
following table of quotations:  
 
Table 4-1.- Strategic Alliance: a broad term and boundaries (LR: Definition of strategic 
alliances) 
 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Broad Quite a broad… term (Interviewee 1) 1 
Diverse Strategic alliances can…take quite… a lot of different forms. 
(Interviewee 6)   
1 
Different 
meanings 
Whatever you want it to mean… It can mean a wide range of 
different things. (Interviewee 8) 
1 
Other types of 
strategic 
alliances besides 
JVs 
I see the broad concept so it doesn't have to necessarily be a joint 
venture so. (Interviewee 9)  
1 
In between a 
contract and an 
acquisition 
It's the grey area between a contract and an acquisition... 
(Interviewee 10) 
1 
 
The quotations above illustrate the diversity of the meaning of strategic alliances within the 
energy sector. This diversity may lead to issues when developing a strategic alliance 
because different understandings could lead to different behaviours among the 
organisations involved. Therefore, it is important to achieve a common understanding of 
‘strategic alliance’ when organisations discuss alliance development. The following figure 
illustrates these findings, where the meaning of the strategic alliance is broad, diverse and 
in between a contract and an acquisition. 
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Figure 4-2.- Broad term & boundaries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parties, objectives, alignment, benefits & competitive advantage (RQ1,3) 
 
The majority of interviewees pointed out the number of partners involved in a strategic 
alliance and alluded to various elements that contributed to its meaning. Some interviewees 
believed that a strategic alliance is a collaborative agreement amongst two or more 
companies aligned to a common strategic objective to pursue a business opportunity that 
cannot be addressed separately. It furthermore looks for mutual benefit and the 
development of a competitive advantage. It can be an agreement of cooperation up to a full 
joint venture, either created as a stand-alone business or putting together joining two 
businesses, and when the strategic objective is reached the strategic alliance comes to an 
end. A strategic alliance is different from a merger. Two interviewees pointed out a 
different perspective on the number of projects that were involved in a strategic alliance. 
The following table of quotations illustrate these points well: 
 
 
Table 4-2.- Parties, objectives, alignment, benefits & competitive advantage (LR: 
Definition of strategic alliances) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Two or more 
companies 
agreed on a 
common 
strategic 
objective 
If two companies, or more, companies have the similar objective and 
they pursue that on a broader front of activities .  Through a number 
of ventures together…. to meet an agreed and commonly understood 
strategic objective. (Interviewee 9) 
 
1 
A number of 
partners that get 
together to 
pursue a 
business 
opportunity that 
A coming together of a number of partners… two at least… in order 
to address, an area, a business opportunity that separately cannot 
be addressed … (Interviewee 14) 
1,3 
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cannot be 
addressed 
separately. 
Loose or 
formalised 
collaboration to 
align and find 
mutual benefit 
In terms of alliance, it could be a loose or more formalised 
collaboration, put it that way. More about trying to get aligned with 
other organisations or other individuals.  And trying to find useful, 
mutual benefit, or mutual goals… (Interviewee 11) 
 
1,3 
Alignment 
among a number 
of parties 
It is, well, an alignment between two parties, or three parties, five 
parties, whatever it maybe… (Interviewee 3) 
 
1 
Creation of 
competitive 
advantage 
The closer you are to the business side of it , people really see more 
the added value of being in a market faster, offering a more 
extensive package and creating a competitive advantage through a 
strategic alliance a competitive advantage. (Interviewee 4) 
 
1,3 
An agreement to 
cooperate, up to 
a full JV, where 
two partners 
create a stand  
alone business or 
put two 
businesses 
together 
It can be a framework agreement to co-operate across a number of 
areas up to a fully incorporated joint venture where the two 
partners have created maybe a stand alone business or put two 
businesses together… (Interviewee 10) 
1 
strategic 
alliances end 
once the 
objective of a 
specific project 
is achieved  
The strategic alliance is two or more people coming together to 
undertake a specific project and once that specific project has been 
completed then the strategic alliance effectively comes to an end. 
(Interviewee 7) 
 
1 
Different from a 
merger, intended 
to last for more 
than one project  
I think of a relationship between, independent companies.  So 
something different than a merger, but something which is intended 
to last for more than one project. (Interviewee 13) 
1,3 
 
The above quotations demonstrate that there is no a limit on the number of partners 
involved which could lead to a variety of challenges in trying to achieve alignment. At the 
same time, it seems that the search for benefits acts as a driver to develop strategic alliances 
and achieve competitive advantage. 
The following figure represents these findings. As can be seen, the number of partners 
could fluctuate, with regard to the need for alignment, the interest of organisations in 
achieving benefit and pursuing the development of a competitive advantage.  
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Figure 4-3.- Parties, objectives, alignment & competitive advantage 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic component (RQ1,3) 
 
Some interviewees highlighted that the word ‘strategic’ was related to the contribution to 
the long-term vision of the parties involved. This means that it leaves a lasting footprint, 
that it fits into an overall plan and that strategic alliances could have a relative and different 
importance to each of the parties involved. One interviewee believed that ‘strategic’ meant 
the alliance would last for more than one project. The following table of quotations 
illustrate this: 
 
Table 4-3.- Strategic component (LR: Definition of strategic alliances) 
 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Bring something 
aligned with the 
long-term vision 
of the parties. A 
more lasting 
footprint. 
[The] strategic word in strategic alliances suggests… that the 
alliance is going to bring something to both parties, which is in the 
line with the achievement of both parties’ long-term vision… 
strategic means it’s going to leave a more lasting footprint because 
structurally both companies will benefit in some way, shape, or 
form… allow them to achieve their longer term vision over time… 
(Interviewee 1) 
1,3 
Fits in an overall 
plan 
Strategic when it fits into the overall plan of a particular company 
or companies that to further their goals... (Interviewee 3) 
1 
Relative 
importance 
Strategic just depends on how important it is to somebody… 
(Interviewee 7) 
1 
Last for more 
than one project 
[It is] intended to last for more than one project.  That’s why it’s 
‘strategic’ as opposed to ‘tactical’… (Interviewee 13) 
1 
 
Metaphor of marriage (RQ1) 
 
Some interviewees used the metaphor of marriage in order to inform the definition - a 
marriage in terms of formality but not permanence. This implies an element of temporality 
and also the satisfaction of needs between the parties. 
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Table 4-4.- Marriage, temporal and duration (LR: Definition of strategic alliances) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Marriage, 
formal, but not 
necessarily 
permanent 
It’s a marriage between companies not necessarily a permanent 
thing…  but that has some formality to it and they are both looking 
to satisfy some needs and has a complementary element to it that is a 
two-way street. (Interviewee 5) 
 
1,3 
Marrying 
resources 
Where you're really marrying financial resources and technology 
resources with access to feed stock…’ (Interviewee 12) 
 
1,3 
 
Even though there is a temporal element to the alliance, certain objectives are still achieved, 
as illustrated by the following quotation: 
 
As a way to access a resource or a skill that you don’t have - you only want that 
strategic alliance for so long as you need that resource or skill.  You don’t want it 
after that so… you’ve got to expect that at some point in time people will say 
‘enough I don’t need this anymore’…and as I said that could be by simply buying 
out the other party…Or it could it simply be ‘I’ve now adopted this skill myself so I 
don’t need you anymore'. (Interviewee 7) 
 
 
There were different opinions about the time strategic alliances last: 
 
Table 4-5.- Duration of alliance (LR: Definition of strategic alliances) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Short or 
extremely long 
Now time can be very short to extremely long… (Interviewee 7) 
 
1 
Last for a 
number of years 
Strategic alliance, I would view it as something that, was probably 
intended to last for a number of years… (Interviewee 13) 
 
1 
 
Concept and measurement of performance (RQ2) 
 
One interviewee highlighted the relationship between the concept of a strategic alliance and 
the measurement of success and failure with the size of the deal and the respective interests 
of each of the parties involved. The comment was related to an example given by the 
Interviewee where the relative importance of the strategic alliance was different for each of 
the parties. This brought different bargaining powers when problems arose because the 
strategic alliance affected more of the core business operations of one party than the other. 
This is of particular interest as it establishes a connection between the relative relevance of 
the strategic alliance and the perception of performance. The relationship is illustrated in 
the following quotation: 
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The concept of strategic alliance covers so much ground, you have to be careful 
how you measure the success and failures of such alliances depending on how much 
is involved. (Interviewee 3) 
 
The quotation above establishes an important link between meaning and effect in 
performance and confirms the need to reach a common understanding when organisations 
are discussing development of a strategic alliance. It seems advisable to make this 
discussion part of the process of a strategic alliance development. 
 
The following diagram integrates the findings of meaning.  
 
Figure 4-4.- Meaning of Strategic Alliance 
 
  
 
 
As illustrated in the diagram above, the meaning of strategic alliance is broad and the 
boundaries are somewhere in between a contract and an acquisition; parties involved need 
to be aligned. The strategic component is related to vision and is relative to each party. The 
duration is variable and temporal; the metaphor of marriage was used in illustration, and its 
meaning influences the perception of performance in terms of success or failure depending 
on how much a particular party is involved. 
 
In the next section, the findings around the types of strategic alliances are presented. 
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Types of Strategic Alliances (RQ1) 
 
Interviewees were asked about the types of strategic alliances they were familiar with. 
Types can take various forms - from a loose structure/agreement to a more formalised 
structure, and could also take the form of an incorporated joint venture.  
 
 
Various types & different levels (RQ1) 
 
The majority of interviewees commented on the various forms of strategic alliance that they 
have experienced. Among these were strategic alliances related to: technology, supply, 
research and development, operating, market and licensing specifically for the energy 
industry. There were examples given between National Oil Companies and International 
Oil Companies. Also there could be strategic alliances of geographical scope, global, 
regional or country levels and strategic alliances between competitors. The 
acknowledgement that these could go beyond an organisational level to an industry level is 
illustrated in the following quotation: 
A number of industry players get together and in a fairly organised way seek to 
lobby government to achieve a particular aim.  I suppose you could view that also 
as a kind of a strategic alliance. (Interviewee 13)  
 
Some interviewees highlighted a number of considerations that influence the type of 
strategic alliance chosen. It was mentioned that strategic alliances were influenced by 
strategy and objectives as well as legal compliance and requirements. It was believed that 
types of structures are limited and the selection of the structure was chosen according to the 
degree of flexibility desired. It was perceived that the more formalised the arrangements, 
the more time needed to develop legal documents and to negotiate terms. It was suggested 
that strategic alliances could start as a pilot or a loose collaboration in order to get to know 
the partners and experience how they work together prior to fully committing resources. If 
the strategic alliance worked, it might result in a more formal relationship. These points are 
illustrated in the following table of quotations: 
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Table 4-6.- Considerations for types of strategic alliances (LR: Types of Strategic 
Alliances) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Type shaped by 
objectives and 
definition of the 
alliance 
It depends on what your strategy or your strategic objectives are… 
(Interviewee 8) 
 
1 
Legal 
compliance and 
requirements 
I guess the structure is driven partly by… legal and compliance 
requirements, partly by the requirements of the third parties that 
you’re going to deal with… (Interviewee 13) 
 
1 
Structure & 
Flexibility 
 
And so the types of structures you can use are roughly limited…and 
the structure you’d normally choose is the one that gives you a 
degree of flexibility…you’re looking for.  The other fact that can 
have some various taxes but generally it’s the structure that gives 
you the flexibility you require… (Interviewee 7) 
 
1 
Structure and 
time invested 
 
If you go for formalised arrangements, that need to be documented 
legally, that causes delay, because you have to write those contracts 
and the Lawyers have to review them, and… that can be very slow… 
(Interviewee 13) 
1 
More detail more 
negotiation more 
time 
Sometimes if you try to structure it too much and have a lot of 
definition and draw up a proper joint venture in terms of a... proper 
company, you might take a lot of time because there’s a lot of 
negotiation to do. (Interviewee 15) 
 
1 
Pilots You can actually have pilots and see what happens… (Interviewee 
14) 
1 
Then structure 
follows 
Sometimes it is easier…we agree there is a need… we agree we 
could both benefit.  You have something that I don’t have.  Let’s just 
get on and do it… and then you basically start collaborating, start 
working together, start getting on with each other… and once you 
see that things are indeed working, that you both are making money 
and that it’s...it’s a relationship that you want to put together, then it 
becomes easier to structure it further. (Interviewee 15) 
 
1 
 
The quotations above highlight a number of aspects which seem to be important in the 
process of selecting a structure for a strategic alliance. One aspect is to consider the 
objectives of the strategic alliance, in relation to the meaning of a strategic alliance as 
discussed in the previous section. Legal compliance and tax aspects influence the structure 
selected and the degree of flexibility required is another consideration. However, once a 
structure is selected, maintaining flexibility in the implementation phase of the strategic 
alliance seems to present a challenge.  
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The following diagram illustrates the findings for the types of strategic alliances.  
 
Figure 4-5.- Types of strategic alliances 
 
 
 
The diagram above illustrates that there are various types of strategic alliances and the 
structure selected is connected to the expected degree of flexibility. Alliances can be 
developed at different levels. The structure is constrained by objectives and legal and 
compliance requirements. Pilots and loose relations could be useful to get to know the 
partners and could test how well the parties might work together.  
The following section presents the perceptions (i.e. motives) of interviewees in terms of 
their rational to enter into strategic alliances. 
 
Motives (RQ1,3) 
 
Interviewees were asked about the rational of entering a strategic alliance and what the 
motives or incentives were. Motives were organised under the subcategories of 
complementary, access, strategic, risks and capital, positives and negatives, and there were 
split motives mentioned in the value chain of oil and gas. This section explores the 
organisational rationales in the process of creating a strategic alliance and illustrates a key 
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finding that, despite the high failure rate of strategic alliances, they are still pursued by 
organisations.  
 
Complementary (RQ1,3) 
 
Some interviewees highlighted complementarities as a motive to enter strategic alliances in 
order to satisfy needs, provide skills or elements that create more value (the whole is 
greater than the sum of the parts). Alliances work more effectively when the objectives are 
complementary. It was highlighted that building capabilities takes time; therefore a 
strategic alliance brings in these capabilities via a partner. These points are illustrated in the 
following table of quotations:  
 
Table 4-7.- Complementary (LR: Motives for the Formation of Strategic Alliances) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Satisfying needs Satisfying needs in some form of complementary way… (Interviewee 
5) 
1,3 
Complementary 
skills: the whole 
is greater than 
the sum of its 
parts (creates 
value) 
Complementary skills, where you actually do find a fit between two 
or more companies who can actually come together and Company A 
can provide certain elements which, when you add… Company B’s 
contribution, the whole is more than the sum of the parts. 
(Interviewee 6) 
 
1,3 
Alliances work 
better if strategic 
objectives are 
complementary  
I think one aspect would be to find an alliance partner which has got 
the same, well a strategic objective which complements one’s own.  
And it doesn't have to be the same, in fact alliances probably work 
best if you don't have the same strategic objective. (Interviewee 9) 
 
1,3 
Impact of time to 
develop 
capabilities 
Like you can’t really build, let’s say the capability so fast…  But you 
have another party that has the capabilities… Building a capability 
takes time.  Acquiring the capability costs a lot of money; perhaps 
not doable too.  Developing a partnership, this is what I call an 
alliance, right?  A partnership.  Then it’s an easier, perhaps, way… 
(Interviewee 14) 
1,3 
 
These quotations illustrate that, as no single organisation has all of the resources necessary 
to exploit business opportunities, there is a need to look for a complementary partner to 
develop added value. The final quotation introduces the term ‘partnership’ as a synonym 
for alliance. This suggests that the concept is not perceived to have a definition which is 
limited by any specific discipline, for instance from a legal viewpoint. 
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The following figure summarises the findings of complementary motives. 
Figure 4-6.- Complementary motives 
 
 
 
 
 
Access (RQ1,3) 
 
Some interviewees highlighted access to markets, technology, people, feedstock (the 
influence of governments and NOCs to provide access), knowledge (for NOCs as a way to 
increase the capabilities of people). These points are illustrated in the following table of 
quotations: 
Table 4-8.- Access (LR: Motives for the Formation of Strategic Alliances) 
 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Feedstock for 
processing 
purposes 
It could be a particular stream that is useful from a processing 
standpoint… (Interviewee 5) 
 
1,3 
Influence of 
governments and 
NOCs 
Access to feed stock in the industry where you've got the increasing 
influence of governments and national organisations, national 
companies… (Interviewee 12) 
 
1,3 
Knowledge as a 
driver for NOCs 
to increase the 
capabilities of 
people 
One of the reasons for developing strategic alliances, because you 
could learn or benefit from association with another organization… 
(Interviewee 11) 
 
NOC is actually – are also benefiting, because... they improve… the 
capabilities of their people… knowledge of the subsurface to develop 
products and optimise the field… better than they would have done 
without all this… (Interviewee 14) 
1,3 
 
Therefore, governments meet their objectives for the development of natural resources and 
the transfer of knowledge through strategic alliances. 
 
The findings on motives of access are represented in the following figure, highlighting the 
relevance of the influence of government on feedstock. 
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Figure 4-7.- Motives of access 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic (RQ1,3) 
 
Some interviewees highlighted reasons that were categorised under strategic motives. 
These could be in the form of a pre-emptive move to prevent competition and protect 
position, a temporary arrangement in order to achieve an exit strategy, as a vehicle to deal 
with uncertainty in new markets and as a step for an acquisition, and using the alliance as a 
tool to gain an understanding of the business, or to build credibility. These points are 
illustrated in the following quotations: 
Table 4-9.- Strategic motives (LR: Motives for the Formation of Strategic Alliances) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Prevent 
competition, and 
protect position 
Going into alliances with companies in order to prevent that 
company doing something with another company... (Interviewee 3) 
 
You could tie someone up for a while because you recognise that… if 
company X joined with company Y… your company would suffer. So 
you might make a pre-emptive move to try and do something about 
that. (Interviewee 5) 
 
1,3 
A temporary 
arrangement to 
exit a business 
If two companies both want to exit businesses they may say, you 
know what, let's put out two businesses together, crash them together 
and sell the whole lot so we know this joint venture is a temporary 
arrangement. (Interviewee 10) 
 
1,3 
A first step for 
an acquisition to 
gain 
understanding of 
a business 
So they could either have used a strategic alliance as a stepping 
stone to taking someone over to make an acquisition.  But not being 
sure that they want to make the acquisition in the first place they 
will do the strategic alliance, get to understand the business of the 
person they are working with.  And only then they make the  offer to 
acquire.  (Interviewee 7) 
1,3 
To build 
credibility 
They don’t have the credibility in – in building these capabilities.  So 
they want to bring a party who has an existing credibility to fill the 
gap and say, “You know something?  I don’t know it myself, but I 
have my friend here who’s – you know these people.  You know 
they’ve been established in the space. (Interviewee 14) 
1,3 
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These quotations show some of the strategic thinking when a strategic alliance is 
developed. Taking into consideration that at least two organisations are involved, this 
confirms the importance of understanding the different motives of the participant parties as 
part of the process when developing a strategic alliance. 
 
The following figure summarises the findings of strategic motives - strategic alliances were 
perceived to be a temporal agreement. 
 
Figure 4-8.- Strategic motives 
 
 
 
 
 
Risks and Capital (RQ1,3) 
Some interviewees mentioned levels of investment, the need for capital and risk as motives 
to enter into strategic alliances, as illustrated below: 
Table 4-10.- Risks & Capital (LR: Motives for the Formation of Strategic Alliances) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Levels of 
investment and 
risk 
Maybe it’s particularly high levels of investment… I guess what all 
of these have in common, thinking about them, is that they’re all 
areas of peculiarly high risk in one way or another … (Interviewee 
6) 
1,3 
To diversify risk 
in the upstream 
Or also what it can also do is allow the reduction of risk.  So if it's a 
particularly risky venture, like you often get in the upstream part of 
the energy pursues.  Then you can get partners that ensure upstream 
activity to diversify the risk. (Interviewee 9)   
1,3 
To share risk and 
access to capital  
To share a risk… So the kind of strategic alliances that I’m most 
familiar with – the main one would be a joint venture of the kind 
that oil companies enter into, to exploit hydrocarbons.  And that is 
about risk- pooling, largely.  It can, for some companies, also be 
about access to capital.  For instance, a small oil company, which 
doesn’t have very strong finances, will seek to farm out part of its 
interest in a license to a larger company that would have… the 
money to be able to explore and then develop that resource.  And the 
smaller company will keep a small share of that – of that license 
that it can afford then to – to fund. (Interviewee 13) 
1,3 
 
These demonstrate that the high level of risk and investment in the energy industry acts as 
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motivation for the development of strategic alliances. 
The findings on the motives of risk and capital are illustrated in the following figure. In the 
upstream, risk-sharing and diversification was found to be a common motive. 
Figure 4-9.- Risks and capital motives 
 
 
 
 
Positive and negative motives (RQ1,3) 
 
Data from some interviewees related to motives that were categorised under positives and 
negatives. With regard to the former, looking for an opportunity to fulfil as a way to move 
faster and to search for efficiency; and with the latter, to solve a problem as a defensiveness 
option or a way to survive. The case was highlighted where the only way for companies to 
access resources in some areas was by developing an alliance with NOCs. There was a 
negative perception from some Organisations who found that strategic alliances were not 
necessarily the best way to proceed and also alluded to the significant costs and difficulties 
involved in their development. This is illustrated in the following table of quotations: 
Table 4-11.- Positive and negative motives (LR: Motives for the Formation of Strategic 
Alliances) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Positive 
motivation 
searching for 
efficiency 
Positive motivations are where companies look at their own 
resources and capabilities, and figure out that to make the type of 
progress towards an end state, towards a vision that they want to 
make… it’s going to be very difficult for them to do that on their 
own.  So they look and they start to think about strategic alliances 
as a way to more quickly or more efficiently… achieve what their 
vision might be to be able to move forward, so for the most part 
that’s the positive motivation. (Interviewee 1) 
1,3 
An alliance with 
a NOC as an 
opportunity to 
access resources 
Very often you simply can't get access to those economically 
attractive feedstocks, without having some kind of alliance with the 
state company or the national company.  So, again, providing an 
opportunity, which wouldn't otherwise exist. (Interviewee 12) 
 
1,3 
Strategic 
alliances are 
complicated due 
to difficulties 
When we talk to clients - we have a number of clients who are mostly 
refining companies or integrated oil companies - they really-they’ve 
said that they looked for strategic alliances but I think they’re much 
more wary… when strategic alliance or help or… complicate 
1 
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and costs  matters. (Interviewee 5) 
 
There are so many costs and difficulties of getting into an alliance, 
that you wouldn’t do it unless there was a special reason to offset 
those costs. (Interviewee 6) 
 
 
The figure above illustrates the findings of positive and negative motives. Efficiency was 
found to be a driver for positive motives and complexity and costs of strategic alliances 
were perceived as a negative motive from the viewpoint of interviewees. These quotations 
are important because strategic alliances could be a second option in the process of 
evaluating alternatives for organisations to achieve their goals, thus to keep the analysis of 
other alternatives as part of the decision making process could bring a continuous light 
when the context changes. 
 
Figure 4-10.- Positive and negative motives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Value chain (RQ1,3) 
 
One interviewee pointed out that the motivation to get into a strategic alliance could be 
seen differently according to the stage of the oil and gas value chain. This was interesting 
because the interviewee specified motives along the value chain.  At the upstream level, it 
was more about access to feedstock and gave the sense that in a developing country it was 
common to form a partnership with NOCs. For refining from an Oil Company perspective, 
a strategic alliance could be used as an exit strategy. In the case of petrochemicals, it was 
about access to technology and markets.  
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Table 4-12.- Motives in value chain (LR: Motives for the Formation of Strategic Alliances) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Upstream, access 
to feedstock 
I think people might have different motives, that you see oil 
exploration… the motive for strategic alliance and the partnership 
its access to feedstock resources you would, as an individual player, 
normally not have.  It could be a partnership with the state oil 
company in the developing country… to enter into a country, you 
team up with a partner and developed a market there, so you’ve had 
access from that point of view… (Interviewee 4) 
 
1,3 
Refining, an exit 
strategy for an 
oil company 
Then you go into all processing of strategic alliance, here is 
refining, etc. might even mean that it is for you as an oil company, 
who has been active with downstream processing are ready to long 
term exit the business because you don’t see a profitable business in 
the long term in the refining sector. so you try to find a partner who 
might at the end take over a business.  That’s why I say a strategic 
alliance very often has a definite timeline, so it’s a more defensive 
approach.  It’s a very forfeiting- out scenario and could be a 
different motive again. (Interviewee 4) 
 
1,3 
Petrochemicals, 
enter new 
markets or 
access 
technology 
In the petrochemical sector, I think if -, as long as the future position 
is okay, you don’t need to be defensive and more really a gross 
perspective but you are entering into new markets.  You gain access 
to new technology to follow certain, customer, trends and 
behaviours. and, then the motive is more on growing market share, 
growing the business and finding partners who allow you to have 
either access to better technology or to different markets. 
(Interviewee 4) 
 
1,3 
 
The following figure illustrates the motives of the value chain in oil and gas. National oil 
companies were partners in upstream when looking for feedstock. 
 
Figure 4-11.- Value chain motives  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following diagram brings together the findings of motivation in forming a strategic 
alliance. 
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Figure 4-12.- Motives for strategic alliances 
 
 
  
 
 
 
The diagram above illustrates the categories of motives that were found in organisations 
entering into strategic alliances – the search for complementarities, time involved in 
developing capabilities, access to markets, technology, knowledge, people, risk-sharing, 
financial resources, prevention of competition, exit strategy and feedstock. Complementary 
objectives among parties seem to work better than sharing the same objective. Positive 
motives are connected with opportunity and efficiency; on the other hand negative motives 
are linked to the solution of problems, to defend or survive. Motives along the oil and gas 
value chain are different. Strategic alliances were perceived as complex and costly and 
therefore, for some organisations, it is not the first choice. This illustrates the relevance of 
understanding the motives of all the parties involved in a strategic alliance and of analysing 
motive as part of the process of developing a strategic alliance. 
The following section presents the themes around the process for entering a strategic 
alliance, partner selection and portfolio management.  
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Process in Strategic Alliances 
 
Three themes were explored with interviewees around processes for strategic alliances - the 
decision-making process to enter strategic alliances, the selection of a partner and the 
experience and perceptions of interviewees regarding the management of the alliances’ 
portfolio. Process in strategic alliances will become the second element of the holistic 
process model as presented in the discussion chapter. The findings in relation to the process 
to enter strategic alliance and alliance portfolio management are presented next, and will 
become the sub elements of the holistic process model.  
 
Decision to enter a strategic alliance (RQ1- 4) 
 
The decision process to enter into strategic alliances was explored with interviewees. 
Findings were organised under ‘business options’ (as organisations review other 
alternatives to strategic alliances,) and ‘strategic alliance process’ (more detail is provided 
by interviewees about the decisions to enter a strategic alliance). 
 
Business options (RQ1) 
 
Some interviewees referred to a sequential process where the starting point is to decide to 
be in a business, then to look at the options available. These are: a) the potential of doing it 
in-house (Standalone), b) acquiring resources if they are not within the organisation, c) if 
not, to partner with someone else or acquire a stake in a company, and d) do nothing. These 
points are illustrated in the following quotations: 
 
Now and again if you're saying I want to set up a new business, well the first thing 
is do we wanna be in this business and then we'll probably do it ourselves or do we 
need a collection of skills that don't exist.  Can we go and acquire those skills or do 
we joint venture them or partner with and buy some because you can argue that 
buying a stake in a company as a partner is a strategic alliance.  I might buy thirty 
percent and I will dabble in that market for a while but the first decision has to be 
the company saying this is something I want to do. (Interviewee 10) 
 
I think you have to look at your options… one option is to go... stand alone and do 
just a local subsidiary or branch for a market entry.  We can go and do a strategic 
alliance or a JV with a local company or individual.  We can do it with a larger...a 
local enterprise, or we cannot do it at all. (Interviewee 15) 
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These quotations show that organisations consider a set of alternatives to achieve their 
goals. Considering the dynamics of the context, this step is integrated as part of the process 
in developing a strategic alliance because they take time to be developed and at the end 
there is no certainty of closing the deal, therefore it is better to keep a continuous analysis 
of the options.   
 
The following figure illustrates these findings. 
 
Figure 4-13.- Business options 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic alliance process (RQ1-4) 
 
A majority of interviewees described different processes that organisations follow in 
making the decision to enter a strategic alliance. These processes were organised under: a 
Strategic approach, a Top-down process, Division level and Informal process. This is 
illustrated in the following figure. 
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Figure 4-14.- Strategic alliance process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reviewing the strategy (RQ1)  
 
One interviewee described the process as involving three steps: 1) reviewing the strategy 
and goals, 2) the strategic alliance as an option of achieving the goals, and 3) the selection 
of the partner. This is illustrated by the following quotation: 
 
 
You start out as a company saying what's my strategy, what do I want to do. Let's 
say you want do X, the next question you'd then ask is well how can I do X…’ 
‘…looks at it fits within the core skills, the core market, all that…well how do we do 
it and then you say, you know what, the best way to do this is through partnership.  
Second step.  Then the third, who's gonna be the partner and there were steps in the 
decision. (Interviewee 10) 
 
 
One interviewee described the process followed in an organisation from the very beginning 
- the development of a strategic plan, where opportunities to growth are pursued, and the 
analysis of the options. These can be organic by investing in internal development, 
acquiring a company or engaging in a partnership. Some areas of the organisation involve a 
gate decision-making process. External actors are sometimes brought in to confirm 
decisions or support the process, this suggests some legitimisation. Then the decision goes 
to the Board and, if approved, is pursued for implementation. This is illustrated by the 
following quotation: 
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We do our strategic plan. 
What we’re looking here, is to see where there is growth… in a space…  So we 
discuss it in… at product line level…  Or sub-product line.  The smaller product 
line, right?  I’ll give you an example.  Product line X [name changed by the author] 
is one product line.  It’s made up by three sub-product lines.  So let’s discuss one, 
that’s services.  Let’s say that in the service area, we discuss how we’re going to 
grow…   
…there are two ways of growth – three ways of growing.  Either through internal,  
growth – organic.  What we call ‘New Product Introduction’, NPI.  So we invest 
money to develop new products.  Or you go and acquire a company to – mostly the 
products.  Or you develop a partnership with a company that provides the service, 
okay?  So if we – then we – we do the plan. 
We discuss it with the – with business development, the product management piece 
goes to the Product Manager, then they create a pearl gate process, where you 
actually… make a decision in different… number of steps. 
And… the BD is actually either M&A or… partnership.  Then… we start really 
looking externally… 
Sometimes you’ll bring Strategy Consultants in.  Sometimes you’ll actually get 
investment banks involved, only to get some ideas.  But they don’t tell us anything 
that we don’t know, really.  They reconfirm what we know, usually. 
And secondly, is they help us in doing due diligence 
put the right people – put horsepower where we don’t have the horsepower.  We 
have the ideas, we have the knowledge, but everybody has got a day job.   
Then we’ve got to develop an – a proposal, okay?  We’re going to take it up to the 
Investment Board.  Then we’re going to discuss it in the Investment Board.  And 
once we get the ‘okay’, then the BD has the opportunity to go outside and say, “I 
have the authority now…. (Interviewee 14) 
 
 
Previous quotations show in detail the process followed by some organisations in the 
development of a strategic alliance - decisions require some levels of approval and 
sometimes there is a need to bring in external people to legitimise the process. The 
following figure illustrates these findings. 
 
Figure 4-15.- Strategy 
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A Top-down process (RQ1-4) 
 
A particularly insightful comment from one interviewee described how the initiation of a 
strategic alliance discussion starts at the CEO or board level. It also points out that the more 
actors involved at the beginning, the more challenging it could be for a project’s 
development. The selection of potential partners is often delegated to expert teams. Due to 
confidentiality or secrecy, there is the view that the Board takes pre-eminence over the 
strategic alliance. Sometimes consultants are involved in order to assist the decision, but the 
Board has the last word. This is illustrated by the following quotation: 
 
I think, first of all, what you see is the definition of what is really the strategic fit 
between a potential partner for such a strategic alliance, and your own position, 
and the first thing to really specify what you want in order not too overload a 
potential project and make it unlikely to happen because the broader you try, the 
more players are involved from business-, from different businesses, from different 
R&D, technical manufacturing organizations, etc… so what my experience is that… 
the initiation of a strategic alliance discussion very often comes from the top, maybe 
the CEO or the board.  They see a deficit in your own organisation.  They see a 
deficit in the competitors positioning of the company, and start to monitor the 
market, who could be eventually of help and who might be an interested partner.  
So, that initiation usually, I would say, comes from the top.  The selection of 
potential partners is then often delegated to experts teams that, when they get the 
task and say it's okay, just give them a mark about who is strong and in which 
areas.  If for confidentiality reasons or for secrecy reasons, it should be made on 
the top level then also I’ve seen that consultants are approached to come in and 
come up with proposals ranking top of exercises following different criteria; who 
might be good in fulfilling one or the other of our requirements and at the end, 
before the contractual relationship is established, I think it’s really the board who 
decide, “Yes, this is an important business prospect for us.  We cannot win alone.  
We need a partner and from the shortlist of proposed partners, this is the one we 
then approach” and that’s a rather popular decision. (Interviewee 4) 
 
This quotation confirms the relevance of understanding needs and wants as part of the 
process. It also provides a different perspective on how the decision to enter a strategic 
alliance is made. 
Some interviewees described the process as a top-down process, and expressed the 
importance of keeping the strategic fit by employing a continuous process of tuning and 
adjustment to accommodate change. Another interviewee described the process as unique, 
pertaining to the particular opportunity. This suggesting the consideration of the context 
and is illustrated by the following quotations: 
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I would describe as a top down process where you know perhaps it’s in the 
corporate planning mode or executive level where the need is perceived you know 
where the strategic thinking is going on and there’s a perceived need… and you 
know the process really works out to the root of the company and they go and 
execute it.  And you know that I think works so far.  One of the things that works is 
if the two companies in the alliance or more than two.  If the companies involved in 
the alliance if they are continuing to re-calibrate and adjust… so that there 
continues to be a strategic fit. 
And so that top down approach is pretty useful and pretty helpful in that respect in 
as much as it has… alignment with whatever the other firm is. (Interviewee 5) 
 
Tend to be dealt with by senior groups, maybe strategy groups, business 
development groups who are like special project groups working at a senior level, 
at the Executive level.  And rather than a standard process, they’ll follow a process 
which is kind of dictated by the particular opportunity. (Interviewee 6) 
 
This quotation highlights the relevance of acknowledging change and of implementing a 
continuous process of tuning and adjustment along the life cycle of the alliance as part of 
the development process. 
The following figure summarises these findings. 
 
 
Figure 4-16.- Top down process 
 
 
 
 
At the Division level (RQ1) 
 
One interviewee gave an important insight into the way decisions are made in large 
organisations. This is a very formal process, where several areas come together when a 
potential opportunity is assessed at international level. In this case, the process started at the 
operating unit (division) level, and then progressed to the corporate level. This 
acknowledges that the process can vary depending on the size of the company, its 
operation, legal structure and relevance. There are certain agreements that can be carried 
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out locally, for instance a licensing agreement. The process varies from company to 
company and is dependent on size, as illustrated by the following quotation: 
 
This varies significantly by company… the size of the company… is there a formal 
planning process, is there a capital budgeting process, are there recognised goals 
and objectives shared by the management… a company A size [Name changed by 
the author], and of course I can speak just of that or Company B [Name changed by 
Author] size. There is a very formal process whereby this might come up through an 
operating unit,  
…so then the refining group… comes to International Strategic Planning which I 
was running at the time that tells me that they see this possibility. So we need to 
look at what other potential there is with Company A [name changed by Author], 
what the implications are, how do we want to do this from a finance point of view, 
do we want to merge the two refineries into a separate company, do we want to just 
go on a joint venture, or do we just want to have a contract that we jointly build the 
pipeline and have an agreement to switch so much crude under certain 
circumstance, so much feed stock under certain circumstances… it’s a difficult 
negotiation. But you have to, you set up the goals and objectives, you set up the 
strategy, you set up the kind of structure you would like to have and then pursue 
it…but the process again, the process on the refinery started with the refining, the 
manufacturing units…where we ran our operations, came up to corporate, came up 
through the international ranks. It was a very formal process, 
So it depends on the size of the company, it depends on the size of the operation, it 
depends on the size of the organisation of the company, the legal structure, and how 
much you are trying to bite off. 
If you are just doing the licencing agreement you can do it locally... 
So again size matters... (Interviewee 3) 
 
This quotation demonstrates the diversity that can be found amongst organisations in the 
process of developing a strategic alliance. Different configurations of the organisations can 
influence the process, for instance size influences the formality. This highlights the 
challenge to develop a process that can accommodate different organisations.  
 
The following figure illustrates these findings. 
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Figure 4-17.- Division level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A more informal process (RQ1) 
 
One interviewee pointed out that the process varies from company to company. Strategic 
alliances are considered viable options in seeking to achieve objectives and overcome 
organisational deficiencies. However, this is not a formal process, and the first 
consideration is to work independently, provided that the budget is not a constraint. This is 
illustrated by the following quotation: 
 
I can well imagine it's different in other companies… we specifically look at 
alliances to address aspects that we're deficient in getting access to ourselves, on 
our own.  So we tend to have an approach of if we can do it on our own we will do it 
on our own…there's not a formal process in place, to find, to, the budget which tells 
us when whether we want to do a strategic alliance or not.  But more, also that 
when we look at what we want to achieve and see where's our own proficiency, then 
start thinking about could a strategic alliance possibly help us to make up that 
deficiency. (Interviewee 9) 
 
 
One interviewee pointed out that sometimes the process could move from an informal and 
flexible process to a more rigid approach. The interviewee indicates that the magnitude of 
decision-making and the resultant economic impact makes the energy industry different 
from other industries. This is illustrated by the following quotation: 
 
Well I think the energy sector, you very quickly move from a scouting phase, a data 
collection phase.  Which is inevitably informal and quite flexible and quite free 
thinking into a very formal process. I think generally whenever you're working in 
any energy activity you're in big numbers and you're into national economies one 
way or another.  So inevitably it runs quite different from alliances in other 
industries, in other sectors of the economy. (Interviewee 12)  
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Another interviewee illustrated the case of oil operators, where there are decisions gates 
involving various levels of the organisation according to financial commitments and 
potential risks. 
 
Oil companies – operators in particular – take any decision involving significant 
financial consequences, is that they will have a series of decision gates involving 
various levels of management, depending on how much money is at stake and what 
the risks are. (Interviewee 13) 
  
 
These quotations confirm the diversity in the process followed to enter a strategic alliance, 
by contrasting the formal process described in the previous section. An informal process 
sometimes evolves to a more formal one; this suggests flexibility and adaptability 
accommodate the context. The perception of the energy industry being different from other 
industries highlights the need for more research. 
 
The following figure presents the findings of an informal process. 
 
Figure 4-18.- Informal process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Considerations (RQ1-4) 
 
Some interviewees highlighted the need for senior level involvement and approvals, and the 
relevance of communication: 
 
But a significant strategic alliance, I would expect would need very senior 
managerial approval. (Interviewee 13) 
Putting together your strategic plans, either in the business, or in a process, or in a 
function, or if you’re organized with an international division… 
They may engage in a consulting firm 
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I need to have a local partner.”  You go to the board of directors and say, “This is 
what we want to do 
Why don’t you go and find a local partner and then come back to us, and if we do a 
formal arrangement with the local partner, the board of directors will probably 
have to approve it. 
a lot of due diligence is what you need and the due diligence that you do need to 
match up with what your company’s objectives are for a good partnership, so the 
most important thing is great communication. (Interviewee 8)  
 
This quotation shows that the analysis of a strategic alliance requires a high degree of effort 
and support at the senior level. 
 
One interviewee highlighted that there are some instances where the development of the 
process can face some resistance. He illustrated the case of technology alliances where the 
effect of ‘not invented here’ imposes some resistance and challenges the development of 
the alliance, as illustrated by the following quotation:   
 
You have that, sort of, defensive reaction in the R&D environment as well but we 
are convinced there is a better option.  We can do things better.  We need a bit more 
time but we will achieve even a more prominent technology status and actually 
more competitive or cost whatever.  They try to defend their own case with, I mean, 
logical motives, securing your own programs, your own funding, etc.  Um, so as I 
say, in general, the closer you are to the technical disciplines, I think the higher the 
resistance is, the more-, the closer you are to the business side of it.  People really 
see more the added value of being in a market faster, offering a more extensive 
package and creating through a strategic alliance a competitive advantage. 
(Interviewee 4) 
 
 
The following diagram summarises the findings of the process of entering a strategic 
alliance.  
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Figure 4-19.- Entering into strategic alliances 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The diagram above illustrates the first step as described by interviewees - looking at the 
business options. It then shows the various decision-making processes involved in entering 
into strategic alliances. It represents the influence of diversity and complexity in the 
decision-making process. Considering the uniqueness of each strategic alliance and the 
diversity and complexity of its development, it seems that a flexible process framework is 
required to improve the understanding of strategic alliances from a multiperspective and 
process approach. 
   
The following diagram brings together the detail of the strategic alliance process. 
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Figure 4-20.- Strategic alliance process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The diagram above presents the four different processes described by interviewees in 
developing a strategic alliance. These processes can start as reviewing the strategy, a top-
down process, at the division level or a more informal process.  
 
The next section presents the characteristics and considerations involved in the partner 
selection process from the perspective of interviewees.  
 
Partner selection (RQ1-3) 
 
As partner selection is a critical stage in the development of a strategic alliance, I explored 
interviewee’s perceptions of this theme. Findings were organised under the subcategories of 
Process, Characteristics, Context and Considerations.  
 
 Initial steps in the selection (RQ1) 
Some interviewees described the initial steps in partner selection through developing a 
SWOT analysis to assess the capabilities of the organisation, then looking for different 
partners with complementary capabilities. 
We sat down with the team and we looked at our strengths and weaknesses, we did 
a typical SWOT analysis, you know we said where are our opportunities, where are 
out threats. We looked at our own company and tore it apart to its basics...Then we 
looked at various partners…and…became such an obvious choice, because where 
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we had massive amounts of capabilities (Interviewee 3) 
One interviewee pointed out that a list of potential partners could be developed according to 
the specific objectives of the project or business to be pursued. He also alluded to an 
experience where his company was looking for a large organisation with capital and shale 
expertise, a strong market orientation and government connections. He expressed this in the 
following quotation:  
I think depending a lot… on what you are doing, really.  There could be a list of  JV 
obvious candidates and strategic very well established, very mature, and you could 
almost use the description as usual suspects (Interviewee 2) 
The above quotations illustrate that, in general, the process of partner selection seems to be 
very straightforward. However, as presented in the following subsections, the details 
surrounding what to look for are more complex.  
The following figure summarises the initial steps for partner selection as highlighted by the 
interviewees. 
Figure 4-21.- Initial steps 
 
 
 
 
 Context for partner selection (RQ1-3) 
Some interviewees pointed out that the context of the strategic alliance affects the partner 
selection characteristics, as illustrated in the following table of quotations: 
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Table 4-13.- Context for partner selection (LR: Partner selection) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Dependent on 
objectives 
Depending on what it is I am looking for that is how I am selecting 
my partners. (Interviewee 3) 
 
1 
Fits with the 
objective 
What are you going to do, why do you want a strategic alliance 
and… what do you want to achieve by it?  And that in turn has to be 
a function of your own basic strategy… what is the company that’s 
looking…. for the strategic alliance, what is it choosing to 
achieve?’… so it’s basically fit with the object…, the things that 
you’re looking to get out of the joint venture. (Interviewee 4) 
 
1 
Characteristics 
according to a 
geographical 
scope, from 
global to 
regional: 
 
If your partner is… global versus being regional?  You may have a 
regional partner, who has different characteristics… a regional 
partner would be somebody who has very detailed understanding of 
regional customers… of executing countries…Whereas the global 
player will be somebody who brings technology. (Interviewee 14) 
 
1 
Contextualised 
according to the 
objectives, 
partners will 
need to bring 
something more 
than 
connections, 
something to 
improve 
efficiency, 
access to 
channels or 
customers 
Be clear on what’s the objective, and be clear on… what you need, 
and what of what you need is what you do not have…  And then look 
for a partner... that can bring that.  There is, at least in my 
experience, a lot of times… you get calls and... the guy says, you 
know “I want to be your representative here.  I want to establish a 
strategic alliance with you.  I want to be your agent.  I want to 
establish a JV,” and you say, “So what do you bring to the table?”  
And bottom line...the guy brings nothing other than connections… 
And yes fine, it’s something you don’t have; you don’t have the local 
connections, but that, to me, is not an enough motive… to do a 
strategic alliance… if you’re going for one it... they need to bring 
something to the business that would allow the business to operate 
it, more efficiently or have access to distribution channels that they 
don’t have, or have access to customers that they don’t have; 
something more than just connections or a typical agency type 
agreement. (Interviewee 15) 
 
1 
 
These quotations illustrate connections with the findings of concept in terms of considering 
the objectives of the alliance. This shows that the strategic alliance process is a dynamic 
and iterative process.  
The following figure summarises the findings about Context in partner selection. 
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Figure 4-22.- Context for partner selection.  
 
 
 
 
 Characteristics of a partner (RQ1-3) 
 A majority of interviewees pointed out various characteristics when looking for a potential 
partner. Interviewees mentioned capabilities, experience, cultural compatibility, resources, 
contribution to the objective, resources, track record, ability to deliver, similar mentality, 
cultural and emotional fit, trust and empathy, values, compliance with authorities and being 
able to work together. These points are illustrated in the following table of quotations: 
Table 4-14.- Characteristics of a partner (LR: Partner selection) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Capabilities You’re looking for capabilities that you don’t have... If I am looking 
for a partner it is because I can’t accomplish something myself, one 
either it’s too expensive, two I don’t have the manpower or the 
resources, three I don’t have the technical capabilities. (Interviewee 
3) 
 
1,3 
Experience, 
cultural 
compatibility, 
resources, and 
compliance with 
authorities 
If you’re looking for joint venture partners, you will be looking for a 
number of things.  You will be looking for people with relevant 
experience. You will be looking for people whose culture you think is 
compatible with your own.  People you think you can do business 
with.  And people with the right amount of money.  People who are 
not likely to be the subject of objections by the authorities, because 
the authorities will need to approve the licensees.  So people who 
satisfy the thresholds of the authorities.  If you’re looking to carry 
out a joint venture in a particular technology, then you’re looking 
for the people with the skills in that technology. (Interviewee 13) 
 
1,3 
Partner should 
contribute to the 
objective 
You've got to identify somebody who helps you address the 
particular challenge you're looking for… you have to be able to 
work with them both in procedural and culturally. (Interviewee 12) 
 
1,3 
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Main 
characteristics: 
1) resource, 2) 
track record of 
working with 
strategic 
alliances, 3) 
ability to deliver, 
4) Common 
mind-set 
1) They’ve got the resource that you want and that means that you 
understand that they’ve got the resource that they want…2) Is a 
track record of working within strategic alliances you are looking 
for a person that is comfortable working where they’re not 
necessarily in control.  So where there’s shared control, shared 
decision-making in that sense of the word and 3) they can actually 
deliver what they’ve undertaken they will deliver…  And I guess 4) is 
the tough-there’s an element of common mentality of mind set in 
other words you’re never going to have a perfect alliance of… 
mindset, of expectation from the joint venture.  You’re looking for 
someone that’s got a similar mindset, similar objectives and you get 
the feel they can be achieved. (Interviewee 7) 
 
1,3 
Industrial logic 
to create value 
and with an 
emotional and 
cultural fit. 
Trust and 
empathy as 
relevant factors 
for an effective 
collaboration  
Industrial logic to partnership, so as they think about their business, 
or think about their geographic footprint, or think about the 
technology, or the manufacturing plant*, whatever it might be. It* 
needs to make a logic... And saying okay if there was no ownership 
limitations what’s logical in terms of collaboration… Is there a logic 
that you could say wow if those two technologies were together, or if 
those two plants were together, or if these two companies 
cooperated in such and such a market, within legal limits of course. 
But if there was a logic to say that would be good, that would create 
value. So that would create value for the customer of course 
ultimately, and would create value for the two companies. 
I would say cultural and emotional fit. So are these two companies 
likely to be able to collaborate in a good, in a positive way. Or are 
they going to be difficult to make that happen, are they going to be 
so lacking in trust with each other, or lacking in empathy for each 
other that in fact the potential benefits of the alliances in the 
industrial logic won’t be realised, because of the personalities 
involved, or because of the cultures of the two organisations, or 
whatever it might be. (Interviewee 1) 
1,3 
Similar values, 
such as honesty.                                                                                  
Values start to 
become apparent 
as the 
partnership 
builds  
First one, which isn't always explicit, but this is my personal point of 
view. It is values, company values. As well as that aspect I would 
also look at, on the extreme you clearly can't work with a company 
who's got dramatically different values to your own…  So if you're a 
company that puts a lot of emphasis on honesty for instance, there is 
no way you can work with a company that doesn't have the same 
attitude to honesty and so on.  So I mean one doesn't normally see it 
upfront immediately, but as you build a partnership and so on, you 
get an idea on what the other party's values are. (Interviewee 8) 
 
1,2 
Values, 
compatibility in 
objectives and 
exit planning. 
Values.  Commonality of interest isn't quite the right expression.  It's 
understanding that their interests and your interests are – it's not 
aligned, it's compatible.  They may be wanting something different 
out of it than you do but it's compatible with what you want.  They 
may be wanting to be exiting a market and you want to enter.  Now 
1,2 
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they appear to be the opposite but they're compatible because you're 
helping them in a two stage process joint venture… if it goes wrong, 
how are we likely to be able to solve it and, that's something every 
Board entering into a strategic alliance has to ask itself.  What's the 
exit. (Interviewee 10) 
 
Compliance of 
rules and 
expectations due 
reputational risk 
and potential 
financial issues. 
Ethical 
compatibility  
I think key particular for western companies and US companies is 
you've got to be absolutely sure that your partner is prepared to put 
in the same effort as you, and rules and expectations as you are.  
And particularly as you're moving into some of these very large 
contract based alliances, where a lot of money is moving around, the 
reputational risk of an alliance failing or being held up in the press 
because of bad behaviour, or indeed the litigious pace of the US 
regulators.  Where if you're found to have transgressed in best 
practice, or bribery or whatever it might be, or code of conduct.  
Then the financial fines on the organisation are very onerous, and 
very punitive.  So ultimately you've got make sure you've got the 
ethical relationship with your strategic partner which meets with 
your own.  With your own value systems. (Interviewee 10) 
 
1 
Track record or 
reputation, 
sharing goals or 
vision and ability 
to work together  
Whether or not they have a good reputation, whether they have a 
good track record.  Whether they are the best in their field.  Whether 
they are same sort of goals or visions to achieve something… 
sometimes it's whether or not you've got a good relationship with 
them, because it's also about being able to work well together. 
(Interviewee 11) 
 
1 
 
The quotations above reflect the different characteristics of a partner. A mixture of hard and 
soft characteristics, they require a subjective measurement. The following figure 
summarises the characteristics for partner selection as mentioned by the interviewees. 
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Figure 4-23.- Characteristics of a partner 
 
 
 
 
 Considerations for partner selection (RQ1-4) 
Some interviewees highlighted several interesting points to be taken into consideration 
when selecting a partner. One interviewee illustrated a case that the industry is 
predominantly characterised by those with scientific backgrounds and this influences the 
selection of a partner. However he felt that ‘softer’ elements need to be considered. Another 
interviewee pointed out the need to understand the motivations of potential partners as 
these might influence the performance of the strategic alliance. One interviewee highlighted 
that alliances became more complicated as the number of partners increased. These points 
are illustrated in the following table of quotations: 
Table 4-15.- Considerations for partner selection (LR: Partner selection) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Industry rationale 
background 
influences the 
selection; there is 
a need to look for 
‘softer’ elements  
In our industries which are dominated by engineers, and 
scientists, and people with technical mind-sets… there is a 
simplifying assumption that if there is an industrial logic… Often 
without really thinking about that emotional side in terms of will 
this relationship work, are these people going to be able to dance 
together…because we are logic driven, maths engineering, 
science types of people generally. But we don’t really think a lot 
about those softer elements of whether or not things will happen. 
(Interviewee 1) 
 
1,4 
Complementarities 
in partner 
selection is 
important but the 
A company looks for a partner because it has a need.  And of 
course you know a good partner will also have a need.  These 
things tend to be complementary.  The requirement of any 
partner can be a tricky thing because you know its one thing if 
1,3,4 
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reasons for it can 
result in 
difficulties for the 
strategic alliance 
they need access to something in a good sense you can kind of 
create a code of conduct and you can create a strong bond 
between the two companies.  But on the bad side you know you 
may find that the company you’re trying to partner with has a 
need but that’s because they’re in bad shape and they have a 
broken strategic process and there are other problems there, and 
so you know they’re more needy that one would suspect and that 
can create the you know an underlying problem that would lead 
to the alliance you know falling apart or being less effective than 
it should be. (Interviewee 5) 
 
More partners 
bring more 
complexity 
One is the less partners, the better because you cannot do a thing 
of strategic alliances, which go beyond two partners, which is 
rather complicated because then you have rather complex 
management,  challenges to keep all the partners, abreast of 
developments and to keep them all involved.  So, the less partners 
you have, the better, so if you have two partners, it’s good. 
(Interviewee 4) 
 
1,2 
 
The quotations above provide an explanation as to why the energy industry does not seem 
to take softer elements into consideration when looking for a partner. Also, these quotations 
raise issues of complementarity among partners and the increase in complexity as the 
number of partners increase. It seems that a multiperspective process could accommodate 
the different perceptions of organisations in a strategic alliance. 
  
The following figure summarises the considerations in the selection of a partner. 
Figure 4-24.- Considerations for partner selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The following figure brings together the findings for partner selection. 
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Figure 4-25.- Partner selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The diagram above represents the initial steps for partner selection, the consideration of 
context in terms of the objectives in order to determine the characteristics of a partner, and 
the characteristics themselves as mentioned by interviewees. Some considerations in the 
selection of partners need to incorporate softer elements, understand the reasons for 
partnership and acknowledge that the more partners a strategic alliance has, the more 
complex it could become.  
 
One area of interest is in the way an organisation manages the portfolio of strategic 
alliances. In order to gain some understanding of this, the findings of this theme are 
presented in the next section. 
Portfolio (RQ1,2,4)  
 
According to the literature review, alliance portfolios are one of the areas that require 
further understanding. Interviewees were asked about their perspective in terms of the ways 
to manage portfolio alliances.  
 
Strategies (RQ1,2,4) 
 
Some interviewees described a variety of strategies to employ in the management of a 
strategic alliance portfolio. One interviewee suggested that an executive with experience 
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could be assigned as a Board member of various strategic alliances in order to identify what 
works across the alliance. This is illustrated in the following quotation: 
 
One of the things that I’ve seen some companies’ do that have no problem is that 
they take a senior executive and his or her sole job would be to be board members 
on these various different companies. So, you might take somebody who’s been a 
vice president or an executive vice president or something at your company for a 
long time and they have experience in your company then you say, “Okay, starting 
tomorrow, you’re going to be on the board of directors of these seven partners that 
we have.” That’s your job. 
That is very good in terms of getting a person a lot of experience very, very quickly 
and seeing what works and I like that as a model. 
Not all companies have the ability to free up an executive like that but it’s a good 
way to do it. (Interviewee 8) 
 
The previous fragment illustrates a strategy where an executive is appointed to the Board of 
different partners in order to understand the management of various alliances and identify 
opportunities for improvement by comparing experiences among alliances in the portfolio. 
This strategy benefits the learning process of an organisation with various alliances and it is 
advisable to consider it as part of the process of implementation. 
   
Another strategy to manage a portfolio is to have a group of people who are appointed to sit 
on the Board of the partnerships, in addition to their current role. However, there is an 
acknowledgement that this could be difficult: 
  
What’s hard to do is to take a whole bunch of people and say, “In addition to your 
regular job, I want you to be a board member” and you’ve got, you know, fifty 
people who are doing that.  Some of those people may not be that connected to the 
corporation because they’re, you know, a manager out in another country or 
something else like that.  It’s harder for them to manage that in line with what the 
corporate objectives are.   
It can be a good experience… tool but it’s not necessarily a good tool over time. 
(Interviewee 8) 
 
The quotation above highlights that this strategy is harder to develop because the people 
involved prioritise core activities and suggests that, in the long run, this is not the best 
strategy to implement.  
 
One interviewee pointed out that one way to manage a portfolio is to build capability across 
all levels of the organisation, as expressed in the following quotation: 
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Well I can tell you how we did it, whether we did it the right way or not.  Effectively 
what we had was, in our case a core of people.  So I was leading, for example, the 
international business, which was middle east, south America and Asia Pacific.  
You'd have a core of people on management team who would sit on various boards 
or advisory committees or joint ventures or alliances.  The way we approached it 
was to go in at a number of different levels in terms of over sight.  So there would 
be people on the alliance board, so formally director positions.  Or company 
directors, sitting on the board of those alliances.   Then we would also have deeper 
oversight through health and safety.  People looking at HR practices, looking at the 
finances.  So the committees of the board, would be populated by the people as well.  
So you would start to build up a capability within an organisation.  To get a feel for 
your portfolio, what is going well, what's not going well.  Why things might be 
working versus not working.  Very quickly then you can move people around from 
one to another.  But you need to build that skill set.  Build a skill set of a group of 
people to operate.  You get the governance structure on alliances.  Quite a broad 
sector which those people aren't working right across.  Very different cultures and 
very different times. (Interviewee 12) 
 
The fragment above illustrates how an organisation dealt with an alliance portfolio by 
building capability and a net of information across alliances. This was achieved by having 
people in different positions in the alliance looking at different disciplines and at a certain 
point making this system dynamic - exchanging personnel so they experienced other 
alliances. One of the perceived benefits of this is the exposure to different cultures and a 
deeper understanding of different ways of working. These findings show there are various 
strategies to manage an alliance portfolio. An organisation with a certain number of 
alliances in its portfolio has to work with partners with different systems which requires 
flexibility and a certain capacity to adapt.  
 
The following figure summarises the findings for portfolio strategies. 
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Figure 4-26.- Portfolio strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tools (RQ1,4) 
 
One interviewee provided interesting details on useful tools in managing a portfolio of 
strategic alliances. He pointed out that when a company starts to deal with several alliances, 
a systematic risk analysis and compliance check-up is useful to identify gaps among them, 
as illustrated in the following quotation: 
 
We sort of woke up one day and realised we had a lot because they'd been made in 
different businesses.  You realise there's actually quite a lot of this business is in 
effect in some form of strategic alliance so we recognise it's one of the corporate 
risks.  You know you have to do a risk analysis… so we added joint venture 
management…. 
 
We'd got the Company Secretary to make sure all the joint venture companies were 
complying with the rules that we need them to comply with because if the other 
partner wasn't a UK listed company it might have a different set of rules that might 
be lower so we had to do a more systematic – we've got twenty, let's make sure that 
somebody looks at each one and says tick tick tick – an example would be the 
Bribery Act.  Have they all got their – do they need procedures because they're 
stand alone businesses or have they all got them.  If they haven't got them, here's 
one you can use.   
 
There is an example that you had to be systematic and tick them all off. (Interviewee 
10) 
 
The excerpt above also highlights that partners who are not listed companies might have 
more flexibility as regards rules; standards therefore have to be reviewed to be certain that 
compliance is accomplished. 
 
There was a recommendation to run internal audits in order to check the alliance: 
 
‘Internal audit is another example.  Do you audit your joint venture businesses and 
how do you do it and there are a variety of different models. 
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In the case of Company A [name changed by author], what was agreed right up 
front was, it would employ three internal auditors but they would be managed by 
the Company B [name changed by the author] internal Audit Manager but they 
would have their own programme reporting to their Audit Committee but the 
internal – but they weren't doing – they didn't need a Manager so ten percent of his 
time was charged then as a management service to run their internal audit 
programme but it was their programme.  He had a duty of care to them although I 
couldn't say Company A will do that audit, the audit can be if Company A did.   
 
In another case… the agreement – there were I think four partners – each partner 
did an audit each year and the internal audit – there was no cross charging.  You 
just each did what – and the internal Audit Managers would just – they'd go, well 
we did this last year so why don't you do this and it would be presented to the Board 
done by one company and then in another case you'd say we're just going to do it at 
our cost because we have a requirement because that's sufficiently important for us.  
It may not be for you but we're going to do that for us. (Interviewee 10) 
 
The excerpts above exemplify two ways of conducting audits for an alliance. In one, a 
special team is appointed to carry out the audit, headed on a part-time basis by the internal 
Audit Manager of one company. The other case is where partners agree that a different 
partner will run audits each year. Irrespective of who conducts the audit, it is important to 
highlight that an audit process could be implemented in order to control the portfolio. 
 
The findings are illustrated in the following figure. 
 
Figure 4-27.- Portfolio tools and challenges 
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Organisation (RQ1,2,4) 
 
Some interviewees highlighted a number of ways to organise the portfolio of strategic 
alliances. One interviewee suggested that a portfolio could be organised according to 
regions or countries, depending of the size of the organisation. 
 
Depending on how big they are, they will tend to divide their portfolio up into 
regions or countries, each of which will be individually managed.  But when it 
comes to investment decisions – major investment decisions, there is definitely a 
degree of competition for… investment… funding. (Interviewee 13) 
 
The excerpt above is interesting because it contextualises potential conflict with the core 
business of an organisation and its alliances and highlights the challenge of competing for 
resources among them. 
 
One interviewee pointed out the complexity of managing a portfolio of alliances. He stated 
that oil and gas companies develop a structure which is divided into operated and non- 
operated assets. Non-operated assets are outside the core business, this gives the advantage 
of focusing on the core business: 
 
Very difficult, very difficult...  if you look at operators at oil and gas companies, 
they typically divide themselves in operated assets and non-operated....  And the 
non-operated assets, they are basically joint ventures where they just have an equity 
stake, and they manage those... almost completely outside the core business by a 
separate team. I think that is a clean way to do it.  It keeps your business separate... 
And it puts focus...management focus on making that joint venture successful.  If 
you’re going to commingle that with your own business…, I think it becomes quite 
difficult because you will always pay more attention to your own business.  You will 
always think that your partner is dragging you down.  So, I think it’s best if you, not 
spin it off, but put it aside and dedicate its own management resources even 
if...whether you’re driving it or just being a silent partner. (Interviewee 15) 
 
The previous fragment illustrates a case where oil and gas companies allocate a separate 
management team for non-operated assets in an alliance. 
The findings with regards to Organisations are presented in the following figure. 
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Figure 4-28.- Portfolio organisations and challenges 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The findings for portfolio management are integrated in the following figure. 
 
Figure 4-29.- Portfolio management of strategic alliances 
 
 
 
 
 
The diagram above summarises the findings for the portfolio management of strategic 
alliances. Some organisations built capability to manage alliances. This involves preparing 
people who can spend time at Board level so they learn from each alliance and thus benefit 
the portfolio. Other companies prepare managers across various levels of the alliance. Risk 
analysis and compliance check-ups are tools that can be implemented in order to identify 
gaps in compliance and so better control the portfolio. In early stages, this can be seen as a 
preventive action. Audits can help if organised by reaching an agreement with the partners. 
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This can be seen as a corrective action. Portfolios can be organised geographically or, as in 
the case of oil and gas, as operated or non-operated assets. An organisation with several 
alliances can face the challenge of dealing with different cultures, ways of working and 
compliance standards. An additional challenge for a portfolio is the competition for 
resources that can exist amongst both the alliances involved and with the core business of 
the organisation. The competition amongst alliances in an organisation requires careful 
analysis when deciding whether or not to enter other strategic alliances. It is important to 
make this analysis a compulsory step in the process of developing strategic alliances. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
This chapter has built the concept of strategic alliances from three foundations: Meaning, 
Types and Motives. It has presented the findings for process in three areas: how 
organisations go through the decision making process to enter into strategic alliances, 
partner selection and management of strategic alliances portfolios.  
 
The meaning of strategic alliance is broad, the definition that emerges by consolidating the 
perception of interviewees is that a strategic alliance occurs when at least two companies 
collaborate seeking similar objectives or goals, complementarities and the pursuit of either 
mutual benefit or the development of a competitive advantage.   
 
The strategic component has a different and relative importance for each party involved in a 
strategic alliance. There should be a search for a continuous strategic fit to accommodate 
change.  
 
One of the key findings is the connection between the broad definition of the concept of 
strategic alliances and their success and failure. This leaves some room for differing 
interpretations on how to measure these. These findings reflect the diversity that has been 
shown in the literature regarding the meaning of strategic alliances. 
 
There are several types of strategic alliances: technology, supply, research and 
development, operational, market, licensing, joint venture (incorporated or not). Alliances 
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can be developed at the organisational, country, industry or international levels. Types of 
strategic alliances are influenced by the objectives, desire for flexibility, compliance and 
time. There is always the opportunity to start a strategic alliance as a pilot in order to get to 
know the partner and, if adequate, evolve into a more formal or larger agreement. The 
literature shows that researchers have the same concern about the flexibility and the degree 
of freedom imposed by the type of strategic alliance chosen. 
 
Organisations are driven by different motives to enter strategic alliances such as a search 
for complementarities, time involved to develop capabilities, access to markets, technology, 
knowledge, people, risk sharing, financial resources, competition prevention, exit strategy 
and feedstock. Complementary objectives among parties seem to work better than sharing 
the same objective. Positive motives are connected with opportunities and efficiency. On 
the other hand, negative motives are linked to problem solving, defence or survival. The 
same theories found in the literature review are useful in explaining the motives that 
emerged from the insight of interviewees.  
 
The energy sector has a greater importance than other industries in terms of the economic, 
political and social dimensions; therefore government influence is expected to be more 
important. In order to gain access to feedstock, companies sometimes have to develop a 
strategic alliance with the National Oil Company in developing countries. Risk and 
financial resources are, in general, the common motive to enter into strategic alliances in 
the upstream. Strategic alliances are sometimes perceived as complex and costly and 
therefore not the first choice for some organisations. 
 
Organisations look for different options to achieve their objectives, for instance in growth.  
Strategic Alliances is one of the options. When entering a strategic alliance, organisations 
make decisions in different ways and follow different processes. These can run from very 
formal to informal processes. Strategic alliances in the energy sector are perceived to be 
different from strategic alliances in other industries due to the magnitude of decisions and 
their impact on countries’ economies. These findings show different perspectives on how to 
develop the process. As mentioned in the literature, authors describe different stages in the 
development of strategic alliances which demonstrates the need to develop a new holistic 
process framework. 
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The selection of partners is carried out in accordance with the context and objectives of the 
strategic alliance. The complexity in managing an alliance increases as the number of 
partners increase. There are different characteristics to consider in selecting a partner, for 
example trust and empathy. Strategic alliances do not always work well, it is therefore 
important to plan for failure and design an exit plan. The energy industry is characterised 
by those with rational and scientific backgrounds, yet a softer perspective to assess relations 
needs to be considered in order to make strategic alliances work more effectively. 
A company with several alliances faces the challenge of dealing with different cultures, 
ways of working and standards to comply with. Different strategies were suggested to 
manage a portfolio and its complexities. The combination of implementing systematic 
tools, such as risk analysis, and audits could benefit the management of alliances’ 
portfolios. Shared learning among portfolio managers would contribute significantly to the 
success of alliances. These findings contribute new knowledge to portfolio management 
literature. 
 
This chapter presented the findings for the first two elements (Concept and Process) of the 
holistic process model that will be presented in the discussion chapter. Both elements 
contain sub elements. For Concept these are: meaning of strategic alliances, types and 
motives; and for Process: decision to enter a strategic alliance, partner selection and 
portfolio. 
 
The following chapter presents the findings for Performance which is the third element of 
the holistic process model. 
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CHAPTER 5 FINDINGS – PERFORMANCE:  MEASUREMENT, 
PROBLEMS, RISKS, CRITICAL FACTORS, FAILURE & SUCCESS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this research is to gain an in-depth understanding of the performance of 
strategic alliances in the energy sector by drawing on an in-depth qualitative study of the 
perspectives of those involved. I explored the interviewees’ opinions on performance 
measurement, problems, risks, critical factors, failure and success.  This chapter will 
present these findings, beginning with measurement and then moving on to problems, 
critical factors, risks, failure and success. Performance is the third element of the holistic 
process model as presented in the discussion chapter. Its sub-elements are: problems, 
critical factors, risks, failure and success. 
 
 The following questions were posed in Chapter 3 ‘Methodology and Methods’: 
 
RQ1: How and why have strategic alliances been developed in the energy sector? 
RQ2: How and why do strategic alliances succeed or fail?  
RQ3: Why do firms engage in strategic alliances despite low success rates? 
RQ4: How can we create more effective strategic alliances in the energy sector?  
 
These findings were used to inform the study’s research questions (Goodson 2013). I have 
sought to assist an understanding of the narrative by presenting the findings using tables 
and diagrams. The format of each section is as follows: Firstly, I have presented a narrative 
of interviewee’s quotations. Secondly, where a table is presented it contains 3 columns 
entitled ‘Key themes’, ‘Quotation’ and ‘RQ’ (Research Question). ‘Key themes’ consist of 
relevant ideas from the ‘Quotation’ and assist the narrative.  The participants’ quotations 
are connected to the research question that they inform, as specified in the column ‘RQ’. In 
sections where tables are not employed, the relevant research question is identified in 
brackets. Tables are cross-referenced with the relevant subsection of the literature; this is 
specified in the title of the table as ‘LR’. The quotations are verbatim except where minimal 
editing was required to preserve confidentiality. Diagrams are presented in the sections and 
subsections in two places: those at the beginning illustrate key themes while the diagrams at 
the end condense key findings. 
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The following diagram highlights the sections presented in this chapter as related to 
performance. 
 
 
Figure 5-1 Structure of Chapter 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measurement of Performance in Strategic Alliances 
 
Interviewees were asked about their perceptions of performance measurement in strategic 
alliances. The data from these interviews is organised under inputs, considerations, metrics 
and assessment, as illustrated by the following diagram. Some of the measurement data is 
interconnected with the categories that emerged from the findings in the next section 
(Problems, Risks, Critical Factors, Failure and Success). This is interesting as they 
complement, confirm or strengthen some of these findings. 
  
Figure 5-2.- Measurement of performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inputs for measuring performance (RQ1,2,4) 
 
Some interviewees raised the issue of inputs when measuring performance. Their basic 
argument was that the objectives of strategic alliances should include the process by which 
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performance will be measured.  Performance measurement is peculiar to each alliance and a 
clear understanding of the objectives made measuring success easier through the 
establishment of a baseline. They further contended that ambitions or motives could differ 
among partners. A performance matrix could be aligned to particular goals, and metrics 
should feed back the strategic alignment. The following table of quotations illustrates these 
points: 
Table 5-1.- Inputs for performance (LR: The Measurement of Performance) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Strategic 
objectives 
Well, most people, I think, should have strategic objectives of what 
they’re trying to do. It might be even before they get into the 
alliance… (Interviewee 8) 
1 
Objectives as a 
base line 
It depends on what the objective [is]…, why are you going into… the 
strategic alliance in the first place. … If you can answer that 
question then you have a clear understanding… the measurement of 
success becomes a lot easier because you start to establish a 
baseline. (Interviewee 3) 
1 
Specific to 
strategic 
ambition of each 
partner. Metrics 
feed back to 
strategic 
alignment 
It’s very specific to the strategic ambition of the particular partner… 
it’s a tricky topic because sometimes their… particular ambitions for 
an initiative can be different…if the alliance is set up to access a 
market then the performance matrix really have to be aligned with… 
achieving that particular goal… they still need some kind of 
concrete way to make sure that they’re measuring that, so that feeds 
back to the strategic alignment between the two. (Interviewee 5) 
 
1 
 
These quotations show a connection between the concepts of strategic alliances as 
presented in the previous chapter, where the revision of the objectives influences the kind 
of metrics to consider. This can be seen as part of a process. 
 
Considerations on measuring performance (RQ1-4) 
 
Some Performance Measurement considerations in strategic alliances emerged from these 
interviewees’ accounts.  One issue raised was the difficulty in measuring performance, 
especially for certain alliances such as technology, marketing or product development. It 
was suggested that the consideration of softer issues, for example cultural issues, is critical 
to performance and success. Lack of clarity around objectives may result in issues, such as 
the influence of stakeholders in setting the metrics for performance. It was suggested that 
the value of the strategic alliance depends on partners’ perceptions and the metaphor of 
marriage was used to explain this. The following table of quotations illustrates these 
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considerations: 
 
Table 5-2.- Considerations on measuring performance (LR: The Measurement of 
Performance) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Difficult to 
measure 
performance 
It gets harder to measure things like technology alliances or 
marketing alliances or dealing with product development alliances 
just because the measures aren’t as definitive as sales or profit or 
growth. (Interviewee 8)   
 
1 
Softer issues are 
critical for 
performance and 
success, the 
cultural issues 
From my experience doing these things for twenty or twenty five 
years.  Ultimately it was the softer aspects of the cultural side of the 
process, that was most underestimated in the development of a 
strategic alliance.  And was most critical and ultimate success by it.  
If you look at many of the discussions, many of the research around 
strategic alliances the hard issues are very much there.  Intellectual 
property, the finances, the regulatory framework, the legal 
framework.  They've recovered very well.  Typically it's the softer 
issues.  The cultural issues around underpinning the performance 
which are not brought out to the degree which I consider to be of 
importance… that's an area I would probably consider to be more 
important now than I ever would have done when I started on this 
journey. (Interviewee 12) 
 
2,4 
Issues: lack of 
clarity around 
objectives  
And the MOU is just an agreement to agree, and you start without 
being clear on what’s the objective, without being clear on what’s 
the role of the parties, without being clear of what you want to 
achieve, without being clear on the profitability, then the next step, 
that is whatever agreement you end up signing, will probably have 
the same lack of clarity. 
And when you’re getting to the actual execution, then you won’t 
have a way to measure. 
So it will become subjective… and in that subjectivity you will 
always have issues with your partner by default.  So if you don’t 
have a way to objectively evaluate performance... ...then that’s 
when the difficulty starts. (Interviewee 15) 
 
1,2 
Consider 
stakeholders 
preferences and 
needs 
You've got a relative unknown, you don't know how this thing is 
going to work.  Don't know where the pressure is going to come 
from, to deliver this.  So you overcome that by having an extensive 
set of measurement, matrix, which are in place, around the business 
itself.  Very often if you've gone to the markets to finance an 
alliance of some kind, of course the banks and investors will have 
governance, they'll have their own issues to be looking at.  They'll 
be assessing the performance from their own analytical perspective 
and that feeds back into share price so on… are the stakeholders, 
1,4 
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or shareholders, happy for the alliance to be holding together?... 
(Interviewee 12)  
 
Partners’ 
perception and 
value, like 
marriage 
It’s all about pace and whether or not the partners thought the 
process then was of any value. 
It’s like a marriage, if you ask someone in a marriage if they think 
it went well, they will know without any sort of… extras. 
(Interviewee 2) 
1,3 
 
The above quotations highlight the difficulty in performance measurement, the importance 
of considering softer issues and the necessity to take stakeholders perceptions into account. 
This requires a more holistic framework beyond the conventional process for strategic 
alliances. 
Metrics for performance (RQ1,2,4) 
A majority of interviewees highlighted the diversity of metrics utilised to assess 
performance and commented on ways this can be measured. Metrics are based on the 
objective of each strategic alliance; a system or matrix can be developed with hard and soft 
metrics. Different measures can be monitored, such as: market share, profitability, 
operating profit, cash flow, duration, health and safety issues. It seems that several 
variables are measured in order to monitor different aspects of performance. Most of the 
measurement points to objectives or hard metrics; however, some subjective or soft metrics 
were also mentioned. These included the health of the strategic alliance in terms of the 
performance of the Board, adaptability to change and the well-being of personnel involved 
in the alliance. The following table illustrates these findings: 
Table 5-3- Metrics for performance (LR: The Measurement of Performance) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
A system of hard 
and soft metrics, 
metrics depend 
on the alliance 
A system that allows you to look at the various variables that 
make up the venture, and it tells you if you are making money, or 
you are gaining knowledge or so on… depending on the joint 
venture, the success is if you are making money and you are still 
an active participant. (Interviewee 3) 
 
1,4 
Agreement on a 
set of matrices 
with partner 
Well there’s has to be clear channels of communication between 
the companies that… and there has to be a set of matrix… that so 
far as the performance of the alliance that both firms can agree 
on, that they can both interpret together so that they both kind of 
understand where they are. (Interviewee 5) 
 
1,4 
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Financial 
performance 
(operating profit 
cash generation) 
but depends on 
the alliance 
Obviously the financial performance… It depends on what you 
are… addressing with this particular alliance.  I don’t think it’s 
one metric for everything… the metrics depend on the objective of 
the alliance… So again, you have different kinds of metrics.  If 
your alliance is to actually address… pure financial metrics, then 
it’s actually… OP, operating profit, cash generation... 
(Interviewee 14)  
1,4 
Profitability and 
market metrics. 
Focus of 
attention 
profitability 
It all comes down to profitability and the business successes that 
you are achieving… at the end of the day, I would boil it down to 
financial figures, to quantitative figures.  As I said, like market 
shares, for example… and then you should see really that your 
market share is increasing and that, for yourself, the bottom line 
is also improving. (Interviewee 4) 
 
1,4 
Meet objectives. 
Own norms and 
criteria, safety 
record and ethics 
Does it meet the objectives? Does the operating unit [meet] your 
own norm, so safety and other values and so on.  So you would 
tend to put the same criteria that we expect from our own 
operations, we would expect that from joint venture or strategic 
alliance operations… The same with ethics in general. 
(Interviewee 9) 
1,4 
Standard 
metrics: 
financial returns, 
health and safety 
issues, market 
penetration and 
market share.  
Performance measurement is generally going to be, the pretty 
normal, pretty standard metrics that you use for any performance 
in the energy sector.  So you're going to be looking at your 
financial returns, your health and safety issues.  You're going to 
be looking at market penetration, market share and so on and so 
forth.  So I think inevitably you monitor the performance of a 
strategic alliance in quite some detail.  Right from the beginning. 
(Interviewee 12) 
 
1 
Criteria for 
success: 
achievement of 
aims, survival, 
adaptation to 
circumstances 
 
If you sort of made an inventory of what the criteria for success 
are, it would probably be… did it achieve its aims and then 
secondly… how long did it survive for, and… how well did it 
adapt to different circumstances? (Interviewee 6) 
 
1,2,4 
Repetition of the 
alliance. 
Different 
objectives could 
work best 
Something we want to measure as well is, is it a one off alliance?  
You've only done it once with the company, is it something that can 
be repeated. 
And it doesn't have to be the same, in fact alliance's probably work 
best if you don't have the same strategic objective. (Interviewee 9) 
 
1 
Indicators are 
different, but a 
common one 
should be the 
So in each case the key performance indicators are different but 
in each case there is an additional one which is the health of the 
relationship of your partners and that's something that you need 
to assess periodically, mainly once a year… that would be a KPI 
1,4 
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health of the 
relationship 
(board 
performance) 
– it's a soft KPI because you can't put metrics to it but certainly in 
the early years of the Company A [Name changed by the author] 
relationship I would sit down once a year with the Company B 
[Name changed by the author] Directors and the Manager of the 
company and say how is the Board working… is it behaving as a 
Board or are people still representing shareholders. (Interviewee 
10) 
Measure success 
in terms of well- 
being of 
personnel 
involved. The 
role of the soft 
side 
I think to a degree as well, if you were in a strategic alliance, 
you're looking at the culture you're developing within that 
alliance.  Frankly is it an enjoyable place to be working.  It's not 
an easy place, you don't want an easy place, but you want 
something which is challenging, gives you opportunities to 
progress.  Have a bit of fun.  
 
And those are secondary issues around sort of well being of your 
people in the alliance.  In terms of how their… whole contribution 
is playing with the alliance.  It can also be very tangible internal 
assessment of how successful the alliance is going.  Clearly if 
you're having a lot of fun and not hitting the targets, you're not 
going to be measure as being successful by your parent company.  
But if you're just hitting the targets and you have a pretty 
miserable place to work, but ultimately is not a sustainable 
strategic outcome either.  So you need to get the soft side being 
delivered as well as some of the hard side. (Interviewee 12) 
 
4 
Measure new 
innovative 
initiatives in 
research & 
development 
So you can measure those numbers of things, the amount of 
activity happening, under that.  Those areas could be, if you 
wanted to set up, energy criteria development.  If you want to do 
something like that, then some of the measurables could be the 
number of new innovative initiatives that have come out of the 
alliances.  It could be new spin outs, or could be new ideas, 
technological ideas of which we're trying to get funding for.  And 
other things in terms of collaborating and in terms of developing 
a joint research program. (Interviewee 11) 
1,4 
Expand the 
network with 
new alliances 
Another thing could be like a social network analysis to see how 
many new alliances, new partnerships have been developed, in 
terms of expanding the network. (Interviewee 11) 
1,4 
 
These quotations provide details on the metrics for performance. They can be used as a 
guideline to identify the performance metrics of a strategic alliance. It is useful to note the 
need for soft metrics. 
 
Assessment of Strategic Alliances (RQ1,2,4) 
Several accounts related to the assessment of performance of strategic alliances emerged 
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from the interview data. There was some evidence of a lack of retrospective analysis and it 
was suggested that consideration should be given to the way in which capital investment 
projects are assessed. There was an example of a strategic alliance where joint and periodic 
assessment was developed through hard metrics. Assessment was suggested as a revision of 
the achievement of objectives or goals. If objectives were not met, the options were to 
either reconfigure the alliance or to exit. The following table of quotations illustrates this: 
Table 5-4.- Assessment of strategic alliances (LR: The Measurement of Performance) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Lack of 
retrospective 
analysis 
I would say I haven’t really seen a great deal of retrospective 
measurement you know where companies say “okay lets measure 
how good this has been” (Interviewee 1) 
1,2 
Assessment of 
capital projects 
So in the same way that some companies, I know certainly when I 
worked with Company A [Name changed by the author]…. If they 
make a capital investment you come back and you do a so called re-
appropriation, you know two or three years after the start of the 
project which is really a learning exercise to say you know we built 
this project based on these assumptions about the market, these 
assumptions about the cost of the project, these assumptions about 
the margins and so on and so forth… (Interviewee 1) 
1,2 
Joint and 
periodic 
assessment and 
the use of hard 
metrics 
I was a relatively junior guy, but I had responsibility on a month to 
month basis, or week to week basis, full liaison between Company A 
and Company B [names changed by author] and we used to meet 
on a fairly structured basis to look at performance, whether that 
was cost performance, or a plant that was operational performance 
or so on… (Interviewee 1) 
1,4 
Assessment on 
achieving 
objectives; if 
not, either re-
configure or exit. 
Not everything is 
money 
The real reason you entering the strategic alliance is to access a 
skill or a resource you don’t have.  The primary measure of 
performance is did you get the access to the skill or resource that 
you needed… and if you’re getting that access then I guess you 
start to tick the box and say the strategic alliance has achieved its 
purpose.  
If it has achieved your objectives then I guess you tick that and say 
I’ve done the right thing.  If it hasn’t achieved your objectives then 
clearly you’ve now got to either re-configure that strategic alliance 
to achieve your objectives or you’ve got to find a way of exiting that 
strategic alliance. 
 
So it’s not always a dollar and cents thing… quite often it’s just 
achieving a particular objective which should translate into dollars 
and cents otherwise you wouldn’t be doing it at all. (Interviewee 7) 
 
1,2 
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These quotations highlight the opportunity to implement a joint periodic assessment of the 
strategic alliance as part of the process of its development. This assessment reviews the 
objectives of the alliance and implements a decision-making process in order to decide its 
future. 
 
In summary, the accounts of interviewees highlighted the contextualisation of the alliance 
in setting performance measurements, understanding the strategic alliance’s objectives and 
needs, and the qualification of performance in terms of achievement. Several variables were 
measured in order to monitor different aspects of performance; most of the measurement 
points towards objectives or hard metrics. However, acknowledgement of the relevance of 
soft elements was also highlighted. Stakeholders’ needs and preferences influence the 
metrics for performance. When an alliance is not working well and there is no room for 
reconfiguration, an exit often follows. These findings are summarised in the following 
figure: 
 
Figure 5-3.- Findings of measurement 
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Problems, Critical Factors, Risks, Failure and Success of Strategic Alliances 
 
I explored the opinions of interviewees related to the performance of strategic alliances by 
asking them about their experience with relation to problems, critical factors, risks, failure 
and success. Fourteen categories emerged from the set of interviewees’ accounts. These 
are: Partner, Alignment, Change, Legal-Regulatory, Culture, Exit, Clarity, Economic risks, 
Plan & Control, Achievement, Stakeholders, Trust, Context, and Leadership. The following 
figure was developed to represent the analysis process: 
 
Figure 5-4.- Process of analysis, problems, critical factors, risks, failure and success 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Categories were organised according to the frequency with which interviewees referred to 
them. The same process was followed within the categories to organise the emergent 
subcategories. The categories are depicted in a word cloud where the size of the category 
accords to its frequency. Some relationships were identified among the categories.  From 
the 14 categories that emerged, I selected seven according to their frequency, then analysed 
the remaining categories and selected a further three due to their strong relationship with 
the initial seven. This chapter presents findings for ten categories that were selected 
according to frequency and relationship. Among them are: Partner, Alignment, Change, 
Legal-Regulatory, Culture, Exit, Clarity, Stakeholders, Trust, and Leadership.  
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Partner (RQ1-4) 
 
The most common theme that emerged from the data was the influence of the partner in the 
performance of strategic alliances. A large majority of interviewees referred to partner 
selection, their capabilities from a technical and financial perspective, the issues related to 
vested interest, the benefits and complexity in partnering and the desired mind-set when 
partnering. 
 
Partner selection (RQ1-4) 
 
The majority of interviewees highlighted the implications of partner selection in the 
performance of strategic alliances. They pointed out that partner selection is critical to 
success and included the need to spend time in selecting a partner and in understanding 
needs in order to identify potential problems. Elements to take into consideration when 
partnering included culture, financial strengths, the right technology, approach to risk and 
experience in strategic alliances. The negative influence of an aggressive attitude should 
also be considered. The relevance of the partner’s contribution in achieving objectives was 
highlighted, as well as the ability to work together to overcome challenges. When the 
chosen partnership did not have a positive result, there was a significant opportunity cost of 
searching for a more effective partner. This suggested that the development of a deep risk-
analysis would be valuable in order to balance risk and opportunity. Therefore, if the 
relationship with the partner did not successfully develop, there would be fewer issues 
experienced with exiting.  The following table of quotations illustrate this: 
 
Table 5-5.- Partner selection (LR: Performance of Strategic Alliances) 
 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Critical to 
success to spend 
time so as to be 
confident in the 
selection of a 
partner  
There was a lot of time on both sides spent understanding 
whether they were the right partner, to the critical success. 
(Interviewee 10)   
2,4 
Understand 
sources of needs 
to prevent 
problems 
The requirement of any partner can be a tricky thing because you 
know it’s one thing if they need access to something in a good 
sense you can kind of create a code of conduct and you can create 
a strong bond between the two companies.  But on the bad side 
you know you may find that the company you’re trying to partner 
with has a need but that’s…because they’re in bad shape and they 
have a broken strategic process and there are other problems.... 
2,3 
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they’re more needy that one would suspect and that can create… 
an underlying problem that would lead to the alliance… falling 
apart or being less effective than it should be. (Interviewee 5) 
 
Right partner a 
critical factor, 
some 
characteristics: 
culture, financial 
strengths, 
technology 
approach to risk 
It’s finding the person that has the right culture, and the right… 
financial strengths, the right technology…, the right approach to 
risk. (Interviewee 13) 
 
2,4 
Experience and 
record in 
alliances a better 
partner 
If the party has done a lot of alliances, they tend to be a better 
partner… It’s when you get somebody that… hasn’t done it a lot 
or has only done it two or three times and it’s always failed, that 
should be a big warning sign. (Interviewee 8) 
 
2,4 
Aggressiveness 
can breakdown 
the relationship.  
Maybe some people are, some organisations are too aggressive 
in terms of Strategic alliance.  Strategic alliance's go ahead 
quite often, mergers and acquisitions and so on are quite 
aggressive…  So like a bullying approach to it.  So it is a 
Strategic alliance but it's not done on the basis of willingness or 
consent.  It's done because out of economic necessity or 
competition.  And those things create a lot of bad will and a lot 
of stress and strain and upset.  And quite often leads to a 
breakdown of the organisational cohesion. (Interviewee 11) 
 
1,2,3 
Contribution to 
the objective and 
fit (culture, 
finance and 
ethics) 
The partner in a strategic alliance [has] got to be bringing 
something to the table, that's number one. If they're not bringing 
something to the table they shouldn't be involved in the first place, 
because they're not meeting the needs you have.   Secondly they 
have to be someone you can work with.  And work with in the 
wider sense.  So that's culturally, financially, ethically, so on and 
so forth. (Interviewee 12)  
 
2,4 
Risk: wrong 
partner – 
opportunity of a 
better partner – 
look at 
opportunities. 
Conduct a deep 
risk analysis. It 
requires ground 
work before 
partnering  
Not achieving the objective. The risk of ending on with the wrong 
partner; at risk of… alienating yourself from a better partner that 
you probably didn’t know about. There’s risk or exposure to … 
access to your business in terms of intellectual property, or how 
you run things.  There’s risk of … bribery or corruption. 
 
I don’t like just to look at risk.  What are the opportunities?.... 
And it goes back to the first question of why do you do it? So it’s 
like everything, you need to balance risk and opportunity... 
 
  And back... to the example, you know, the risks are not generic, 
you need to do your homework and be clear on... the risks that 
are specific to the joint venture, and be able to identify the risk… 
2,3,4 
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and put measures in place that are jointly owned...to be able 
to...to mitigate it. Some of them are specific to the partners, some 
of them are specific to locations, some of them are specific to the 
business, but if you are able to properly say, you know, “What’s 
the probability?  What’s the consequence? How can you manage 
it?” Then you’re quickly able to say, “You know what, there are 
seven things that could bring this thing to a complete belly-up 
situation...so let’s make sure that we manage these seven 
properly.”  So...we’re back to what we were just talking about, 
about the amount of pre-work...that you do before getting into 
bed with someone. (Interviewee 15) 
 
Wrong partner – 
deal with exit 
I would say partner and then an agreement that doesn't deal with 
the circumstances that you find yourself in and you end up – 
you've fallen out with your partner and you go to the agreement 
and the agreement isn't what you said it is because it didn't deal 
with exit properly. (Interviewee 8) 
 
2,4 
 
The above quotations confirm that partner selection is critical to success. There is therefore 
a need to carefully analyse partners. This also connects to the importance of understanding 
the needs and motives of the parties involved, as presented in chapter four.  
 
Partner’s technical and financial capabilities (RQ1-4) 
 
 
Some interviewees interpreted the partner’s capabilities in financial and technical terms as a 
source for problems and risks. If the partner does not have the skills or resources that are 
needed, they will not be able to deliver. It was therefore suggested that it was important to 
spend sufficient time in assessing the capabilities of a potential partner.  Issues can arise 
when the partner lacks the financial resources to honour his commitments. When this 
occurs, there is a risk of default and the potential loss of the hydrocarbon license. Thus, the 
weak financial health of a partner may require the commitment of further resources from 
the other partner. The following table of quotations illustrate these findings well: 
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Table 5-6: Partner’s capabilities (LR: Performance of Strategic Alliances) 
 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Not delivering 
skills or 
resources. The 
issue is not 
spending time 
to assess 
capabilities 
The main risk… that the person can’t deliver the skills or the resource 
that you actually thought they would deliver.  I think that’s probably 
the biggest risk.  Or if you look at it from your own side it’s the risk 
that you don’t understand the resource or skill that you actually want 
or the resource and skill that the person can… actually deliver. 
So I think that’s where I see the biggest issue on that one is… not 
spending enough time getting comfortable with what you’re asking 
for they can deliver... (Interviewee 7) 
 
2,3,4 
Risk of 
default and 
losing the 
license 
There can also be issues about the risk that if you default and fail to 
develop this resource the way you are supposed to, that in certain 
circumstances the government may have the right to come in and say, 
“Well, you’re not doing what you committed to do, we’re going to 
take away your license.” So it’s a three-way conversation often, that 
involves the partners and the state, in trying to find the best way 
forward to make sure that the project… can continue.  And then it’s a 
four-way conversation, because you’re also having to talk to the 
financiers of the party in trouble, who are going – you know, 
considering whether to cut their losses, and potentially exercise their 
rights of security over that party.  And you’re going, “Please don’t do 
that, because if you put this party into insolvency, it’s going to trigger 
all sorts of consequences for us”. (Interviewee 13) 
2 
Financial 
health or more 
resources 
needed 
For instance, you may be entitled in a joint venture, to effectively 
takeover your partner’s share of the venture.  But then you have to 
fund it and you may not have the funds yourself… So sometimes, 
parties are forced into nursing along a quite sick partner in the hope 
that their financial situation will allow them to continue to fund their 
share of development, because the alternative is worse. (Interviewee 
13) 
 
2 
Healthy 
relationship 
amongst 
partners to 
face financial 
issues 
And also keep momentum, so to keep that relationship good under 
stresses and strain and budget problems.  So quite often if you've got 
an alliance and you're working together, you might run out of funds, 
but still have to deliver.  Because if you don’t' have a good 
relationship with your strategic alliance then… you might not be able 
to convince them to take that loss, to share that loss, and you might 
have to take the whole losses out. (Interviewee 11) 
1,2 
 
The quotations above highlight that time should be invested in considering the relevance 
and consequences of choosing a partner. The lack of a partner’s capability could have 
severe consequences at the upstream level in the energy industry, for example losing the 
license to operate.  
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Issues related with vested interests (RQ2,3,4) 
 
Accounts from some interviewees highlighted issues related to vested interest amongst 
partners. In some cases, there could be inordinate gains in the execution of deals; 
agreements might be pursued which may not be in the owner’s best interests. Difficulties 
with vested interest could be on individual or organisational levels if their behaviour was 
not congruent with the agreement. Openness and communication were highlighted as 
critical, along with the early identification of problems and the need to address these 
immediately they arose. The following table of quotations illustrate this: 
 
Table 5-7.- Vested interests (LR: Performance of Strategic Alliances) 
 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Desperation to 
make deals 
happen.  
Common failings that people… think about because they desperately 
want to find some synergy to make a deal happen. 
 
When people get into developing an alliance particularly in a sort of 
private equity type of thing; there is a lot of vested interest to make 
your deal happen... emotionally as well as financially, I mean some 
people start to gain financially if things happen. But there is also 
once you, most people I believe… want to make things, you know 
once you have got this concept and once you have got some level of 
agreement then you want to make this thing happen. (Interviewee 1) 
 
2,3 
Problems arise at 
the individual or 
organisational 
level 
Mismatch 
between 
agreements and 
behaviour 
 
I think quite a lot of the times there are problems with vested 
interests... Although the organisations agree to the alliance or 
partnership, the purpose of what it is for.  They may not behave on a 
day-to-day basis, in accordance with that agreement… But some 
individuals or organisations might be in that alliance to see if they 
can get something out of it for themselves as well, and maybe 
focusing more on that, than the greater benefit for the whole 
alliance. (Interviewee 11)   
2,3 
Prescription: 
Openness & 
communication. 
Early 
identification of 
problems and 
addressing them 
 
When people are putting together an alliance, they’re on their best 
behaviour and they’re showing their best face to the other party, 
and maybe they do not always admit to weaknesses.  And then once 
the alliance goes forward then the truth begins to emerge and 
relationships can begin to break down.  So I think openness and 
very, very good communication at the early stage is probably 
critical in making sure that… if there are problems that they are 
identified early and addressed before they get a chance to develop. 
(Interviewee 13) 
 
2,4 
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These quotations show that when a process is hurried, issues can arise. It is advisable to 
identify the hidden motives of the parties, segregating and comparing the interests of the 
organisations and the interests of the individuals participating in the process of a strategic 
alliance.  
 
 Benefits of partnering (RQ1,2,3) 
 
Some interviewees highlighted the benefits of partnering. The perception is that the value 
created of doing business together is greater than doing it alone.  Partnering could allow 
access to a country or market, thus overcoming cultural or technological deficiencies. In 
these cases, partnership offered a way to achieve strategic objectives more quickly due to 
the synergies created. It was also highlighted as a way to develop business by sharing the 
cost, despite the risk of high levels of tension in the relationship, referred to as having a 
‘Highlands games week’. People could find strategic alliances enjoyable, but they could 
distract managers from core operations. This is illustrated in the following table of 
quotations: 
 
Table 5-8.- The benefits of partnering (LR: Performance of Strategic Alliances) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Partnerships 
increase the 
value of a 
business 
You want to see the success but the business success associated 
with it.  If two parties come together, they should together be more 
successful than the individual party… 
The business result from such an alliance has to be bigger, high 
profitability, bigger market share than before. 
 
The logic of a successful strategic alliance is that fifty percent of 
the profit, fifty percent of the profit from a strategic alliance should 
at the end be more than the hundred percent of the profits you 
would make if you had not entered into the strategic alliance and 
do your business on your own… (Interviewee 4) 
 
1,2 
It allows to 
access a country 
or markets, 
overcoming a 
deficiency in 
cultural or 
technological 
terms 
Sometimes a strategic alliance is a real enabler of… success 
because… you are lacking…. a regional and cultural specific know 
how.  You cannot even enter into a country without an alliance 
partner or the technology side is, for example, a catalyst 
technology.  You [own] a process platform, maybe with some 
standard material, standard catalysts or standard products and you 
form a strategic alliance with a partner with this added type of, 
more differentiated product available and accessible. (Interviewee 
4) 
1,2,3 
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A way to achieve 
strategic 
objectives more 
quickly 
I think that both parties get their strategic objectives met and I 
think my second one would be that they met those objectives faster 
because they partnered with somebody… 
That’s what you do and that’s why people do them all the time. 
(Interviewee 8) 
 
1,2 
Develop 
business, share 
cost (despite high 
tensions like the 
‘Highland 
Games’) 
It’s a little bit like the Highland Games every week you have your 
round of jousting, stone throwing, caber rattling, whatever you like 
and all you’re building in is an immense amount of tension and an 
immense amount of… time to try and engage in relationships… 
continued difference, continual disputes but it doesn’t mean that 
it’s not profitable.   
 
The root of the difference is that each one feels they are inhibited 
as to how they would like to develop part of the business that 
comes out of the joint venture.  And they would love to go it alone 
and develop it alone.  But the cost of going it alone is inhibitive… 
(Interviewee 7) 
 
1,2,3 
Strategic 
alliances are fun 
for some people, 
but could distract 
a lot from core 
operations 
In terms of management, if you're not contributing the whole 
company, alliances can be very time consuming.  And can be that 
your management is less focused on other parts of your business.  
And particularly at various stages of the alliance, they're very 
distracting, often quite fun to be involved in.   So you find that, 
compared to the mundane of running a business, being involved in 
alliances is quite attractive for people.  So it can become a 
significant distraction from running the main part of the business. 
(Interviewee 12) 
 
1,3 
 
These quotations highlight the benefit of partnering. Although involvement in an alliance 
can be attractive, they demand a lot of attention from the parent organisations. This should 
be considered when deciding how to configure the number of alliances within a portfolio. 
 
The complexity of partnering (RQ1,2,4) 
 
Some interviewees highlighted the complexity of partnering. Partnering was perceived as 
something complex and the metaphor of marriage was used in order to suggest that there 
was no simple recipe for success. There was also the perception that, in managing a 
business, partnership was more difficult than doing it alone. The complexity of strategic 
alliances increases as the number of partners increase due the challenge of cohesion and 
involvement among partners. This is illustrated in the following table of quotations: 
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Table 5-9.- The complexity of partnering (LR: Performance of Strategic Alliances) 
 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
More difficult 
than managing 
alone. It is like 
marriage, there is 
no recipe for 
success and 
difficult to 
identify success 
factors 
It is like a marriage.  There’s no recipe...on whether you have a 
happy marriage or not...it really depends on are you getting 
married for the right reasons? Are you getting married to the right 
girl? And are you putting the effort into making the marriage work? 
Because when there’s a problem, there’s not a problem just on one 
side, right?  Typically it’s a problem on both sides.  So...I don’t 
think it’s as simple as what are the things that will make it work or 
not… make sure that you get into a strategic alliance for the right 
reasons.  Make sure that you... choose your partner well.  Make 
sure that… you put the effort into managing the relationship, 
because, for sure, it will be far, far more difficult than managing 
yourself.  If you do all that, it will probably be fine.  If your party 
does that...it will be fine. (Interviewee 15) 
 
1,2,4 
The more 
partners the more 
complex  
One is the less partners, the better because you cannot do a thing of 
strategic alliances, which go beyond two partners, which is rather 
complicated because then you have rather complex management, 
…challenges to keep all the partners, …abreast of developments 
and to keep them all involved.  So, the less partners you have, the 
better, so if you have two partners, it’s good. (Interviewee 4) 
 
2,4 
 
The above quotations demonstrate the issues around partnering. It encourages developing a 
careful process of the alternatives available for an organisation when making a decision. 
This aspect is linked with the process mentioned in the previous chapter under business 
options.  
 
 Win-win mind-set in partnering (RQ2,4) 
 
Only one interviewee commented on the need to have a win-win mind-set for success. He 
additionally mentioned the need to deal with partners as colleagues rather than opponents. 
This quotation is of particular interest because it was identified as a success factor by the 
interviewee: 
It’s got to be a win, win situation in my view. I think I was successful in doing a lot 
of these because I never viewed it as a, you know a negotiation where that was a 
zero sum game. 
So sometimes you would enter into an agreement with a company that thought well 
they are going to get your assets, they are going to take all your money as well, and 
because you are at a disadvantage they are going to rape you. That never works... 
So it’s always trying to get your opponent to see that he is not your opponent he is 
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your partner… And being willing to compromise… (Interviewee 3) 
The quotation above shows the importance of long term thinking when partnering, 
otherwise the strategic alliance will not last. 
 
The following diagram summarises the findings of the most common category - ‘partner’. 
 
Figure 5-5.- Summary of findings of partner 
 
 
 
 
 
The diagram above represents the 6 subcategories that emerged from the findings on 
Partners. The benefits assist helping us to understand why organisations enter into strategic 
alliances. Complexity offered two perceptions of particular interest. On the one hand is the 
view that partnering is more complex than doing it alone and, on the other, that the more 
partners the more complex the strategic alliance. The benefits of partnering by developing 
businesses and sharing costs, despite creating high tension and conflict, is referred to as 
‘highland games week’. 
 
Alignment (RQ1-4) 
 
The second most common theme that emerged from the data was the influence of alignment 
in the performance of strategic alliances. Differing interests were a negative influence, 
along with objectives, expectations, drivers, and approach, and the perception of the 
connection between alignment and success.  
 
 
157 
Differences in interests, objectives and expectations (RQ1-4) 
 
Some interviewees highlighted issues caused by misalignment between partners due to 
differences in interests, objectives and expectations. Cases of a refinery and an aromatics 
plant illustrated the issues when the interests of one party went beyond the boundaries of 
the alliance and the resulting conflict could be with other partners or shareholders. It was 
suggested that it was necessary to spend time in agreeing the objective of the alliance in 
order to prevent such issues. Lack of alignment could emanate from different expectations 
due to a disparity in size or financial resources between partners. Different approaches and 
appetite for risk can drive decisions between partners in different directions. For example, 
conflict can arise with regard to an oilfield due to a different approach towards either 
continuing operations or decommissioning. Disagreements over expected levels of return, 
funding or operational matters were also highlighted. Having a different view of the 
balance of rewards was also cited as a potential source of conflict. The following table with 
quotations illustrate this:  
 
Table 5-10.- Difference in interest, objectives, priorities and expectations (LR: Performance 
of Strategic Alliances) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Different 
Interests. The 
case of a refinery 
and an aromatics 
plant 
There was a flaw with respect to I would say the alignment of 
interests, which fed through in to some very big issues from the 
emotional side.  
The refinery was a hundred per cent owned by Company A [name 
changed by Author], whereas the Aromatics plant was fifty per 
cent Company B [name changed by Author], fifty percent, 
Company A. And that led to unnatural tension in the interface 
between the two, because if you were a Company A guy you 
would say okay every dollar that I can keep on my side of the 
fence is a dollar for me... (Interviewee 1) 
1,2 
Different interests 
and conflict with 
other business of 
shareholders or 
partners 
Now, you’ve formed a strategic alliance because both parties are 
receiving the respective technical part of the other party and only 
if you put it together, it makes business sense for them to pursue 
that opportunity so they’re doing this, and they’re just teaming in 
the strategic alliance.  It’s creating new business opportunities 
and might, for example, get in conflict with the business of one of 
its shareholders or partners, while… the other’s would be 
supportive of a business proposition and then, that business very 
often has a conflict of interest or a discussion with the interest of 
the participating parties in the remaining business is very often a 
root cause for trouble. (Interviewee 4) 
 
1,2 
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Different 
Objectives and 
priority 
Prescription: 
spend time to set 
objectives 
The first one I would say is people [hasn’t] gone through the 
strategic objectives together.  
 
I strongly suggest that you spend a lot of time with those partners 
figuring out what you’re both trying to do before you enter into 
the partnership. 
 
One of the main issues as well is that the two partners don't have 
the same strategic objectives.  They don't have the same 
priority…  
 
You haven’t talked about… the objectives enough.  You’re not 
really aligned on what you’re trying to do. (Interviewee 8) 
 
 
2,3,4 
When 
expectations are 
different, end the 
alliance as soon 
as possible 
The shortest strategic alliance I have ever been involved…the 
problem… everyone has certain expectations, all the 
documentation when the dust had cleared one of the parties came 
back and said well that didn’t achieve what I wanted it to achieve.  
And this is what I expected and having thought about it… And the 
other party said well that’s not what we were anticipating you 
getting anyway.  So rather than fight about it and before they 
committed anything to it they just decided to fold it. (Interviewee 
7) 
 
2 
Different 
expectations due 
to different sizes 
and financial 
resources 
A lack of alignment as to what the joint venture should be trying 
to achieve.  And often, that lack of alignment is because one party 
wants to spend a lot of money and the other party doesn’t… and 
particularly where you have… parties of very different sizes and 
financial resources that can be a real stress… that can often be 
solved by the party that’s lacking in resources selling out to a 
party that does have resources, if there’s time… so financial 
stresses have been the main cause of difficulties that I’ve 
encountered. (Interviewee 13)  
 
2 
Difference on 
approach and 
appetite for risk. 
A case of 
decommissioning. 
The North Sea 
would be under 
stress, because 
multinational 
operator would 
assess 
opportunities 
globally, and 
I had an example just the other day of a difference of approach, 
where one party felt that it was time to decommission an oil field 
and the other party wanted to carry on, and thought there were 
things that could be done that could prolong the life of the oil 
field.  … so that’s just a straightforward difference of – maybe 
different – different risk appetite, in that one party was prepared 
to continue for a level of return, which the other party considered 
inadequate.  And I guess that’s something that’s going to happen 
more and more in the North Sea, where… some of the larger 
multinational operators have a competition for their capital.  
Where in other parts of the world they can see very high level of 
return from… investment in – say, in West Africa or in the Gulf of 
Mexico.  And they’re being told that the alternative is they can 
2 
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invest in more 
attractive areas. 
This could derive 
in issues for 
strategic 
alliances, there is 
a need to align 
expectations of 
return. 
invest their money in the North Sea, where costs are very high 
and levels of recovery are relatively low, and they’ll therefore get 
a much lower level of – of return.  Now, there may be smaller 
companies for whom that lower level of return is perfectly 
adequate… so… clarity as to what level of return you would be 
prepared to accept and making sure that there’s a degree of 
alignment over that, is probably pretty – pretty important 
(Interviewee 13) 
 
Different 
perception of 
rewards can result 
in problems  
It kind of takes you back to the main analogy about a marriage.  
But you know I think if one side is perceiving that they’re… 
doing all the work and getting none of the rewards… that creates 
a fundamental problem that you need to address before it ever 
happens. (Interviewee 5) 
 
2 
 
These quotations show how differences can affect the performance of strategic alliances 
and highlight the need to align expectations. This confirms the need to be scrupulous and 
spend time creating a common understanding of expectations and objectives among 
partners in when developing a strategic alliance. 
 
Alignment and success (RQ2,4) 
 
Accounts from some interviewees highlighted alignment as a success factor. In order to 
achieve the outcome, it is vital to work together. This represents a process of continuous 
negotiation and the skills of actors in the strategic alliance are critical in achieving success. 
The following table of quotations illustrates this: 
 
Table 5-11.- Alignment and success (LR: Performance of Strategic Alliances) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Success I think success is that alignment of interest… (Interviewee 10) 2,4 
Continuous 
alignment of 
the strategic 
ambition 
Always start whatever the strategic ambition was of a particular 
partner… if access of a particular market… to the technology…. to... 
raw materials that you know provide the sustainable advantage for 
your facility… whatever the strategic need is… your performance 
along that… relative to the costs that … the undertaking have… that is 
really the major determinant of success.  If … one way or another the 
alliance is satisfying that need and is doing it better than your 
foregone alternative…. then you have it.  And all that comes down to 
is making sure you’re continually getting alignment and its working 
and its fitting.  You know it fits for you and… that it’s also workable 
for your partner. (Interviewee 5)   
4 
Success: Work 
together to 
I think it’s really difficult to identify what makes for a success...  
particularly when you come to a big organisation that actually this 
2,4 
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achieve the 
outcome. It is a 
continuous 
negotiation of 
disputes and 
differences 
(actors’ skills 
are critical) 
strategic alliance isn’t you being the dominant partner this is about 
working together to achieve the outcome that you want the reason 
you’re there and they want the reason the they’re there.  I think that 
probably leads into the saying I have heard is that a strategic alliance 
is a negotiation continuum 
 
People had to have very good negotiation skills to make a strategic 
alliances work… if they allowed a deadlock to develop… then the risk 
of some form of breakdown was very, very high.  So it was about being 
able to see where disputes and differences would arise and being able 
to negotiate through those disputes and differences and not let them 
become deadlocks in their own selves. (Interviewee 7) 
 
 
 
Findings are summarised in the following figure: 
 
Figure 5-6.- Summary of findings of alignment 
 
 
 
 
 
The diagram above represents the two subcategories that emerged in reference to 
alignment. Difference in interests, expectations and objectives could cause tensions and 
difficulties. Continuous alignment was perceived as important in achieving success, along 
with the skills of the actors in the strategic alliance. 
 
Change (RQ2,3,4) 
 
Another of the common secondary themes which emerged from a majority of interviewees 
was the influence of change in the performance of strategic alliances. Four categories of 
change were identified: (1) change in expectations, interests and objectives, (2) change and 
the perception of failure, (3) change and markets and (4) change and the need for 
endorsement by executives. 
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Change in expectations, interest and objectives (RQ2,4) 
 
Accounts from some interviewees pointed out that expectations, objectives and priorities 
change, therefore there is a need to develop flexible agreements and plan for a possible exit 
as part of the management process. The terms of ‘divorce’ should be agreed in advance. A 
Board drawn from both organisations was implemented to keep track of and communicate 
change at the parent and alliance levels, requiring transparent communication.  The 
response to change may differ amongst partners and their respective reactions could depend 
on the options available to each party. A lack of possible options acted as constraint as one 
partner may become subject to the behaviour of the other. It was suggested that the source 
of a change of interest should be analysed and understood in order to help to fix problems 
and that mediation be included as a tool to accommodate change. This is illustrated in the 
following table of quotations: 
 
Table 5-12.- Change in expectations, interests and objectives (LR: Performance of Strategic 
Alliances) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Expectations 
change 
Prescription: 
flexible 
documentation 
and plan for exit 
I think the critical thing is to accept that expectation will change, 
that the documentation needs to be flexible enough to meet those 
change in expectations.  And a point will be reached when either 
one or more of the parties will say I’ve got what I want or I’m not 
getting what I want I want to exit.  So there needs to be built into 
the strategic alliance a recognition that things will change over 
time….  I have seen strategic alliances structured so that there 
can’t be an exit.  Of course there can always be an exit but 
financially it’s, it’s always going to be unattractive for there to be 
an exit.  
 
But that joint venture was put together a long time went into the 
structure of the joint venture.  There was very little time went into 
how the joint venture was going to be managed and I mean on a 
day to day basis not just reporting terms… and no time was put 
into the question of what happens if someone wants to leave.  What 
is exit? (Interviewee 7) 
 
2,4 
Things always 
change 
Prescription: 
Parents-Board 
Alliance people 
transparent 
communication 
I think is organizational and that’s… how are you going to have 
both parties monitor, control and direct the alliance once you put 
it together because there are always going to be things that are 
going to change and how do you work together well to do that 
smoothly… 
What I found to be very effective is, we put together a board of 
people at a senior level from both companies who knew what the 
strategic objectives were and they met with the alliance people 
1,2,4 
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multiple times a year and provided input from their respective 
corporations as to what might have changed on the corporate side 
so they can be incorporated into the alliance, and then the alliance 
people gave the same message to both sides at the same time as to 
what was going on, and it was very transparent. It was very clear, 
and organizationally, it’s never easy but it was a good way to run 
things so there were fewer surprises and problems. (Interviewee 8)  
 
World changes, 
partners respond 
different 
depending on the 
options available 
to each party 
And of course often the world changes.  And how the strategic 
alliance partner wants to respond to those changes can be 
different to ones own change… 
 
From my experience, where strategic alliance's haven't worked so 
well, that's the main thing.  That either they've got other options as 
well, and you don't have them so that's one thing.  And then the 
other one is that they're out of time and they just don't deliver.  The 
one party is just happy to sit there and work with its other options.  
For us it was the main option then you're stuck, you must get out of 
it.  And that is brought about by the world changing our pace from 
the time you put the strategic alliance together.  (Interviewee 9) 
 
2 
Interest change, 
different 
behaviour from 
expected. 
Prescription: 
understand the 
sources of 
change to solve 
the problem 
I think the main problem is when one party's interests change. 
  
If your interest has changed and you say I don't wanna be in that 
alliance with that person anymore but I am.  How do I gracefully 
exit without losing value or if you're on the other side you suddenly 
realise that your partner is behaving differently than you had 
expected and that's the general fault line.  So understanding what 
the change of interest is might give you the clue as to how to solve 
the problem which could be the company needs to raise money.  So 
it's gone from being a buyer to a seller.  There are lots of things 
but generally most strategic alliances start off well and hit a block 
after years two and five.  The ones that survive in the long term get 
through that, whatever it is. (Interviewee 10) 
 
2,4 
Prescription 
Mediation as a 
tool to 
accommodate 
change 
I am now – I wasn't ten years ago – I always put mediation in as a 
first – you know, proper mediating – to try and stop it getting 
legal.  Proper mediation from a professional mediator to say is 
there a way that this can be effectively renegotiated that means 
that both parties feel they've got what they need.  So I would insert 
– I would now put that into any joint venture agreement. 
(Interviewee 10) 
 
1,2,4 
These show the need to acknowledge change. Strategic alliances can take years to develop, 
therefore original ideas and expectations change. This has to be taken in consideration and 
discussed with the partners in order that documentation accommodates change. 
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Change and perception of failure (RQ2,3) 
 
Some interviewees pointed out that a change in objectives and interests is natural in the 
cycle of an alliance. Failure could therefore simply be a perception and thus strategic 
alliances which come to an end were not necessarily failures. This is illustrated in the 
following table of quotations: 
 
Table 5-13.- Change and perception of failure (LR: Performance of Strategic Alliances) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Alliances have 
a natural end-
point which 
this does not 
necessarily 
mean failure 
Some – well failure is the wrong word – some – most successful ones 
reach a natural end point.  That's not failure but there comes a point at 
which one of the partners changes or the business changes to a newer 
structure but then you can say the same within companies.  Businesses 
come and go but understanding you've got a shareholder agreement 
and that in ten years’ time someone's gonna pick that back up and say 
how do we use it. (Interviewee 10) 
2 
Objectives 
change but this 
is not failure 
And I go into Brazil and discover it’s not a very attractive market for 
my product and I pull out of the alliance, is that a failure?  Well, no.  
I’ve had my objectives changed, I’m not interested in Brazil anymore, 
and it wasn’t necessarily because you and I failed as partners, it was-, 
Brazil wasn’t the best kind of place for me to sell my product and I 
wouldn’t have known that had I not done the alliance but, you know, 
things change. (Interviewee 8) 
 
2,3 
 
These quotations challenge the perception of failure. Even when organisations enter a 
strategic alliance and do not achieve their objectives, the learning process could be of 
benefit to other alliances. 
 
 Change and markets (RQ1-4) 
 
Accounts from some interviewees pointed out that markets change. In the industry, the 
price of oil could develop differently in various situations. This needs to be taken in 
consideration when dealing with change. The need for continuous recalibration and 
adjustment in the relationship among partners was suggested to help deal with changes in 
the market. The market mechanism reflects change  - this explains why some strategic 
alliances continue despite variations in actual performance. This is illustrated in the 
following table of quotations:   
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Table 5-14.- Change and markets  
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Change in 
markets (oil 
price), 
perspectives 
change. Teams 
get to know 
each other and 
face different 
circumstances. 
Prescription: 
Continuous re-
calibration and 
adjustment, a 
search for 
strategic fit 
 
One of the things that works is if the two companies in the alliance 
or more than two.  If the companies involved in the alliance if they 
are continuing to re-calibrate and adjust… so that there continues 
to be a strategic fit. Then the alliance usually stays pretty healthy. 
 
You’ve one set of perspective and as you move on and the team 
partners get to know each other and they have to deal with 
different circumstances things could change. 
 
I mean in the oil business what I saw… in the last decade when oil 
prices were twenty dollars a barrel there was a lot of different… 
alliances and… sharing agreements and applied agreements… and 
then… oil suddenly becomes a hundred dollars a barrel in a 
matter of a few years… 
 
So it certainly over the course of time if the partner continues to… 
identify gaps and … to work together and make sure that they’re 
finding a way to keep the relationship fair and balanced on both 
sides.  And that takes a lot of commitment and both sides really 
have to want to make it a priority. (Interviewee 5) 
1,2,4 
Environment 
change, 
strategic 
alliance 
continues even 
if it is 
delivering less 
value 
The markets accept the under performance and the back room 
environment might have changed, and then it effectively goes down 
as a lesson learned and you've lost some value.  It was the case 
that many strategic alliance organisations stay together for a long, 
long, a strategic alliance that stays together for a long time, but 
not delivering the value projected.  The market place is sufficient.  
They're still providing value that is over and above an alternative.  
The market will continue to support it and it just goes on. 
(Interviewee 12) 
3 
 
The quotations above show a contextualisation for the energy industry, particularly in the 
oil and gas segment where the price of oil plays an important role and could encourage the 
development of strategic alliances. Considering that strategic alliances can last a long time, 
it would be useful to visualise the future with the partner and look for a common 
understanding. 
 
 The complexity of change and need for Executive endorsement (RQ2,4) 
 
Only one interviewee highlighted the complexity of change for organisations and the need 
for endorsement from a senior level to make things work. This view was of particular 
interest because it highlighted the challenges of change in organisations and its connection 
with alignment. Being involved in a strategic alliance requires alignment with other 
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partner(s), but this could be challenging because they all have different processes and 
systems. The following table of quotations illustrates this: 
Table 5-15.- Complexity of change and need for endorsement (LR: Performance of 
Strategic Alliances) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Entering a 
strategic 
alliance 
demands a 
change in 
behaviour and 
alignment with 
a partner.  
Change for 
organisations is 
difficult 
It’s maybe a little bit analogous to change… if you want to engage in 
a strategic alliance to make it work you’ve got to take part of your 
business and you’re asking it to behave and to, to work in a different 
way.  You’re going to say, you, you go off and you align yourself… 
around this particular area of business with our strategic partners.  
And I think it – you’re sort of saying, you’re asking the group that 
does that to change. 
 
Why change in organisations is so difficult, because people have 
established ways of doing things, they have established processes 
and… they have established belief systems about what’s important, 
who’s important and how, how things should work around them. 
(Interviewee 6) 
 
2,4 
There is a need 
for endorsement 
at the executive 
level 
Now if you’re going to change those you’ve got to make it absolutely 
clear from the… top that you want to do that.  So…if strategic 
alliances are going to work they’ve got to be bought into at a senior 
level and they’ve got to be endorsed by the top of the organisation 
and not just at the launch day each.  The CEO has… not just got to 
say, “We’ve got this strategic alliance… it’s going to be marvellous, 
it’s going to be very good for both of our companies” and then walk 
away from it.  There’s got to be a commitment and from an Executive 
level that we really believe in this and we’re going to do what it takes 
to make it work. (Interviewee 6)    
 
4 
Prescription: 
invest in 
developing 
skills to deal 
with change 
I think expecting there to be problems and actually putting the 
resource in place… to manage the problems, so to actually invest in 
things like… behavioural workshops and …the equivalent of 
organisational change workshops… and team building processes, I 
think those things are – it’s easy to be cynical about, about those 
kind of things.  But I think doing them well and doing them effectively 
is, is really important for, for this type of thing, because … you tend 
to get… such strong problems where you’re bringing together… two 
different companies’ resources. (Interviewee 6) 
 
4 
 
The findings for change are summarised in the following diagram. 
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Figure 5-7.- Summary of findings of change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The diagram above represents the five subcategories of Change. The need for a continuous 
re-calibration and adjustment was highlighted, suggesting a connection with alignment. It is 
complex for organisations to accommodate change which suggests a link with culture. 
 
 
Exit (RQ1-4) 
The issues related to exit and strategies to deal with it were highlighted by the majority of 
interviewees. Exit strategies could be identified in the contract (similar to a pre-nuptial 
agreement), but this was not always the case. Enthusiasm to complete the deal sometimes 
caused this to be overlooked. Exit is likely to be simpler if there is a parent company, but 
can very difficult when the whole organisation has been committed to the strategic alliance. 
The agreement should contain provision for termination alongside a conflict resolution 
mechanism. It was suggested that, when necessary, exit should be speedy. There was an 
acknowledgement that a strategic alliance had a natural end where it must be exited or 
renewed. Exit could exist as an alternative to change; if this is complicated, a simple option 
is for one party to buy out the other. For example, in the North Sea it is not common to 
have pre-emption rights. The partner then goes through a process of setting up a data room, 
running an auction and selling to the highest bidder, provided that financial and technical 
competence is met. This is illustrated in the following table of quotations:  
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Table 5-16.- Exit issues and strategies (LR: Performance of Strategic Alliances) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Exit 
strategies, 
excitement 
to do the 
deal 
overlook 
exit, context 
of strategic 
alliance. If a 
parent 
company 
exit is easier. 
Exit is 
difficult 
when 
everything 
has been 
committed 
Well in many cases I would hope that the initial contract around the 
strategic alliance would identify exit strategies.   That is not always 
the case.  It can be very easy in the excitement of putting an alliance 
together to forget that you may actually separate at some point in 
the future.  So having your pre nuptial agreement which identifies 
what happens when you separate is part of the discussion when you 
go into it.  I think the answer again, it depends on what you've done.  
If you still have a parent company, so if you put an alliance together 
where the alliance is part of the company.  You have a parent 
company.  Then exiting from the alliance is absolutely somewhat 
easier in terms of re assimilating the parts. Assuming you've 
reached some kind of financial agreement.  Typically if you're 
looking at your energy project, then one of the partners will assume 
the project, in total, or one of the partner will sell out to someone 
else.  And effectively someone might have a new partner to work 
with.  Both of those should be allowed for within the contract.  You 
can do that if you've got a parent company that you can bring your 
own people back into, and bring the resources back into, from an 
exit.  If you put a strategic alliance which you've burnt your bridges, 
you've committed your entire organisation into that alliance.  Then 
separating I would say is quite unusual and very messy... 
(Interviewee 12) 
 
1,3,4 
Interest has a 
‘shelf life’, 
exit gets 
complex 
when 
agreements 
do not 
consider it 
This is quite some time ago an old gas joint venture.  We hadn't 
properly understood that it probably wasn't a permanent 
relationship. 
 
There came a point when one company was gonna have, you know, 
– both companies were gonna want a hundred percent of the 
business or none of it and we didn't properly realise that it had a 
shelf life and that happened quicker.  Company A [name changed by 
Author] wanted a hundred percent of it quicker and then Company 
B [name changed by Author]  decided they wanted none of it – they 
were gonna stick at upstream and sell wholesale but the joint 
venture agreement didn't allow a graceful exit and it took a year of 
unnecessary angst to end up… (Interviewee 10) 
 
1,2,3 
Problems 
when exit is 
not 
considered 
Prescription: 
implement 
exit clauses 
(‘divorce 
provisions’ a 
I think one of the things that we learned, certainly I learned, we had 
no exit clause. 
When we did it we couldn’t talk about the potential of the failure 
of the alliance, because basically we had no choice. If I were 
doing that all over again I would have been, I would have put in as 
much protection as I could, given some numbers, some objectives, 
some goals… some targets that had to be hit. And if they weren’t 
hit giving us a way to divorce...There were absolute, there was 
nothing in there that is why it was two years of negotiation… And 
1,2,4 
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prenuptial 
agreement) 
they tried to rape us going out. 
There was nothing written and today if I was doing a strategic 
alliance, or doing a joint venture I would put in divorce 
provisions, almost like a prenuptial agreement. 
Yeah, exit clauses I think are essential but you don’t always have 
that option... Because another company if they are, if they are 
taking you on thinking ultimately we are going to gobble you 
up...You’re not going to agree to that.. (Interviewee 3) 
 
Termination 
provision & 
a good 
conflict 
resolution 
mechanism 
A natural 
ending or 
renew it 
You have to have termination provisions, and the termination 
provisions will not kick in before a proper deadlocked resolution 
process... And there has to be also a natural ending… at which you 
have the option to exit or to renew… and you need to have some 
good conflict resolution mechanism. (Interviewee 15) 
 
4 
A successful 
exit: do it 
fast 
I think you do it quickly, in my opinion.  I think if you want… to exit 
in a successful way, it’s to actually do it, when you… get the second 
or the third time that you have issues.  What I’m saying is, in other 
words, if – to be having a divorce is not every easy, right?  You 
know, it’s not an easy situation.  So I think what happens here – in 
business, where you don’t commit your life, like in the private 
situation, right?  You’ve got children and things like that.  In the 
business, there’s nothing like that.  In business, I would say that if 
you feel that after two or three times, you’re not – that you don’t 
have the right partner, then… the best way to deal with that, is to do 
it as soon as possible.  Don’t let it, you know, continue, continue, 
and then brew forever. (Interviewee 14)   
 
4 
If objectives 
are not 
achieved, 
reconfigure 
the strategic 
alliance or 
exit 
If it has achieved your objectives then I guess you tick that and say 
I’ve done the right thing.  If it hasn’t achieved your objectives then 
clearly you’ve now got to either re-configure that strategic alliance 
to achieve your objectives or you’ve got to find a way of exiting that 
strategic alliance. 
 
So it’s not always a dollar and cents thing… quite often it’s just 
achieving a particular objective which should translate into dollars 
and cents otherwise you wouldn’t be doing it at all. (Interviewee 7) 
 
 
1,2,4 
Exit as an 
alternative to 
change, if 
not buy the 
other party 
And the change is either the party’s exit and if it’s easy to exit, it’s 
going to be easier to just exit, or what is probably the most 
common if it’s not easy to exit is, one party buys out the other. 
(Interviewee 8) 
 
1,2 
North Sea Sell to your partner, or sell to the market…, I would – 1 
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case, not 
common 
pre-emption 
rights. 
Follow a 
Selling 
process (data 
room- 
auction-sell) 
occasionally, it might be so successful you can even float it.  But… 
certainly in the North Sea, what you would tend to find is that 
interests in joint ventures are – are sold fairly – it’s – unlike some 
– some classic joint ventures, it can be quite difficult to extract 
yourself from… and it may be very difficult to – to sell, because 
the partner says, “No, I – I agreed to deal with you and only you.  
Only you have the resources that I need for this, so it just doesn’t 
make any sense for you to be able to sell.  If you want out, then we 
go through some sort of ‘Russian Roulette’ process, and I have to 
be able to bid for your shares before you can exit.”  The North Sea 
joint ventures don’t tend to work that way… increasingly, they 
don’t have pre-emption rights in them.  So it – if a partner wants 
to get out of a joint venture, he’ll tend to set up a data room, run 
an auction process, and sell to the highest bidder… and as long as 
that highest bidder meets the relatively limited thresholds of 
having financial and technical competence that are set out in the 
joint venture agreement, then he’s free to sell to a third party.  
Sometimes, he has to offer to his partners first, and they can pre-
empt.  But more often than not, he can just sell out. (Interviewee 
13) 
 
The quotations above highlight the relevance of discussing and agreeing terms and 
conditions for exit. This category should be considered as a compulsory theme for 
discussion with the partners involved in the process of developing a strategic alliance. 
The following diagram summarises the exit findings.  
 
Figure 5-8.- Summary of exit findings  
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The diagram above represents the exit findings. Sometimes, provisions for exit were 
overlooked in the rush to make deals happen. Exit was highlighted as an alternative to 
change, acknowledging that interest has a ‘shelf life’. 
 
Legal-Regulatory problems and risks (Technology, intellectual property, anti-trust 
and competition law) 
Some interviewees referred to the legal-regulatory issues and risks that impact the 
performance of strategic alliances in terms of technology, intellectual property, anti-trust 
and competition law.  
 
Technology and intellectual property issues (1,2,4) 
 
Some interviewees pointed out the problems and risks related with technology and 
intellectual property (IP). It was acknowledged that IP is critical. One major concern was 
the strategic management of IP issues. A variety of strategies were suggested to deal with 
this. There are certain issues with intellectual property at an international level which are 
due to gaps in jurisdiction. Managing IP could result in issues with collaboration. IP 
ownership and restrictions could require a legal review of complex licensing agreements. 
This is illustrated in the following table of quotations: 
 
Table 5-17.- Technology and intellectual property issues (LR: Performance of Strategic 
Alliances) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Critical to be 
clear on IP and 
know-how 
because strategic 
alliances end 
One area which is always very crucial and critical is that before 
you enter in negotiation of a strategic alliance, it has to be 
absolutely clear on intellectual properties because strategic 
alliance means that you have two parties where they would have 
their own heritage … there will be developments, there will be 
know how, there will be results, which were only created or 
becoming available because the parties are together… you should 
always consider the strategic alliance as being a partnership of 
time, which means there will be a time when parties separate again 
because the business reason for the alliance disappears and then 
you want to be sure that in that separation process, both parties 
has the right to a good understanding about their rights to the 
technology, to the business… as a result of that alliance. 
(Interviewee 4) 
 
2,4 
Loose 
technology or 
A lot of people are very concerned getting into a partnership that 
they lose technology or control or other types of things, so in some 
2,4 
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control 
 
cases, it might be what’s my view of security of my key assets. 
(Interviewee 8) 
 
Prescription: 
Keep control 
over the process 
Well, in some cases, you might say…. ‘my partner will have no 
access to my technology at all.’ ‘I will do that part of the process 
with people one hundred percent under my control, or I will only 
transform-, I will only transfer into the partnership a finished good 
or, something that’s already had the technology put into it.  They 
will not participate in that part of the process. You may put a lot of 
systems controls in so that people can’t have access to your 
computers, your intellectual property. (Interviewee 8) 
1,2,4 
Prescriptions: 
legal protection, 
provide second 
best version of 
technology, have 
knowledge 
outside 
operations, 
catalyst outside 
JV (China) 
Can you think if you protect your own technology we are owned 
by.  The intellectual property doesn't have to be necessary 
technology.  The one is of course to work on a regulatory or legal 
basis to protect it.  Now that, if you are to play it to China or so on, 
not so easy.  So what may do is you don't go with your best 
technology to other countries.  To regions where you don't feel 
comfortable about your intellectual property being protected.  So 
you maybe go with the second best version of your technology or 
so. But you also, that's beyond doing the obvious.  Protecting 
yourself legally…. having the knowledge in case of needed 
operations out side of the joint venture.  And only supply for 
capital into the joint venture, and not put the catalyst into the joint 
venture.  And look at practical aspects, like that. (Interviewee 9) 
 
2,4 
IP & 
Technology lost 
(China),  
Prescription: Do 
not contribute 
with your latest 
technology or 
keep developing 
advancements 
The risk if you are contributing technology or intellectual property 
is that know how you've got, becomes available to third party, 
which in some form or another at some point, uses it 
independently.  And of course we all know that's happened in 
China.  We find out are catalyst sales in China were significantly 
higher than the productive capacity of the plants which were being 
built there.  You find out that there's, basically your design and 
ingenuity has been copied. Independent plants have been set up.  
Say your strategic alliance which gave you a bridge into a market, 
ultimately leads you to losing the very technology that gave you the 
purpose in the first place.  Of course that is well known.  You can 
overcome that by either not contributing your latest technology, or 
keep developing advancements all the time. (Interviewee 12) 
 
1,2,4 
Commitment to 
warrant 
technology is a 
signal of 
potential issues 
People that we decided to partner with said that they had a game 
changing technology that would reduce the cost of raising the 
product by forty percent but it was a major capital investment to 
do it, and neither one of us wanted to put that major capital 
investment in the smaller sized businesses but if we put the two 
together, we were able to finance it, and the technology didn’t 
work.  Simple as that… 
 
Eventually, we got the technology to work some but it was-, it 
1,2 
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wasn’t as good as it was said to be and frankly, there was no real 
way to unwarrant the venture at that point but it ended up being 
sold…  
 
The warning sign for us probably should have been they refused… 
to back or certify the technology as workable as we were 
negotiating the engineering contract… What they were saying is, 
you know, it’s not that we know it’s going to fail, we just have no 
idea if it’s going to work at this scale.  (Interviewee 8) 
 
IP issues at an 
International 
level due to gaps 
in jurisdiction 
And some of the issues that come up with it are, say for example 
you've got international regime for international property rights.  
But you're dealing across jurisdictions and there are gaps in where 
there is coverage or where there isn't coverage.  So some of the 
issues there may be that you might want to retain your intellectual 
property rights but because you're partnering out of your 
jurisdiction you may not be able to because of finances, or maybe 
because there isn't a system that covers you sufficiently.  You might 
not be protected with that partnership, so your intellectual 
property rights then become subject to others appropriation. 
(Interviewee 11) 
 
2 
IP protection 
issues, either 
overprotection 
or dissemination 
without 
protection 
So you don't have information to be able to form alliances because 
there isn't enough detail.  Because they are overly protective of 
their international property rights.  And that could be a barrier to 
collaboration in the first place. 
A lot of individuals don't understand enough about how they can 
move their intellectual property rights so they can give 
presentations and discuss and publish information which then 
makes it difficult for them to claim those intellectual property 
rights.  When you go into an alliance, because they've already 
made it public.  It's in a public domain.  So the issues were then for 
me to talk to people and get them to put on record, and to secure 
intellectual property rights within the organisation. (Interviewee 
11)   
 
2,4 
IP Ownership 
and restrictions 
could require a 
legal review of 
complex 
licensing 
agreements 
If you’re talking about technology, you would need to consider 
ownership of intellectual property.  How that was going to be 
handled.  Whether the party that you’re dealing with really does 
own the intellectual property that he says he does, and which 
you’re relying on in order to be able to take forward your strategic 
alliance.  And that can require a lot of legal review of sometimes 
some quite complex licensing arrangements, under which your 
partner has the benefit of certain technology.  And maybe he’s only 
got the benefit of that technology for a certain period, or in a 
certain geographical area, or subject to certain restrictions. 
(Interviewee 13) 
 
1 
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The quotations above show the concern that the industry has regarding intellectual property 
rights and technology. It is interesting to see that contracts alone are not enough to protect 
technology and to note the need to develop strategies. This reflects issues concerning trust 
amongst parties. 
 
 Antitrust and competition law issues (RQ1-4) 
 
Only one interviewee raised issues related to anti-trust matters and competition law. Anti-
trust compliance could act as test for a strategic alliance in probing commitment to and 
rational for its development. Competition law is not a large problem for JVs in oil as long 
as there is competition in selling the product. Maximising recovery in the UK as 
highlighted in the Wood Review needs further analysis. The EU might investigate the 
competition dynamics of North Sea oilfields due to some of the common terms of 
collaboration. The following table of quotations illustrates this: 
 
Table 5-18.- Antitrust and competition law issues (LR: Performance of Strategic Alliances) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
A test for 
commitment and 
rational of a 
strategic alliance 
There may be anti-trust issues that you need to address at that 
stage.  There may be clearances you need to obtain, in order to 
allow the alliance to go forward…. and that is quite a good test in 
some ways, of whether there is genuine commitment to the alliance 
and also whether there’s a genuine reason for it.  Because if there’s 
a genuine reason for it, if both parties are bringing different things 
to the party, it’s much easier to construct a justification for any 
competition law issues that may arise. (Interviewee 13) 
 
1 
JVs not a big 
problem for 
competition law, 
as long as there 
is competition in 
selling the 
product  
Where the parties are potential competitors.  So if you take a joint 
venture to develop a hydrocarbon license, operators are potential 
competitors in relation to that.  But generally speaking, the 
creation of a production joint venture is not a big problem under 
competition law, as long as the parties are able to separately sell… 
their own share of production.  The competition authorities will say 
that it is an advantage to the consumer to have more oil and gas 
produced.  And if none of those parties would be prepared to 
produce it on their own, the fact that they could join together to 
produce is – is therefore a good thing, as long as they then compete 
when it comes to selling it. (Interviewee 13) 
 
1 
Wood review 
analysis in terms 
of information to 
be exchanged  
Well, maybe we should do it.  Maybe it’s a good thing to do it.  But 
we have to analyse the competition implications of doing it.  And 
see whether the benefits that the consumer will get from, for 
instance improving production in this area of the North Sea, or 
2 
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improving the length of the life of this infrastructure, are justified 
by the fact that we will have to exchange a certain amount of 
confidential information between us that would not normally be 
permitted.  (Interviewee 13) 
 
Potential risk of 
anti-trust inquiry 
from the EU 
The strategic need for collaboration from the perspective of… the 
UK Government, which is very much in favour of this in order to 
maximise production.  With the significant potential risk to the 
company of an anti-trust inquiry, which would come not from the 
UK Government, but probably from the EU. (Interviewee 13) 
 
2 
Due diligence to 
identify risks, 
but constrained 
with the times to 
do business 
I think very often, the due diligence is not anywhere near that 
extensive… and there will be some – some basic financial due 
diligence, and then there will be the discussion of how the parties 
are going to work together on a very particular project.  And that’s 
about as far as it goes. 
But it’s got to be balanced against the time and expense that people 
have available… to devote to these things.  Because if you want to 
get on with your project and somebody says, you know, “Give me 
two months to dig around into this company,” you’re going to say, 
“No, we need to – we need to start.  We need to start now.”  So 
there’s always those competing pressures. (Interviewee 13) 
 
2,3,4 
 
The following diagram summarises the findings of Legal and Regulatory risks. 
 
 
Figure 5-9.- Summary of findings of legal and regulatory risks 
 
 
 
 
 
The diagram above represents the two subcategories that emerged from findings in the 
legal-regulatory category. IP and technology were highlighted as a major concern and 
interviewees suggested some strategies to deal with this. 
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Culture (RQ1,2,4) 
 
Accounts from some interviewees pointed out the problems related to differences in culture 
and suggested ways to deal with these.  
 
Different organisational cultures (RQ2,4) 
 
Some interviewees pointed out the issues which arise in dealing with different 
organisational cultures. It was suggested that time be taken to understand different cultures 
and ways of working. This leads to a process of change which, if not properly managed, 
could result in misalignment among partners. The perception of failure related to 
differences in culture and disputes about control was also highlighted. Again, marriage was 
used as a metaphor to illustrate culture and the risk of termination of the alliance if it did 
not work. The following table of quotations illustrates this: 
 
Table 5-19.- Different organisational cultures (LR: Performance of Strategic Alliances) 
 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Working with 
different 
cultures leads 
to a process of 
change 
I mean you've inevitably got cultural issues… often you don't realise 
the strength of your own corporate culture, until you try and do an 
alliance with someone else's corporate culture. 
But you're suddenly working in different organisation with equally 
strong corporate values coming from the other side.  Sorting out the 
change of process, the cultural or development of the alliance, is a 
very critical aspect of making an alliance successful. .  One of the 
biggest issues. (Interviewee 12) 
2,4 
Misalignment 
due to different 
backgrounds 
and ways of 
working.  
Overcoming 
issues requires 
time, money 
and resources 
 
There are all kinds of ways that people can become misaligned when 
they actually do anything together, because they come from… 
separate backgrounds and they have all these separate ways of 
working.  
 
Now I think people will often use the word culture… 
None of these things are impossible to overcome but you do have to 
invest time and money and resource in order to overcome them. 
(Interviewee 6) 
 
2,4 
Can prise 
collaboration 
apart and 
promote 
unhealthy 
competition 
within alliance 
Very often, these structures fail because the culture in the companies 
coming together is so different that people do not really work 
together properly.  They don’t understand each other and then they 
are not on a converging operating mode but on a diverging operating 
mode in the sense of, I want to prove that I’m the better guy. 
(Interviewee 4) 
2 
Work together, Cultures, different companies have got different cultures.  Making 2,4 
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have a good 
marriage 
sure that the cultures actually work together…  And making sure that 
there is a good marriage in the culture.  So if that doesn’t work, then, 
you know, the alliance breaks down. (Interviewee 14) 
 
These quotations show a connection between culture and other categories such as alignment 
and change. There is a need for organisations involved in strategic alliances to adapt to 
different cultures. 
  
Dealing with cultural issues (RQ1,2,4) 
 
Some interviewees highlighted ways to deal with cultural issues. For instance, the 
importance of leadership and having people with skills in change management were 
highlighted and that the alignment of behaviour could impact trust. Conducting pilots to 
minimise the risk of exposure was suggested as an option. This is illustrated in the 
following table: 
 
Table 5-20.- Dealing with cultural issues (LR: Performance of Strategic Alliances) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Culture issues 
require 
leadership and 
effort. People 
with change 
management 
understanding. 
Management 
demonstrates 
new cultural 
norms. 
Behaviour has an 
impact on trust 
Well the cultural one I think is a case of very significant amount 
of effort, and probably a far larger amount of leadership time, 
than is normally allowed for.   In our experience and effectively 
what we did, we put somebody in the new company or new 
alliance, we put them through all kinds of change management 
understanding training.  You constantly mix up the teams.  You've 
got to reward success at the right time, so you're recognising 
good behaviours versus less good behaviours.  Management is 
actively demonstrating what they consider to be the new cultural 
norms versus the old cultural norms.  And visibly leading the 
organisation into a new place.  Very often I would say that 
management does not appreciate the amount of time they need to 
take, on developing a new culture.  And also their own 
behaviours, sending the right signals to their staff.  If you don't 
work in accordance with the way the strategic alliance has 
spoken, or indicated it wants you to act, then you can very quickly 
destroy trust within the organisation and very quickly you have 
separate teams operating in the same organisation. (Interviewee 
12) 
1,2,4 
Look for similar 
cultures and 
conduct pilots to 
minimise risk 
exposure 
I think that you need to identify companies that – they have 
similar cultures… Bigger companies, conservative companies, 
will actually try – will always try pilots, to actually – to minimise 
the risk and the exposure. (Interviewee 14) 
1,4 
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The quotations above establish a connection between culture and leadership, where leaders 
should have sufficient skill to manage change. Cultures perceive behaviours in different 
ways and some differences could bring some issues around trust.  
 
Culture and success (RQ1,24) 
 
Some interviewees cited culture as a factor for success at national and organisational levels. 
A requirement to work with different cultures by being open and accommodating the needs 
of the strategic alliance, was suggested. This is contrary to the situation in large companies 
with rigid rules and suggests that flexibility is important in choosing a partner in 
developing countries. It also suggests that the rigidity found in larger companies might not 
be ideal. This is illustrated in the following table of quotations:  
 
Table 5-21.- Culture and success (LR: Performance of Strategic Alliances) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Culture a 
factor for 
success, create 
collaborative 
teams 
Culture is probably overlooked as a factor in a lot of strategic 
alliances… I know it’s an enormous factor in the success or 
otherwise of mergers.  And I can’t imagine it’s much less 
significant in a long-term alliance where people are going to have 
to work together. 
The success is to do with the culture and whether the parties have 
managed to create a really collaborative team. (Interviewee 13) 
 
2,4 
Flexibility to 
deal with 
cultures. Large 
companies 
more rigid 
Well I think where we've worked with the cultural thing, has worked 
really well… one shouldn't be too prescriptive when you start 
engaging with a partner. 
 
When you are far more open to tailoring it according to what their 
needs are of that specific joint venture.  So that's one aspect that 
they've found open doors for us.  As opposed to being one of the big 
major chemical companies which has it's own advantages.  But one 
thing that's a disadvantage there is that there's only one way, and 
that's the big company way.  And if you work with companies in the 
developing world… We found it actually opens door by not being 
that prescriptive. (Interviewee 9) 
 
1,2,4 
 
The quotations above show that culture could be a determinant for success. This depends 
on both the collaboration of the organisations involved and on the flexibility to adapt to 
other cultures.  
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Figure 5-10.- Summary of findings of culture 
 
 
 
 
 
The diagram above represents the findings on Culture. Differences in organisational 
cultures could result in misalignment. Leadership, taking time to understand culture and 
skill in the management of change were highlighted as a requirement in dealing with issues.  
 
Clarity (RQ2,4) 
 
Some interviewees identified clarity as a critical factor. Where objectives and benefits are 
not clear, problems could arise and so clarity was also acknowledged as a factor for 
success.  
 
Clarity in objectives and benefits (RQ2,4) 
 
Clarity was also highlighted in terms of alliances’ objectives and purpose, and was 
suggested as being critical in the development of a common understanding amongst 
participants, thus facilitating alignment in terms of sharing a common vision. The metaphor 
of marriage was again used to highlight the attributes of a good strategic alliance in terms 
of not having to revert to detailed contracts to find solutions to issues which occur during 
the development stage. Clarity of objectives and benefits were seen as important in a win-
win situation; a lack of clarity would negatively impact the reputation of a party. Clarity is 
needed in the plan and scope of the strategic alliance. Transparency and honesty is required 
of the people involved. The value proposition for the customer needs to be clear. 
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Table 5-22.- Clarity in objectives and benefits (LR: Performance of Strategic Alliances) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Clarity in 
objectives – 
Alignment – 
Marriage-
better if do not 
look at the 
contract 
And probably the most important is clarity about what the 
strategic alliance is there for, what is it trying to do, what is the 
point of the strategic alliance? So you know if you start in a 
strategic alliance and the two parties don’t have a commonly 
held view of some kind of positive vision for that alliance, then I 
think that’s an issue. And again I will make a differentiation 
between a strategic alliance, which I think is a long term, I mean 
they focus more on the long term, and focus more on the moving 
towards some kind of shared vision, rather than a short term 
commercial optimisation. 
 
So, you know the challenge is trying to keep the partners aligned 
for as long as possible and it generally is like a marriage, the 
easiest partnerships are the ones that you never have to look at 
the contract again because you both have the same goals in the 
end. (Interviewee 1) 
 
2,4 
Clarity on 
benefits. Win-
win situation 
otherwise 
could impact 
reputation 
I think you'd have to be very sure of what you wanted out of the 
alliance.  And make sure you knew what the partner would, they 
need to understand what they would gain by the alliance, it has 
to be a win, win situation.  If you are sure that you would benefit, 
but you're not sure how they would benefit then your 
conversation would stop quite quickly.  And you wouldn’t gain 
that alliance and also it would be bad for your reputation. 
(Interviewee 11) 
 
2,4 
Strategic plan 
& a clear 
value 
proposition 
That you [have] a very… clear, laid-out strategic plan… How it 
will be staffed… what kind of scope the alliance will have…you 
need … a number of things well thought out, before you launch 
the alliance….  You need to have a very clear value 
proposition… that’s to me – it’s critical.  The moment you go out 
in public and say, “Now I’m in an alliance, or in a JV with this 
party, and our value proposition is this”…. (Interviewee 14) 
2,4 
 
Clarity critical for success (RQ4) 
 
Some interviewees pointed out that clarity was critical to success in terms of honesty 
around the level of value being created. The North Sea was cited as an example of success 
being related to clarity. This is illustrated in the following table of quotations:  
 
Table 5-23.- Clarity critical for success (LR: Performance of Strategic Alliances) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Clear and 
honest about 
So… there was no… confusion... about…what both sides was 
bringing to the party… it was very, very clear… what people 
2,4 
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value created were bringing… so… I think that was the key factor of it.  
The success factor is being really pretty honest about the 
analysis of whether or not value will be truly created or if it’s 
just an aspiration. (Interviewee 1) 
 
North sea 
cases clearly 
scoped 
Most joint ventures in the North Sea… are successful within 
their terms, because they’re relatively…clearly scoped and 
relatively limited in their ambition. (Interviewee 13)   
2,4 
 
Figure 5-11.- Summary of findings of clarity 
 
 
 
 
 
Stakeholders (RQ1,2,4) 
The role of stakeholders in the development of strategic alliances was highlighted, as there 
are sometimes diverging interests in the development of strategic alliances. For example, in 
natural resources development, governments disperse the risk through the terms and 
conditions, for instance in production sharing agreements. It was suggested that risks 
should be assessed with a long-term perspective and take other factors into consideration - 
for example political risks such as the potential for nationalisation. Another example is the 
impact of communities on the development of an alliance, as the shale gas and wind energy 
industries have shown. The following table illustrates this: 
 
Table 5-24.- Stakeholders (LR: Performance of Strategic Alliances) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Governments 
and the 
allocation of 
risk 
Governments that try and put all the risk on the oil companies, and 
give them very little of the return, or give them a return after so much 
has been taken to fund their own needs… Right, are not going to find 
willing partners.  
Look at the Brazilians today. They can’t find willing partners 
because the risks are very great, and they are asking the oil 
companies to take all the risk. (Interviewee 3) 
1,2 
Prescription: So you are looking down the road and you are saying what are my 4 
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long term 
assessment 
(think down 
the road) 
objectives, how can I get hurt, what are the risks, how do I protect 
myself. 
So you are thinking down the road, especially in our industry. You 
are thinking about what’s going to happen ten years down the road, 
everything that we do takes ten years. (Interviewee 3) 
Government 
and political 
risk 
Well… six, seven years later Mr. Chavez decides that he is going to 
nationalise the crude stream.’ (Interviewee 3) 
1,2 
Community 
approval, shale 
gas and wind 
energy 
And again you see that with shale gas, you see it with wind turbines.  
That's why those environmental behaviour factors of a live 
community can have a significant impact on whether the alliance can 
go ahead, and whether it will be successful. (Interviewee 11) 
2 
 
Figure 5-12.- Summary of findings of stakeholders 
 
 
 
 
 
Trust (RQ1,2) 
Some interviewees interpreted lack of trust as a source failure in the development of a 
strategic alliance. It was suggested that trust comes from actions and actions follow spoken 
commitments. When there was a lack of trust in the early stages a strategic alliance might 
fail. This was illustrated by the case of a company in China failing to make a deal. 
Although it was based on good market fundamentals, it fell apart mainly through a lack of 
trust. The company had insisted on having the governing law of JV based in its home 
country rather than in China, the host country for the joint venture. This is illustrated in the 
following table: 
Table 5-25.- Trust (LR: Performance of Strategic Alliances) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Trust comes 
from actions 
following 
words (Walk 
Trust, lack of clear objectives and targets…different drivers from the 
partners… changes of circumstances that were not ambitioned… at 
the time of... entering into the relationship. 
And the trust comes through the negotiation...the trust comes from 
2 
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the talk) the actions following the words.  So, it’s... just something that needs 
to be developed, and every time that you do not fulfil something you 
said, the trust gauge goes down… And there’s...when you reach the 
bottom, then is when trouble starts. (Interviewee 15) 
Trust in 
working 
towards a 
common 
interest 
In particular lack of trust… if you don’t truly believe that your 
partner… is working towards the common interest… then it’s very, 
very difficult to be successful… so for me that’s the big risk of failure 
really around trust, trust that your alliance partner is working 
towards the common good… and recognises that a time like common 
good will be negative for them or for their legacy organisation. But 
in time will be positive for them or their legacy organisation, but 
overall you know it’s the right thing, it will create value overall. 
 
If you insist that every single factor is a separate negotiation and 
must be in your favour… as opposed to saying okay look the 
important thing is that the overall… alliance works. And you know so 
long as the combination of all those elements creates a positive value, 
and so long as there is some reasonable way that I can see that that 
common value will be shared between the… two parties… then that’s 
good. But if you don’t have, if you don’t have trust and you start to 
sub-optimise in those… different decisions then I think that’s where 
you have got a problem. (Interviewee 1) 
2 
Lack of trust 
at early stages 
drive strategic 
alliance to 
failure 
Issues started during the planning of the facility, and the lack of 
trust, and all those types of things. 
And then from a performance measurement afterwards you know I 
don’t think it really went well, I don’t think there was a good 
common view of what they were trying to achieve. So in many ways 
trying to measure and discuss was the alliance working, were things 
going well…wasn’t a positive experience. And ultimately that venture 
failed… (Interviewee 1) 
1,2 
 
Figure 5-13.- Summary of findings of trust 
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 Leadership (RQ1,2,4) 
 
Only one interviewee pointed out the issues and risks related to leadership and its influence on the 
performance of strategic alliances. This was important as it highlighted connections with 
alignment, clarity, culture and stakeholders. There is a need for leadership in each partner 
organisation to focus on maintaining a shared vision and sustaining alignment. Not having clarity 
in role or strong leadership to deal with different cultures was a root cause for failure. This is 
illustrated in the following table of quotations: 
 
Table 5-26.- Leadership (LR: Performance of Strategic Alliances) 
Key themes Quotation RQ 
Leadership to 
manage 
cultural 
differences 
The first few years of that alliance were not all that successful, and I 
think one of the reasons is there was not clarity around who was 
running the company; there were effectively three leaders of the 
company. And it wasn’t until… leadership was unified under one guy 
that this alliance began to, really began to work, because there were 
too many fights around well you know my legacy technology is better 
than your legacy technology, my legacy operation is more efficient 
that your operation, you know all that type of thing. 
 
I think the leadership… you know for me these are principally 
matters of leadership. And if you don’t have strong leadership, then 
you know then bringing two cultures that don’t fit particularly well 
together… that can be very, very tough… and I have seen, 
particularly as a consultant I have seen lots of examples of that. You 
say wow you know how are you going to achieve your goals when 
you have got two organisations which culturally can be quite 
different, and you don’t have sufficiently strong leadership... 
(Interviewee 1) 
1,2 
Strength of 
leadership to 
manage risks  
The main risks are principally organisational…the principal risk is 
really to do with the people and to do with the organization… Do you 
have strong enough leadership to be able to get after those risks, and 
manage those risks, and make some tough decisions at some 
points?... (Interviewee 1) 
2 
Leadership 
and a new 
culture-reach 
potential 
And then from that point was really the development of a new culture 
around… the new company the alliance company rather than around 
the legacy company…and then for me then that change in leadership 
really allowed them to reach their potential. (Interviewee 1) 
1,2 
Leadership 
share vision, 
best interest of 
stakeholders 
If you have two leaders who have a shared view… that… this 
alliance is in the best interests of the stakeholders in general. So the 
people who own the company, the people that work in the company, 
the communities that the company operates in. So if you have two 
leaders that have a shared vision about why a strategic alliance 
would make sense, whether it’s a small one or a large one. I think 
2,4 
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that is absolutely critical and they are able to communicate, transmit 
their commitment to the alliance, to the people who are you know 
working the alliance… (Interviewee 1) 
 
Transmit and 
ensure people 
understand the 
rational of the 
strategic 
alliance 
I think the failure factors are principally failures of leadership in 
terms of not taking that strategic direction and enabling your 
organisation to succeed, by making sure that they understand, they 
have got clarity, transparency about what’s happening… they know 
what it means for them, they understand the whole picture… and then 
they are being encouraged to actually… execute, so where those 
things don’t happen that’s for me the failure factors. (Interviewee 1) 
2,4 
 
Figure 5-14- Summary of findings of leadership 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter presented the findings of Performance, useful in addressing most of the 
research questions. Firstly, it presented the findings on how interviewees perceived 
measurement in strategic alliances. As every strategic alliance is unique, metrics should be 
developed according to its context and objectives. A matrix employing diverse metrics 
could be designed to facilitate the monitoring and control of alignment. Measurement was 
perceived to be difficult and included hard and soft metrics. Soft metrics could include 
cultural issues and stakeholders’ preferences. The metaphor of marriage was used to 
attempt to explain that measurement was about the perception of the performance of each 
partner. It was suggested that a joint and periodic assessment of performance be carried out. 
This would assess the strategic alliance according to its objectives and goals and make 
decisions where differences occurred, reconfiguring or exiting the alliance as appropriate.  
 
Several categories emerged from the Problems findings. The categories of problems, 
critical factors, risk, failure and success were analysed and selected according to the 
frequency with which they were cited by interviewees. Their interrelations were considered 
and the findings for ten subcategories presented.  
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The most common theme was Partner. Interviewees identified the relevance of partner 
selection, their capabilities in technical and financial terms, the issues related to vested 
interest, the benefits and complexities of partnering and the need for a win-win mind-set.  It 
was of particular interest that the subcategory ‘the benefit of partnering’ could help 
understanding as to why organisations engage in the process of strategic alliances (despite 
high tension and conflict referred to as the ‘highland game week’. complexity and the 
issues around change and alignment). These subcategories are key issues in the 
performance of strategic alliances and require further analysis.  
 
Alignment amongst partners emerged as potentially having a negative influence on 
performance. Differences in interests, objectives, expectations, drivers and approaches from 
different partners, were identified as connected to alignment and success. A difference in 
size or financial resources could result in diverse expectations amongst partners. Problems 
could also arise from a difference in perception on the balance of rewards. In order to 
achieve the expected outcome, it was perceived as critical to work together and maintain 
alignment between partners. This would demand a continuous process of negotiation. 
 
Change was perceived as something natural in strategic alliances. Expectations, interests 
and objectives change and therefore there was a need to have flexible documentation, an 
exit plan and open and transparent communication between partners. When change occurs, 
partners can react in a variety of ways according to their options outside the strategic 
alliance. Understanding the source of change was considered important in preventing 
potential issues and mediation was suggested as a tool to counterbalance differences. 
Markets change, especially in the oil industry, and price variation is common. Strategic 
alliances therefore require continuous re-calibration and adjustment. Even if performance is 
below expectations, strategic alliances could continue operating as other alternatives could 
be worst. This could explain why some strategic alliances continue despite their 
performance not being as expected. Failure could be a perception; the natural end of 
strategic alliances should be understood. The dynamics of objectives and interests should 
be considered in relation to strategic alliance failure. Change was perceived as complex and 
it was acknowledged that every organisation has its own beliefs and ways of working. A 
need to have people with the skill to manage change was identified. 
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Some issues related to exit were identified and a variety of strategies were suggested to 
manage it. Exit could be complicated should one partner have all its interests committed to 
the strategic alliance. It was suggested that agreements have provision for termination and a 
robust conflict resolution mechanism. Exit was perceived as an option both for the natural 
end of a strategic alliance and as an alternative to dealing with change. 
 
The legal-regulatory problems and risks category emerged as having two subcategories: 
technology and intellectual property issues and antitrust and competition law issues. One 
major concern was in losing technology and in certain countries the risk was higher. 
Strategies to protect IP and technology were suggested, such as controlling the process, 
providing a second-best version of technology and the continuous development of 
technology. There are some gaps in jurisdiction at the international level which increases 
the risk of losing technology. As for the anti-trust and competition law issues, following 
processes in order to satisfy regulatory requirements could be perceived as positive in terms 
of testing the rational of the strategic alliance and the commitment from partners. In the oil 
and gas industry, JVs were not perceived as being as big a problem as mergers as long as 
there was competition to sell the products. The Wood Review would encourage the 
exchange of information and this could bring some anti-trust inquiries from the EU. Due 
diligence could be useful in assessing potential issues, however the time for these to be 
explored could be constrained by the urgency for closure. 
 
Culture was another category that emerged from the interviews. Differences in cultures 
require time to understand others’ ways of working. By entering into a strategic alliance, 
dealing with different cultures and ways of working, organisations become immersed in a 
process of change resulting in being able to work together. If the process is not managed 
properly it could result in misalignment amongst partners. Differences in culture could 
produce failure in the alliance as illustrated by the metaphor of marriage. Leadership and 
skills in change management were perceived as being important in dealing with different 
cultures. The impact on trust of congruent behaviour was also highlighted. Conducting 
pilots to minimise the risk of exposure was suggested. 
 
Clarity was identified as a factor which could facilitate alignment among partners. Clarity 
around objectives and benefits as a win-win situation for the parties was important as 
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otherwise reputation might be negatively impacted. Clarity was perceived as being critical 
to success. 
 
The need to consider stakeholders also emerged. Governments disperse risk through terms 
and conditions to develop natural resources. Risk assessments require a long-term 
perspective; difficult situations could arise from political risk. The increasing influence of 
communities in the development of strategic alliances was identified, for example in the 
case of shale gas and wind energy projects. 
 
Issues with trust were identified as a source of failure for strategic alliances, along with 
differences in culture. Actions and fulfilment of commitments signified trust.  
  
Leadership in relation to clarity, culture and stakeholders also emerged. Leadership is 
required to manage cultural differences, risk and in the development of a shared vision in 
the best interests of the stakeholders. Leaders play an important role in ensuring that the 
rational of the strategic alliance is understood. Lack of leadership was perceived as a factor 
in failure. 
 
The diversity of the categories which emerged in these findings are linked with the need 
highlighted in the literature to take a multi-constituencies approach in performance 
measurement for strategic alliances. Furthermore, findings provide a set of categories based 
on the perspective of key informants in the energy industry which are full of prescriptions 
and can enrich the process of developing a strategic alliance. In the Discussion chapter, I 
will elaborate further on these findings and on the relationships between these categories. 
 
This chapter presented the findings for the third element (Performance) of the holistic 
process model and its sub elements: measurement, problems, risks, critical factors, failure 
and success. The following chapter presents the findings for the last two themes and 
elements of the holistic process model: Influence and Prospects.  
 
 
 
 
 
188 
CHAPTER 6 ‘FINDINGS-INFLUENCE & PROSPECTS’ 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The aim of this research is to gain an in-depth understanding of the performance of 
strategic alliances in the energy sector by drawing on an in-depth qualitative study of the 
perspectives of those with experience in strategic alliances in the sector. This chapter 
presents the last two themes of the ‘Findings’ chapters which are related to the influence 
and prospects of strategic alliances. Interviewees were asked about the influence that 
external constraints and executives and managers have over strategic alliances. The final 
theme under prospects is about interviewees’ perceptions regarding the future of strategic 
alliances and the challenges that they could foresee. Influence and Prospects are the final 
two elements in the holistic process model; these and their respective sub elements are 
presented in the discussion chapter. 
 
The following research questions (RQ) were posed in Chapter 3 ‘Methodology and 
Methods’: 
 
RQ1: How and why have strategic alliances been developed in the energy sector? 
RQ2: How and why do strategic alliances succeed or fail?  
RQ3: Why do firms engage in strategic alliances despite low success rates? 
RQ4: How can we create more effective strategic alliances in the energy sector? 
 
These findings were used to inform the study’s research questions (Goodson 2013). I have 
sought to assist an understanding of the narrative by presenting the findings using tables 
and diagrams. The format of each section is as follows: Firstly, I have presented a narrative 
of interviewees’ quotations. Secondly, where a table is presented it contains 3 columns 
entitled ‘Key themes’, ‘Quotation’ and ‘RQ’ (Research Question). ‘Key themes’ consists of 
relevant ideas from the ‘Quotation’ and assist the narrative.  The participants’ quotations 
are connected to the research question that they inform, as specified in the column ‘RQ’. In 
sections where tables are not employed, the relevant research question is identified in 
brackets. The quotations are verbatim except where minimal editing was required to 
preserve confidentiality. Diagrams are presented in the sections and subsections in two 
places: those at the beginning illustrate key themes while the diagrams at the end condense 
key findings. 
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The following diagram highlights the sections that are presented in this chapter, related to 
influence and prospects. 
 
Figure 6-1.- Structure of Chapter 6 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Influence 
 
I explored interviewees’ perceptions of the influence of strategic alliances on two 
dimensions.  Firstly, external influence, interviewees discussed their perceptions of the 
external constraints that strategic alliances faced. This was followed by internal influence 
where the interviewees gave insight as to how executives and managers were able to 
influence the performance of strategic alliances. The skills that managers in alliances 
should have emerged as a theme of interest and this was also explored during the 
interviews. The findings are reported in the following sections. 
 
External sources of influence (RQ1-4) 
 
During the interviews, various external sources of influence that served to constrain the 
development of strategic alliances emerged. These sources were as follows: governments 
and markets, legal and regulatory, political, cultural, other stakeholder and market 
influences (see Figure 6.2). The instance of government was of particular interest because, 
on the one hand, it was seen to impose constraints on organisations that develop strategic 
alliances, yet, on the other hand, such influence was also seen to encourage their 
development by enforcing partnerships. The nature of markets was also perceived to 
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encourage alliances as in the case of Japan where strategic alliances with locals facilitated 
access to a market with a complex structure. I will discuss each of the five categories of 
influence in turn.  
 
Figure 6-2.- Categories of external sources of influence 
 
  
 
 
 
The figure above illustrates the categories that emerged from external influence: (+) 
denotes encouraging strategic alliances, while (-) denotes constraining strategic alliances. 
As can be seen, government and markets could play a dual role. The categories are 
explained as follows. 
 
 
Role of the Government and Market’s configuration (RQ1,2) 
 
Some interviewees believed that the Government imposed constraints in the development 
of strategic alliances by determining market entry conditions, but at the same time strategic 
alliances were enforced as the only way to enter and have access to attractive feedstock and 
sometimes by partnering with the National Company, as expressed in the following 
quotations: 
 
There have been times where a number of countries have said, “The only way you, 
as an outsider to my country, can invest is if you have a local partner.”  China went 
through this period… depending on how the political situation is in China and the 
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investment situation, they have allowed, or not allowed, what are called wholly 
owned foreign enterprises… 
 
There are times where we said, “Look, we think China is the most exciting place 
that we want to be and we want to do this.”  China will say, “Well, we’re happy to 
have you here but you have got to do a fifty/fifty deal with… 
 
For years, places like Egypt did that and told any foreign company that wanted to 
invest in the country, you had to have thirty percent of the company owned by 
Egyptians. (Interviewee 8) 
 
Access to feed stock in the industry where you've got the increasing influence of 
governments and national organisations, national companies.  Very often you 
simply can't get access to those economically attractive feed stocks, without having 
some kind of alliance with the state company or the national company. (Interviewee 
12) 
 
In the Middle East, you know, I don’t see, um – I think the role of the state is – is 
actually very important to – to understand.  You know, if you have, um – in an open 
market, you need the alliances in order to address the fast moving market spaces.  
In a closed market, you – you may also need an alliance to exploit the space. 
(Interviewee 14) 
 
Some interviewees pointed out that at the same time the Government could be a facilitator 
for the development of the business and encourage collaboration. This was the case in UK, 
through the promotion of the Wood Review, as illustrated in the following quotations: 
 
The government and relationships can facilitate contact and the communications, 
and of course can actually drive a deal taking place. (Interviewee 12) 
 
The Wood Review as encouraging strategic alliances, very much.  Because it has a 
very strong theme of collaboration and is requiring, operators to take a much 
broader view of their obligations… it’s requiring them to look at ways of 
maximising resources across the whole of the basin and that will require them to 
work together with other joint ventures in the area… (Interviewee 13) 
The quotation above shows how governments try to maximise the development of the 
country’s natural resources by encouraging collaboration. The United Kingdom is an 
interesting case because of the maturity of the petroleum industry. 
 
Several interviewees highlighted that in order to access some markets there was a need to 
develop a strategic alliance. Therefore in some countries, rather than being a constraint, this 
tended to encourage the development of strategic alliances. An example of this was the 
structure of the Japanese market, as illustrated below:  
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The Japanese market like Japanese economy I suppose is very structured.  And the 
way that many companies enter markets is through multiple layers.  So you very 
rarely have a producers that is directly assisting the consumer.  You have in very 
many cases, three, four, five, six layers of intermediaries, perhaps going between 
one and the other.  Some of the intermediaries have cross shareholding 
relationships, long personal relationships.  Or some of them have historic 
relationships, which at a corporate level go back to the very formation of the 
organisations.  So they're very strong and effectively control access to markets.  So 
if you try to get into a market place such as Japan, where you have those very 
controlled channels to the customer.  Then one of the ways you can do that is to 
form an alliance with a Japanese player.  Effectively what you're then doing is 
piggy backing on their secondary, tertiary relationships.  That's the way to get your 
products into market. (Interviewee 12) 
 
The quotation above shows how a strategic alliance facilitates entry into a market with a 
complex configuration. Similarly to governments encouraging strategic alliances, when the 
market configuration encourages the development of strategic alliances there could be some 
restrictions to find the appropriate partner, for example, sometimes there is less scope to 
select partners in remote locations or politically restrictive environments.  
 
 Legal and Regulatory constraints (RQ1) 
 
Some interviewees pointed out that the constraints imposed by Law and Regulations related 
to competition law, especially in cases when market share increases as an outcome of the 
alliance. There was also a perception that there were fewer competition constraints for 
strategic alliances than for mergers - also the case with fiscal, anti-bribery and corruption 
legislation. This is illustrated by the following quotations:  
 
I think there’s a lot of legal constraints… depending on the jurisdiction where you 
want to do it, and depending on the level of complexity that you want to do it… 
that’s quite a lot of influence. …; tax can have a lot of influence…, anti-bribery and 
corruption can have a lot of influence. .., competition could have influence. 
(Interviewee 15) 
 
If a partner is state-owned that can require you to treat the employees of that 
partner as foreign public officials, for the purposes of bribery legislation. 
(Interviewee 13) 
 
Yes well one is competition law of compliance.  So in some jurisdictions it can be 
constrained by that.  So that can be on a technology basis, a market basis of course 
if the combined alliance of market share becomes too big, then you probably get 
competition authorities prohibiting that alliance. (Interviewee 9) 
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And I think in the case of alliances, I don’t see constraints so much.  Because in the 
case of M&A, I do see.  In the case of M&A, we have the competition authorities 
that … will allow… a deal to take place only if it includes disposals of certain, sort 
of… positions. (Interviewee 14) 
The quotation above shows that, from a regulatory standpoint, it could be less problematic 
to develop a strategic alliance than a merger or acquisition. This gives the sense that 
strategic alliances could be an intermediate step in achieving a merger and could form part 
of the analysis of the business options for an organisation. 
 
 Political Constraints (RQ1,2) 
 
Some interviewees believed that political sanctions imposed a constraint on the 
development of strategic alliances and illustrated the cases of Iran and Russia. Political 
constraints could also arise from concerns over security issues, for example, petroleum 
imports from foreign countries through strategic alliances. This is expressed in the 
following quotations:  
 
The extent to which the authorities or government in certain countries do want to 
allow your own development in a certain country and region.  So this would be Iran 
for England at the moment.  It's difficult because of the, in the United States, 
sanction costs.  So that's another area.  So if one wanted to have, basically wanted 
to have a joint venture with strategic alliance with Iranian national company then 
you couldn't do it…’ (Interviewee 9) 
 
At the moment, I’m aware that it’s very difficult for oil companies to enter into 
strategic alliances with Russian companies, because of sanctions.  And I’m certainly 
involved in – in various discussions about arrangements, which may have to put on 
hold at least, because of the current sanctions, regarding the situation in Ukraine. 
 
US and North American companies have entered into arrangements with joint 
ventures with Chinese companies… that has caused concern around security issues 
and issues about the extent of influence of Chinese companies over hydrocarbon 
resources and things like that… (Interviewee 13) 
 
The quotations above highlight different political constraints, for example in Iran, where 
sanctions have been in place for long periods of time. They also show how political 
constraints emerge from other situations such as in the case of the Ukraine. This provides a 
sense of the dynamics of external influence and context change.  These must be considered 
in the process of developing strategic alliances, by incorporating a dynamic feature in the 
process to accommodate emergent opportunities and changes.  
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Culture as a constraint (RQ1,2) 
 
Some interviewees commented on the relevance of culture in the performance of strategic 
alliances. It was identified as a constraint which derived from working with foreign 
organisations where the reporting and transparency requirements and legal structures were 
different. This is illustrated in the following quotation: 
 
Cultural constraints when you're working across border, cross cultures.  The 
acceptance of working with foreign organisations.  The reporting requirements, are 
sometimes different legal structures, transparency so on and so forth.  Requirements 
can put very I suppose, hidden, challenges into a strategic alliance. (Interviewee 
12) 
 
Other Stakeholders. Communities and Financial institutions (RQ1,2) 
 
One interviewee referred to other stakeholders as able to impose constraints in the 
development of strategic alliances. Both the important role that communities were having 
in the development of unconventional resources and how financial institutions’ 
requirements needed to be satisfied to get the funding for the development of the alliance 
were mentioned.  
 
And very often the wider population can play a very significant part in whether 
those alliances can go ahead.  And again you see that with shale gas, you see it with 
wind turbines.  That's why those environmental behaviour factors of a live 
community can have a significant impact on whether the alliance can go ahead, and 
whether it will be successful.  
 
But you're looking at the environmental section of alliances in your home market 
and the recipient market.  And of course, for banks to be funding you need, you've 
got to go through your environmental assessments, sign off on your ecological 
footprint as well as your economic footprint. (Interviewee 12) 
 
The external influences findings are summarised in the following figure. 
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Figure 6-3 External sources of influence  
 
 
 
 
Governments and markets could play a dual role. They could impose constraints in the 
form of requirements to develop strategic alliances, but at the same time could also 
encourage the development of strategic alliances as the only way to access feedstock or 
certain countries. Laws and regulations such as those concerning anti-bribery and 
corruption, fiscal and competition law, could impose constraints which could determine the 
viability of a strategic alliance. There was the perception that mergers face more constraints 
than strategic alliances. Political sanctions could limit the development of strategic 
alliances, for example in Russia or Iran where organisations of certain countries were 
prohibited from developing businesses. In another example, overseas investments from 
China could cause some security concerns in the influence on natural resources of the host 
country. The success of international strategic alliances is threatened by the complexity of 
the different cultures of foreign organisations, different reporting and transparency 
standards and different legal structures. Communities could constrain the development of 
strategic alliances, and were playing an important role in the feasibility of developing 
unconventional resources. Requirements from banks to obtain funding could also impose 
constraints.  
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These findings show how external influences can either facilitate or constrain the 
development of strategic alliances. It is therefore important to integrate the analysis of 
external influence into the development process of strategic alliances. Furthermore, the 
categories that emerged from the data can be considered as part of the analysis in order to 
see how these might affect the alliance. 
 
Executives’ & Managers’ Influence (RQ1-4) 
 
I explored the perspective of interviewees with regards to the influence of executives and 
managers in the performance of strategic alliances. For the purpose of the research, I 
differentiate between executives and managers; executives work at the parent company 
level and managers are those directly involved in the strategic alliance. Findings were 
organised under the categories of dilemma of interest, degree of freedom, executive’s role 
and the skills of the right people. These categories are illustrated in the following figure. 
 
Figure 6-4.- Categories of Executives’ & managers’ influence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dilemma of interest (RQ1-4) 
 
Some interviewees highlighted the challenge of working in a strategic alliance. They 
referred to the potential conflict of interest faced when they had to make decisions which 
could favourable to the alliance but at the same time unfavourable to the parent company. 
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One interviewee provided a perspective on how the role of people in strategic alliances 
could be split in two stages, firstly in the creation of the alliance and secondly in its 
execution. For the creation stage it was critical to be honest and transparent in the value 
proposition, and that managers acted in the interest of the parent company. However, 
during the execution stage a conflict of interest could develop in the dilemma of acting 
either in favour of the parent company or the alliance. This is illustrated by the following 
quotation: 
 
I think there is two phases… the creation of the venture, and then… the execution of 
the venture… from the management viewpoint, the involvement, the creation of the 
ventures is really critical… being clear and honest about whether value is being 
created. And I think at that point in time the managers’ role is a dual role…  first of 
all make sure that the interest of his host company is… being looked after. So this 
point I think there is two or more managers representing their entities towards the 
alliance, so you know for me at that point it’s critical that the manager says: “okay, 
is this a good deal for my company, should we be playing in this company, in this 
alliance or not?”  
And then balancing that with the question of well how do I manage with this other 
guy, if we create value and we take off all the value on the table my partner is going 
to be unhappy and the alliance will not be sustainable. And you know vice versa if 
he takes all the value it’s not going to be sustainable… so I think managing those 
two things about the fairness of the alliance… and the individual interest of his 
company… alliance managers have an incredibly difficult job. And I think there is 
different types of alliance managers… from situations where somebody is… 
completely now dedicated… their career is now in that alliance. (Interviewee 1) 
 
The interviewee also illustrated the case where a new company was created, thus managers 
working directly in the alliance did not face a conflict of interest: 
 
They were completely divorced from you know their legacy… So for those managers 
in that particular alliance the only thing that they thought about when they woke up 
in the morning was the New Company [name changed by the Author]… 
(Interviewee 1) 
 
However, when there was not a separate company there could be a potential conflict of 
interest. This arose as people in the alliance eventually went back to their host company: 
 
In other strategic alliances… that’s not the case. So the people who are managers 
of the alliance… are there for a term, two years, three years, four years, whatever it 
might be, but then they are going to go back… 
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But I think for a manager who is going to go back to one of the host company, one 
of the partners in the alliance… is more difficult. (Interviewee 1) 
 
The quotations above show two different situations that derive from the type of structure 
selected. When a new organisation is created it decreases the conflict of interest for the 
managers involved. 
 
Another interviewee added that to improve the nature of the strategic alliance there had to 
be a guarantee given to those sent to work in the strategic alliance that they would go back 
to their parent company. The employee would then develop a different mind set, as noted in 
the following quotation: 
 
One of the real problems with strategic alliances is that… the company has to send 
an executive to the strategic alliance to work within the strategic alliance.  And 
there is no way back.  It’s almost like it’s an exit strategy… and I think one of the 
ways that… you can improve the nature of the strategic alliance is… giving some 
kind of reassurance that the executive sent to work within the strategic alliance 
actually have a way back into their own organisation.  And I think that creates a 
totally different mind-set for the person that I am here and this is termed the last 
chance saloon.  Now they are looking around for something else to do once I… 
leave here.  So I think that is the first thing. (Interviewee 7) 
 
One interviewee proffered the opinion that, in the end, managers had to act in the best 
interest of the alliance: 
 
 But I think it’s imperative that… that manager is wholly dedicated to the alliance 
and making the alliance work…. regardless of the implication for his host company, 
and because that needs to be somebody else’s business, so if the best interests of the 
alliance aren’t in the best interests of the host company then a manager back in the 
host company needs to be responsible for that, needs to be responsible to reacting 
to that. 
 
So when there is a conflict like that I think it’s critical that the alliance manager 
acts in the best interests of the alliance. (Interviewee 1) 
 
Another interviewee pointed out that there were two stages of influence, before signing the 
alliance and after it. Before signing, there was a need for an honest assessment of the 
strategic alliance. After signing, assessment (stop checks) was needed in order to review if 
the alliance was still working and to keep taking care of the relationship, and being able to 
understand change and how it affected the alliance, as expressed in the following quotation: 
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You've got two phases.  Before you sign the alliance and then the alliance is in 
existence. The first is be honest about your interest and why you want to do it and 
make sure you listen to what the other party is saying.  So not what you think their 
interests are but what they're telling you they are as well as what you think they are.  
So it's a proper and honest assessment of the partnership before and then once it's 
in, it's just doing those stop checks… The step back – is this still working – um, and 
relationship – but businesses are people stuff and generally a strategic alliance will 
involve relationships between a single figure number of people from each side… 
and it's just keeping the relationship alive, um, and being sufficiently emotionally 
aware when things are starting to change in your partners and understanding is 
that gonna affect this joint venture or isn't it. (Interviewee 10) 
 
One interviewee commented that the people involved in the strategic alliance might face a 
conflict of interest in relation to the potential gain. However he stated that there should be 
an awareness that, by being in an alliance, the benefit was much greater that doing it alone. 
This is illustrated in the following quotation: 
 
If you’ve formed a strategic alliance for a certain sector of the business while still 
being operational in other areas of this business where there’s not that 
complementarity required from a partner… for example, maybe you created a 
different venture then obviously, the intrinsic dilemma that for this venture you are 
sharing with somebody else; any success, any results, etc. while if you do it on your 
own, you have 100% of the profits, of the benefit.  So, there’s an intrinsic 
dilemma… it’s almost like the stepchild compared to the 100% owned business so 
perhaps on your question, what should managers and executives do.  They should 
be aware of this intrinsic… issue in order to focus specifically on the strategies of 
the strategic alliance to make this successful in order to achieve something, which 
is that-, so that you own only own fifty percent maybe of the benefits of the result of 
the profit.  In quantitative terms, the fifty percent of what you earn is more than the 
one hundred percent you would have had without having a partner in that 
business… (Interviewee 4) 
 
The quotation above shows how the interests of the manager and alliance should be aligned 
in the search for creation of value. 
 
One interviewee highlighted that a conflict of interest can arise at the executive level. This 
splits the group of executives according to their interest and their conflicts. From his 
perspective, there were three levels of executives - people in the business who have to be 
loyal to it, the shareholders and the Board of Directors in the joint venture. The Board may 
at some point experience a conflict because, on the one hand, they represent the 
shareholders but, on the other, they also represent the company. In addition, the shareholder 
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sometimes needs to represent himself in certain decisions, despite the fact that shareholders 
are represented on the Board. This is mentioned in the following quotation:  
 
You've actually got potentially three levels of executive.  You've got the people in 
the business who have to owe loyalty to the business not to either shareholder, 
you've got the … People here, they are the shareholder… and then you've got 
maybe the Board of Directors in the joint venture. They're in the goo in the middle 
because they're representing the shareholders but they're also fiduciary duty to the 
company and they've got the more difficult job and I think sometimes the trick is to 
take hats off.  Look, I think this is right for the business but I'm not sure my 
employer would agree so I've got a problem and that's a difficult one…  
 
We had to sort of quarantine the middle tier when there was a conflict.  Fairly rare 
but understanding it's that middle tier that has the – because the first and the third 
your duties are clear.  It's the second one that has to look both ways.  When things 
are fine, no problem, because what's in the business interest is what's in the 
shareholder's interest.  Just occasionally. 
 
We can't do it at the Board.  It'll have to come to the Board shrink wrapped, 
decided, because the Board people are conflicted and re-negotiating a key contract 
into the joint venture. (Interviewee 10) 
 
Another interviewee believed that a conflict of interest depended on how the alliance was 
structured, as noted in the following quotation: 
 
Yes, definitely.  And I – I mean, strategic alliances, sometimes they have dedicated 
personnel…seconded in from the parent organisations… and those personnel will 
inevitably… want their project to succeed, but they’ll have a degree of loyalty to the 
parent organisation.  And sometimes, you can have a conflict between… the need of 
the… strategic alliance, and the needs of the parent.  And ultimately, I guess the – 
the personnel will tend to give priority to the parent’s view at the end of the day.  
Because… depending upon the nature of the strategic alliance, they may still be 
employed by the parent.  Certainly they may see their future as being with the 
parent. (Interviewee 13) 
 
This interviewee added that structure determines obligations, for instance in a Corporation 
the obligations were with the Company not with the Parent: 
 
Their legal responsibility may or may not be to the parent, depending on how the 
organisation is structured.  For instance… if it’s structured as a corporation, the 
strategic alliance, and you’re a Director of it… then you may have obligations to 
that company and not to your parent…. and that can sometimes put Directors in 
quite a difficult situation… particularly if it’s a minority parent and they are not 
supporting the joint venture… it can create some stresses.  (Interviewee 13) 
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The above two quotations show the relevance and effects of the selection of certain 
structures for a strategic alliance. This suggests that the human factor should be considered 
in the process of determining the structure in order to facilitate the development of the 
alliance. 
The chances of success increased when people in the alliance took a balanced view and 
there was alignment in terms of goals and interest between partners. This is expressed in the 
following quotation: 
 
On the other hand… I can think of an example of a strategic alliance between a 
number of operators… where there were a certain number of personnel who were 
seconded in.  But other services, specifically legal services, were… involved all of 
the parent organisations, and there were nine of them.  And there was a remarkable 
degree of alignment in that particular case between the parents and the strategic 
alliance, which allowed an enormous amount to be achieved in a relatively short 
amount of time.  Because there was ultimately alignment on the goal to be achieved, 
and there was no major – I guess, no major commercial threat to any of the parent 
organisations in allowing that goal to be achieved… the people who were seconded 
in took a very balanced view and did not favour their parent organisation, but – but 
tried to make the decisions that were right… for the strategic alliance.  And the 
parent organisations… gave the strategic alliance the funding and the scope, to 
allow it to – so succeed. (Interviewee 13) 
 
Degree of freedom (RQ1,2,4) 
 
Some interviewees acknowledged that managers faced constraints imposed by their 
organisations. The degree of freedom to influence performance was therefore limited.  
 
Also highlighted was that the degree of influence or power depends on each individual 
organisation, on the degree of freedom granted to managers to solve issues. There was also 
the perception that the larger the company the more formal the process. These views are 
expressed in the following quotations: 
 
It depends on the company, it depends on how much authority they have to do the 
negotiations, how much licence you have, how much wiggle room you have… the 
larger the company the more formal the process tends to be… (Interviewee 3) 
 
Of course they can, because companies are people… everything that a company 
does is done by people.  And good people can rescue bad situations sometimes.  Not 
always.  Sometimes they’re beyond saving… and good people can create the right 
relationships that allow strategic alliances to – to flourish.  So yes, undoubtedly, 
within the scope of the powers given to them… employers, Managers can affect 
success. (Interviewee 13) 
 
 
202 
 
One interviewee pointed out that people in the strategic alliance depended on the processes 
and constraints imposed by their parent companies; therefore the needs of the alliance were 
decided at the parent company level: 
 
The people in the strategic alliance team, they have one interest which is… the 
company or the program to make that a success but they are dependent on 
budgeting, on resource education, on…, whatever from their parents or from their 
mother company, so to say, and the guys who…, who are managing that interface, 
they should be aware of the fact that there’s this intrinsic… ownership part of 
aspect and should proactively address it and make that physical so that they take 
the right conclusions. (Interviewee 4) 
 
 
Another interviewee proffered the opinion that it is individuals which make strategic 
alliances work. There is therefore a need to identify people within the organisation involved 
whom you can trust and work with. However, when issues arose, the organisation took 
control over the individuals, as mentioned in the following quotation: 
 
You have to develop a relationship, a relationship with individuals.  Because from 
my perspective people do business with people. 
 
So you have to be able to find someone that you can work with.  And when I say you, 
it could be someone within an organisation, it doesn't have to be the person you 
most wanted to choose.  So within the organisations where the partnerships, it must 
be individuals who trust each other enough.  And get on enough to be able to work 
together to make that alliance workable, and enjoyable. 
 
The issues are, another big issue, that when things go wrong, you're not dealing 
with individuals you're dealing with organisations against organisations.  So when 
things go wrong, the organisation may take control and it might be out of control of 
individuals who might get on very well.  Then things could become bitter and a bit, 
very formalised. 
 
But contractually and if things go wrong it will be the organisations that take 
control.  But when you try to set something up it's with individuals and it';s maybe 
individuals who will make it work, or not. (Interviewee 11) 
 
The quotations above show the tension between individual and organisation. It seems that 
individuals can influence performance but are constrained by the limits imposed by 
organisations. 
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Executives’ role (RQ1,2,4) 
 
Some interviewees believed that executives influenced the performance of strategic 
alliances in various ways - through their actions, decisions, establishing expectations and 
staff selection. 
 
One interviewee pointed out that managers (Executives, in this context) had to be conscious 
of the challenges involved in bringing different entities together and the pitfalls around 
making them work, for example in keeping alignment. Otherwise, it might be better not to 
enter the strategic alliance. This suggests that Executives influenced the decision to enter 
the strategic alliance after measuring risks and challenges and is expressed in the following 
quotation: 
 
This is a two way street and there is a given and take here… and if the give and take 
is not acceptable… today…or in the future they’ve got to identify that and move in a 
different direction.   Because… you’re trying to get these two entities or more than 
two entities to work together and if the manager don’t feel that they can do that or 
aren’t conscious that you know there is a whole other side to this equation that 
things have to work for them too.  That they’re going to get themselves into some of 
the pitfalls…. the alignment of…  the two parties … begin to move apart… so far as 
their common view of this alliance and… things just begin to separate, and it won’t 
work. (Interviewee 5) 
 
On the other hand, senior level Executives were expected to endorse people in the alliance 
through all stages. Executives also sent indications, at the alliance level, on attitudes toward 
working together with other parties (the halo effect), as mentioned in the following 
quotations: 
For the Senior Managers it’s quite different.  I think being seen to endorse the 
strategic alliance and being seen to consistently endorse it, in order words, not just 
at the beginning but to support it and to be prepared to back it up when things get 
difficult, that is, you know, in, in other words, it’s easy to buy into the strategic 
alliance and announce it and launch it, but when things come under pressure… to 
have visible senior support, it, it’s almost more important than it is right, right at 
the beginning. 
 
And I think to have behaviours at the Executive level that act as examples at the, at 
the alliance level can be very valuable, that you actually see the CEOs of the 
companies at least giving the right signals about working together…  that has a 
filter… a halo effect on… the way that people perceive acceptable behaviours and… 
desired behaviours. (Interviewee 6) 
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The second thing is I think people working in the strategic alliance have to believe 
that they have the support of their… home company or their parent company… 
(Interviewee 7) 
 
Some interviewees highlighted that people who were working at the alliance level could 
influence the strategic alliance directly. People at the parent level could also exert influence 
by setting the targets, metrics or via the operating mechanisms that were in place in the 
organisation. An example of this is in the periodic business plan reviews, mentioned in the 
following quotations: 
 
[Executives can] set targets for the joint venture company, which adhere to good 
governance practices.  Again safety records, all those aspects… (Interviewee 9) 
 
Either do it through, setting the measurables, the targets and objectives, and 
making sure the reporting is against that.  Or effectively as chief exec, if you say 
right I'm going to be measuring whatever it might be, maybe look at certain ratios, 
looking at market share, gain so on and so forth.  Providing those are signed off 
and agreed by the leadership of the alliance, then you have a framework against 
which you can measure success… As a leader you play an awful lot with defining 
what success looks like. (Interviewee 12) 
 
If you are in a strategic alliance, you influence the strategic alliance directly… if 
you are…in a company that has got a strategic alliance, but you’re not directly part 
of the alliance, then you can actually – you influence through… the operating 
mechanisms that you have, the alliance being subject to.  So you may have, let’s 
say, a two-year and a biannual review of the opportunities, of the plans of the 
alliance, okay?  Or the JV.  So you… create operating mechanisms that tie in, 
dovetail to the operating mechanisms that you have in your organisations.  That’s 
the way.  Because then you make it an integral part of your organisation.  You can 
actually feed in results from one side to another side. (Interviewee 14) 
 
As one interviewee expressed, the people directly involved with the strategic alliance could 
be guided by having some metrics to qualify performance and contribution to success: 
 
Well if they're sensible they will have metrics put upon them.  By the parent 
company or by the market whatever it's going to be.  And hitting those and meeting 
those metrics, is a tangible measure of success. (Interviewee 12) 
 
Another interviewee pointed out that Executives could change the people managing the 
alliances if interpersonal conflict arose. Decisions were made at the Executive level as to 
whether the strategic alliance should continue or not and the appropriate taken, as 
illustrated in the following quotation: 
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Sometimes it’s good to change personnel on both sides, because sometimes it’s just 
an interpersonal relationship that is the one that is not working.  The guys have run 
themselves the wrong way, and from their own words, “They didn’t get on… 
together.”  …sometimes it’s good to go one or two organisational levels above the 
guy, that the guys that are managing the day to day business and for the...for the 
senior guys to sit down, look at each other in the eye and say, you know, “Are we or 
are we not?” 
“Because if we are, let’s tell our guys… make it work.”… “And if we’re not, let’s 
stop faffing around, and let’s break this up.”  So, I...think it’s...and the sooner you 
have that conversation...you cannot have it too soon because not every dispute is a 
reason to break up...but if things start to go really the wrong way, I think it’s... good 
to implement any of those things quickly. (Interviewee 15) 
 
Select the right people (RQ3,4) 
 
Some interviewees agreed that Executives influenced the strategic alliance through the 
selection of the people who managed the alliance or sat on the Board. They also 
recommended desirable skills for employees. Further findings on skills are presented under 
the section ‘Skills of the right people’. 
 
One interviewee highlighted that the selection of appropriate people to manage the alliance 
was key to its performance. Managers working with strategic alliances required certain 
skills such as team building, management of problems and negotiation. The latter was key 
to the development of the alliance, as mentioned in the following quotation: 
 
I think you’ve got to pick the right people.  And I would …. suspect that…., only a 
subset of the Managers in most companies would be… good for managing strategic 
alliances, because it’s just human nature that some people are better at 
collaboration than other people are.  And some, some people just simply are – that 
they, that they enjoy working with other people, they enjoy being taken out of their 
routine environment, they really do enjoy… working in teams and sharing ideas and 
building things together.  And… they’re maybe not the people who are most 
individually driven.  They’re maybe not the people who would usually make the best 
leaders in the core of the company. 
 
I think you, you’ve got to select people…, who at least have a chance of… of doing 
the jobs well, in that they’re people who are experienced enough…. and mature 
enough to understand the nature of the problems that are going to arise, as well as 
having all the capabilities, technical, functional capabilities and experience to… do 
the job in relation to what the strategic alliance is… actually about.   
 
You’ve got to have people whose behaviours are…going to suit them to, to 
dealing… with these problems.  If you have, for example, people who are by nature 
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adversarial negotiators, then… you’re going to have a very diminished chance that 
you’re going to have a successful joint venture. (Interviewee 6) 
 
Another interviewee added that Executives could influence when they selected and 
configured the Board. This increased the chance of success, as expressed in the following 
quotation: 
 
The best way to do it is to take a couple of those people from each company and 
create a board of six, is the number that I like… so three from each company if it’s 
a two way and they serve on the board of that company and act as a board of 
directors… And you can then work with the management, you can be in touch with 
what the company’s plans are from both sides and communicate well across with 
your peers, so we’re on the board for the other company, and if you pick the right 
people, it can be much more successful. (Interviewee 8) 
 
The following figure illustrates findings on executives’ and managers’ influence. 
 
Figure 6-5.- Executives & managers’ influence 
 
  
 
 
The figure illustrates findings on executives’ and managers’ influence. The influence of 
managers is constrained by the structure selected for the strategic alliance through 
executives and parents’ policies. The arrow that points from executives to the outer oval 
represents the influence that executives have in the formation phase of the alliance. This is 
when they select the structure that later works as a constraint on the strategic alliance. 
Executives influence strategic alliances by setting the objectives, expectations, targets and 
metrics. They select the people to manage the alliance and need to look for appropriate 
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skillsets.  Managers, on the other hand, had a direct influence on the alliance, solving issues 
and developing relationships to make it work. However, they expected support from 
executives and parent companies. One of the managers’ concerns was to do with their 
future in the parent company. Managers faced a dilemma in terms of the loyalty that they 
owned to their parent company when making decisions which conflicted with the strategic 
alliance and they were constrained by the degree of freedom granted by their parent 
company. 
Skills of the right people (RQ1,2,4) 
 
As seen in the previous subsection, the interview data showed that the selection of the right 
people to manage the alliance was fundamental. Some of the skills already identified were 
team building, management of problems and negotiation. Interviewees were asked about 
their perception on what the profile of people managing strategic alliances should be.  
 
One interviewee perceived that the role of managers from strategic alliances was different 
from that of managers within a single organisation. It therefore demanded a different skill 
set, as seen in the following quotation: 
 
It’s a different skill set when you’re day to day working across… a strategic 
alliance as opposed to working within a single organisation… (Interviewee 7) 
 
However, another interviewee pointed out that a manager of a strategic alliance did not 
differ from a manager in other organisations, but, interestingly, the expected skills that he 
mentioned were consistent with those of other interviewees:  
 
I think it’s just a good manager… because a good manager has to have clear vision, 
a strategic mind, ability to relate to other people, ability for conflict resolution, and 
all those are the characteristics that you need to have, whether leading that 
department or leading a JV. (Interviewee 15)  
 
One interviewee highlighted that to influence the performance of strategic alliances 
required having people who were experienced in partnering, negotiating alliance contracts 
and budgets, as mentioned in the following quotation: 
 
In one of the companies I work and did a lot of them… we intentionally put people 
in a lot of audiences to get them experience because we knew we were going to be 
doing a lot of them, and so we got people experienced in partnering with people 
who were outside that company.  We get people experience in negotiating these kind 
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of contracts.  We get people experienced in negotiating annual budgets across three 
different parties, and the people that we partnered with that were most successful 
did the same thing. (Interviewee 8) 
 
 
One interviewee highlighted that people who focus on control could be good in managing 
the strategic alliance. However, at Board level there was a need for influencers to make 
things happen, as noted in the following quotation: 
 
A control freak wouldn't be good, do you know what I mean, because your control 
freak wants to run something and with a strategic alliance if you're managing the 
strategic alliance relationship you have to use your influencing skills.  There may 
be a CEO who's the control freak, who's running it, but if you're the Board Director 
you can't be the control freak because you've got – you imagine three control freaks 
in a room, one from each partner, and the CEO.  It will fail.  So you need a control 
freak and two influencers. 
 
That's just an instinctive view and the interesting thing when I look back, I can see 
that what we had to do was, make sure that the people representing Company X 
[Name changed by Author] were either influencers by nature or knew that in this 
case that was their role and I wanted them to be a control freak in their business but 
the non-exec stuff they had to influence and there was a guy I remember – and 
actually we put him on the Board to learn the skill of influencing because you can't 
decide.  You've got to help somebody else get to the point where you are.  We want 
you to learn that skill. (Interviewee 10) 
 
One interviewee reported that the development of strategic alliances across different 
cultures demanded very versatile people who could work with different cultures, systems 
and languages: 
 
I think you've got to have someone who first of all, recognises their own culture and 
their own position in terms of where they are from a work place point of view.  
Unless you actually recognise where you are yourself, it's very difficult to work with 
someone who is coming from a different place.  
 
A lot of the strategic alliance now are, truly working cross cultural or cross belief 
systems, across languages.   
 
So you've got to think of people in the organisation who are willing to work in 
developing a new culture, or accepting some of the culture of the organisation that 
you've joined.  So they are some of the softer issues.  I think some of the harder 
issues that you need people moving to that organisation who firstly understand the 
business and understand the reason why they've gone into a strategic alliance.  And 
they're actually able to deliver and drive for results.  
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So you need quite versatile people.  Very well prepared in the business sense.  
Culturally quite in tune, so you need a combination.  The IQ, and the intellectual 
quotient in relation to the business.  But you also need the emotional quotient.  You 
need to be able to have people who can operate in a new, potentially uncertain 
culture, and be comfortable in doing so.  (Interviewee 12) 
 
Another interviewee mentioned that people needed to have the ability to adapt and be 
flexible, as mentioned in the following quotation: 
 
One of the key skills is the ability to work out how other organisations function, and 
to adjust your own normal mode of operation to fit those varying styles.  And to be 
able to… allow for other people to continue to operate in the way that they feel 
comfortable… openness and flexibility is very important. (Interviewee 13) 
 
It was also pointed out by one interviewee that managerial experience - able to manage 
issues and having a good understanding of industry and customers - was a characteristic of 
strategic alliance managers. This is expressed in the following quotation: 
 
Somebody who… is an experienced Manager.  Somebody who has… understanding 
of solutions, and somebody who has… industry knowledge…  And somebody who 
has got a good understanding of customers. (Interviewee 14) 
 
The insights from interviewees provide a list of desirable characteristics for people 
managing alliances. This could be used as a reference in the selection of candidates. 
 
Findings on the selection of the right people are presented in the following diagram.  
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Figure 6-6.- Skills of the right people (RQ1,2,4) 
 
 
 
 
 
The findings on the selection of the right people to manage strategic alliances were 
classified as hard and soft skills. Hard skills included knowledge of the business and 
industry, experience and technical skill that allowed people to deliver and get results. 
Several soft skills were mentioned by the interviewees such as control and influence at the 
alliance level (influence was essential at the Board level), versatility in working across 
different cultures, adaptability and flexibility, managing uncertainty, team building, clear 
vision, strategic mind, interpersonal relationships, conflict resolution, managing issues and 
negotiation skills. It was interesting to find that the number of soft skills was sizeable. 
These skills provide a framework of the characteristics for people-selection.  
 
The next section presents the finding on prospects. 
 
Prospects for the future of strategic alliances 
 
I explored interviewees’ perception of the future for strategic alliances and the challenges 
that they could foresee. Findings were organised under scenarios, motives and challenges as 
illustrated in figure 6-7 below. A majority of interviewees pointed out that strategic 
alliances would continue and shared their vision of the future. This was organised under the 
heading Scenarios. Some motives were identified: complementarity in terms of resources, 
financial, skills and technology, risks could continue to be an incentive, strategic and a herd 
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effect where perception of success could incentivise the development of strategic alliances. 
Cultural, financial, technological, changes, stakeholders, economic, political and legal 
dynamics were some aspects associated with the challenges that could be foreseen for 
strategic alliances. 
Figure 6-7.-  Categories of prospects 
 
 
 
 
Scenarios (RQ1,2,4) 
One interviewee described two scenarios. The first was where strategic alliances increased 
because of the diversity in the number of players. This came from the fragmentation of 
major companies and an increase in NOCs’ competitiveness and internationalisation and is 
illustrated in the following quotation: 
 One driver that might make it more common to have more strategic alliances 
would be if you get more diversity in the players in the oil and gas business… 
It’s not inconceivable that in the future you would actually have a… much more 
diverse set of private companies who are in – on average smaller if you had some 
kind of breakup of the, of the super majors.  
And then you’ve got the NOCs becoming… more international and growing in their 
competencies.  And I think the NOCs are by nature a more, a more diverse group 
than international private companies, because NOCs are so much a function of 
their domestic environment, their particular domestic legacy and their domestic 
history.  (Interviewee 6) 
 
The second scenario was where strategic alliances were fewer because of consolidation in 
the industry. The internationalisation of NOCs also did not happen, as mentioned in the 
following quotation: 
 
Now that’s entirely speculative and I’m, I’m not sure I believe that that’s any more 
likely than you would have a net consolidation and…that the progress towards 
internationalisation of the NOCs might falter, it might not carry on forever, and the 
international companies, it might, as happened in the past, it maybe consolidation 
will happen… rather than… breakups, you get consolidation.  If that happened…I 
think the chances of getting more strategic alliances would… actually be low, you 
could actually have fewer strategic alliances. (Interviewee 6) 
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Another interviewee described the scenario where a national oil company became more 
international. This brought the advantage of political connections and the International Oil 
Company relied more on service companies, therefore questioning the role of the IOC. 
There were no foreseen changes at the upstream level; the drivers for the development of 
strategic alliances would continue in terms of complementarity and risk sharing. For 
midstream and downstream, the future was less obvious, as expressed in the following 
quotation: 
Upstream is all about working with people… who’ve got the skills got the resources 
that you don’t have.  But the other element of it is the sharing of the risk.  And you 
know in the oil industry that sharing of risk is very high and why you work together.  
Maybe in other industries it’s not so high... I don’t see a lot of change in the oil 
industry in strategic alliances or joint ventures.  But I do see a change in the 
components.  So upstream I, I think as we see the development of the national oil 
company beyond just being a national oil company to become an 
international/national oil company, I didn’t see a change in balance there.  I did as 
the oil companies… develop less and less of their own skills and rely more and 
more on service companies to provide skills.  I think the balance will change there 
as well.  I don’t think beyond the will of man to end up in a situation where national 
oil companies don’t deal direct with service providers… then you’ve got to ask 
yourself what the role of the international oil company is. 
And international/national oil companies of course bring something else to the table 
that… the international oil company doesn’t bring and that’s political connections. 
So I think we will see a change or maybe it’s a change in waiting but I still see 
things being done upstream on strategic alliance basis. 
Midstream went downstream it’s less obvious I think we’re already seeing a shake-
up between midstream and downstream. We are seeing more and more service 
providers.  We have got a heck of a lot of refineries for example have moved away 
from the oil companies into I guess what we could call service providers.   I see it 
similarly happening downstream as the oil companies get out of things like retail.  
They may stay in wholesale even then I’m not sure who would want to stay in 
wholesale other than the national oil companies. But independents we’ve already 
seen them cut back midstream and downstream.  But don’t see a lot of change other 
than as I mentioned upstream. (Interviewee 7) 
One interviewee pointed out the expectation that strategic alliances would be more 
important, because of the advantages of partnering with NOCs: 
So I see the future of strategic alliance as much, much more important than it has 
been in the past. In the past if you needed something you went out and you bought 
it… today that’s getting much more difficult... 
Especially given the price of the assets...You know you can’t buy a field any more 
with oil at a hundred dollars a barrel…  
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So look at these companies that invested in acreage thinking that oil was going to 
be a hundred and twenty, a hundred and fifty dollars a barrel. Now they break even 
at ninety bucks. If you do a deal with a national oil company that owns the acreage, 
oil could go to seventy-five dollars and you could still make a margin. A strategic 
alliance is going to be crucial for both parties. (Interviewee 3) 
One interviewee reported that there were expectations of having more collaboration among 
academia, service companies and operators in the North Sea, as commented on by 
Interviewee 13:  
And that will also require collaboration between industry and academia, between 
different groups of service companies, and between the service companies and… the 
operators.  So I think, we’re going to see a lot more collaboration in the North Sea. 
(Interviewee 13) 
Another interviewee forecast that strategic alliances would continue. The evolution of 
organisations could either promote more strategic alliances or independent companies, as 
noted in the following quotation: 
If you look at the oil area, … that most oil companies have radically reduced their 
participation in refining… So I think there is going to be… an explosion in the way 
that companies have disintegrated and then reformed in different strategic alliance 
or independent companies, and I think that is going to continue to be the case. 
(Interviewee 1) 
Another interviewee believed that strategic alliances would continue because of the 
perception that they had worked well and the expectation of an increase in onshore UK 
exploration. Therefore there was a need to pay more attention to the interests of other 
stakeholders, as mentioned in the following quotation: 
I think it could be more of the same because it’s been working so well for so long.  I 
think the one thing that will change a bit more is that…because it’s all been a lot 
more, in the next ten years, a lot more onshore exploration… that means that there 
are a lot more attention to pay for it… I think there will be a lot more interest by the 
non-partners the non-operators you call it. (Interviewee 2) 
One interviewee described a scenario where movement towards a decarbonised economy 
could encourage collaboration: 
The whole move towards a decarbonised economy will require much more 
collaboration between organisations… This is not just in energy but the disruptive 
technology, digital, decarbonisation, all require skills that are generally outwith an 
individual company… So I think strategic alliances in many sectors are here to stay 
as a way of working out how we change how we do things. (Interviewee 10) 
The interviewee added that the more change occurred, the more dynamics could be in 
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strategic alliances in the search for creating value. This is pointed out in the following 
quotation: 
I think as technology is disrupting in the energy space and decarbonisation is 
disrupting, you're gonna see alliances happen and unhappen as people work out 
where there's value and where their core skills are. (Interviewee 10) 
Another interviewee described a scenario where strategic alliances in the energy sector 
would become more strategic, on the one hand turning to more protectionist environments 
and on the other in areas with big resources moving forward. It was highlighted that there 
was insufficient capability to develop the resources at national level, thus strategic alliances 
would be required. These alliances could be driven mainly by financial and political factors 
unless dealing with deepwater, where technology could be the driver. 
The energy sector is going to become more strategic as we go forward.  As it 
becomes more strategic it'll become more national, more protected nationally or 
regionally.  So one side you can see nature of alliances shifting at the protectionist 
nature of nations start to have an impact.  On the other side the places where  
you've got really big sources of hydro carbons going forward, when you're looking 
at the shale gases, or shale oils, or deep water resources.  Are increasingly areas 
where you don't have, where you have commons in the wide sense.  So you don't 
have overriding regulations you have the commons of the oceans, and commons of 
the Antarctic.  And so on and so forth.  Then effectively there are going to have to 
be alliances to operate at that level.  I think quite a few places where you have 
significant resources, and trying to get out.  Individual nations don't have the 
capability nor the resources to develop them on their own.  In which case you start 
getting this need for alliances actually grows.  In those cases I think the nature of 
the alliance is going to be driven increasingly by financial factors, rather than 
technology factors.  A lot of the technology is quite well known now.  Deeper oceans 
might be a bit different, but generally the technology is known.  So the formation of 
an alliance is likely to be more driven by politics, than it is driven by technology. 
(Interviewee 12) 
These quotations illustrate different perceptions about the future for strategic alliances and 
provide drivers that can be followed in the evolution of strategic alliances. The common 
understanding is that strategic alliances will continue to be deployed, however, there are 
some different views regarding the drivers for this to occur. As part of the process of 
analysis, it could be useful to integrate the development of scenarios in order to create 
common vision among the parties involved in a strategic alliance.  
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Motives (RQ1,2,3) 
 
Some interviewees highlighted the importance of motivation and drivers for the 
development of strategic alliances in the future. These were categorised under 
complementarity and risk factor, technology-access to market, strategic-market-technology, 
culture-market-regulation, risk, and the herd effect. I will explain these in turn. 
The search for complementarity & the risk factor (RQ1-3) 
One interviewee pointed out that in terms of the value chain, there is a perspective that 
high-risk environments favour more upstream activities. On the other hand, the search for 
complementarity skills and assets encouraged more midstream and downstream alliances, 
as commented on in the following quotation: 
If my theory of strategic alliance has been… driven by activities of particularly high 
risk has any merit, then I guess you would expect more in the upstream than in 
the… downstream.  But, it may well be… if the other drivers for strategic alliances 
are to the complementary skills and maybe complementary assets as well… perhaps 
you could get more… strategic alliances for the downstream, in the midstream and 
downstream in retail and in gas markets… (Interviewee 6) 
Another interviewee believed that strategic alliances would continue as the rational to enter 
them in the search for complementarity would not change. This is expressed in the 
following quotation: 
They will continue forever.  They are not going to change... when I say they’re not 
going to change around the edges we’ll do things differently but at the end of the 
day if I don’t want to buy the resource or skill that I need how else do I get it other 
than to work with someone who has got that resource or that skill… and I need to 
work with that person as long as I need that skill.   
So I don’t see them changing… you know they’ve been around forever.  You know 
we’ll just give them totally different names.   
When you think about… just sitting here in Scotland and some of the earlier 
strategic alliances were with Scottish.  We talked about the joint venture you know 
and in legal terms you could say a joint venture is Scottish law back beyond sixteen 
hundred... strategic alliances were joint adventures in those days.  That type of joint 
venture in the fishing industry which was developed in Scotland continues to 
operate in numerous countries around the world today.  So if it’s lasted what then 
close to five hundred years I see absolutely no reason why it won’t continue on. 
(Interviewee 7) 
One interviewee pointed out that strategic alliances would be needed but geographic 
variations were expected. Some parts of the world had underdeveloped resources and 
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lacked certain skills and technology. This is mentioned in the following quotation:  
I think it’s going to vary by geography basically.  Because the energy sector has 
been consolidating for one hundred and fifty years.  My guess is that will continue. 
But there are sections of the world where it’s not consolidated.  There are sections 
of the world that have regional levels.  There are sections of the world that need 
technology from other parts of the world that probably will choose to do alliances 
and partnerships because they just can’t-, to answer your question before, they 
can’t deal with the constraints.  I mean, if I want to get into fracking in Argentina 
and I don’t have the technology, I need to find a way to get it. (Interviewee 8) 
One interviewee expected to have more strategic alliances, especially in the North Sea, with 
the implementation of the Wood Review. This would benefit businesses due to their 
interdependence in terms of infrastructure. He also referred to a kind of domino effect 
where the success of a venture was linked with the success of a series of ventures: 
I think there will be more and more of them. 
In the North Sea, I think we’ll see a lot more.  I think we’ll see a lot of alliances 
between operators and one or more contractors, to develop technology around 
things… around decommissioning, enhanced oil recovery, and that kind of thing, 
and as I said, in terms of the implementation of the Wood Review, we’re going to 
see a lot of – of strategic alliances between groups of operators, to treat 
holistically, interconnecting infrastructure.  It makes sense and it’s something that 
hasn’t happened in the past. 
Sometimes… people don’t realise that… the success of their venture would be 
improved by the success of the series of other ventures in the area.  They view those 
other ventures as being marginal, but they may not realise the impact of those 
marginal inputs into their infrastructure. 
Businesses are increasingly interconnected and can benefit by working together. 
(Interviewee 13) 
 Technology-Access to Market (RQ1-3) 
One interviewee highlighted that the need to combine technology, materials and knowledge 
could motivate the development of strategic alliances in renewable energy: 
I think for renewable energy…. because you want to combine certain pieces of 
technology so with material knowledge, materials knowledge, which materials to 
use in windmills for instance.  I can imagine having to combine different parties 
there to develop an alliance. (Interviewee 10) 
Another interviewee pointed out his expectation of having more strategic alliances between 
NOCs and IOCs. These would be driven by needs for technology and know-how in 
exchange for access to market. Other factors would be the size and complexity of the 
projects and risk-sharing, as mentioned in the following quotation: 
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There is already a trend for more strategic alliances between national oil 
companies and successful international enterprises in which one complements the 
other with technology and know-how, and it’s reciprocated with access to market 
and some local advantage.  There’s also already a trend for service companies to 
partner with each other, to target specific customers… because the projects are 
getting so big and so complicated... 
There’s also a trend to do strategic alliance to decrease the project risk, or to 
access technologies or know-how, to increase the probabilities of success. 
(Interviewee 15) 
 
Strategic-Market-Technology- (Acquisitions & Competitive Advantage)   
(RQ1-3) 
Another interviewee believed that strategic alliances would continue to be important as a 
step towards an acquisition or for competitive advantage purposes. This is noted in the 
following quotation: 
When you look at the industry, the interesting thing is that even the big winners in 
the industry, they are very open to these kind of alliances and corporations… are 
not shying away to team up with smaller companies in fields where they are, maybe 
too big, too slow, not innovative enough and secure through these partnerships 
access to market, access to technologies, and I think therefore a strategic alliance 
can be and often is the first step into a later merger or acquisition scenario but for 
sure is a very important and helpful tool to retain the competitive advantage with 
the other players in the industry. 
So, for me, strategic alliances..., definitely will continue to play a very important 
role and I think, you need to keep them in mind, as long as they are defined for 
some time period and then to take different decisions, either you stop activity or you 
acquire the company or you merge with the company then it will be a very 
successful model. (Interviewee 4) 
 Culture-Market-Regulation (RQ1-3) 
One interviewee agreed that strategic alliances were going to be needed because of the 
benefits they provide when entering new markets and dealing with cultural differences. 
Partnering with a local made things easier; the local organisation brought knowledge of the 
market in terms of customer preferences and were au fait with the best way of dealing with 
different regulations. This is expressed in the following quotation: 
Just like anything else just like on an individual level I think from a cultural 
standpoint… it’s always a challenge…  And it’s like… an individual coming from a 
different country working in the group… who have a different… cultural context.  
The same thing can work…. in the corporate sense it can take some time… it does 
create one of the greatest opportunities for strategic alliances in that if you get 
local you know what I’d call feet on the ground which I think a lot of firms still see 
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in when they look outside of their you know traditional core market… 
Because you know all these markets even in places like the United States in the 
complex there is a whole set of regulations. 
And just entering at grassroots’ level can be difficult.  So that does hold out some 
promise I think for a strategic alliances. (Interviewee 5) 
 Risk (RQ1-3) 
One interviewee expected to have an increase in strategic alliances due to the level of risk 
involved in the upstream, as noted in the following quotation: 
Certainly in the upstream sector, I think they're growing.  Because the amount of 
upstream activity is becoming more, and to some extent, well I think to a lot of 
extent has to go into riskier areas.  To find upstream capability.  So it's also 
deepwater drilling, or areas which are completely unexplored.  They are riskier.  So 
strategic alliance and forming partnerships to tackle where those areas are.  I think 
it's going to be more so in the future than in the past to be do that. (Interviewee 8) 
It was highlighted that the size of investments and risk-diversification would stimulate 
continued interest in alliances in the Petrochemical sector, as expressed in the following 
quotation: 
The other aspect which has been coming for quite a while was, and I see continuing 
is that to reduce the risk to have joint ventures that are big investment.  So ethylene 
crackers for instance, that you find a partner or two or which you can go in, to just 
diversify the risk, or reduce the risk of that investment.  Commonly a scale aspect 
has also resulted in some of these investments are so big, that even the major 
companies would be looking for a partner.  To just, you know not having to put all 
your eggs in one basket. (Interviewee 9) 
The opportunity to develop strategic alliances further down the value chain in specialised 
areas of the chemical sector was highlighted, as mentioned below: 
Where if you're working in a fairly specialised area of the chemical industry you 
can see how you can build value chains down the value chain. (Interviewee 9) 
The herd effect (RQ1-3) 
One interviewee pointed out that if strategic alliances were perceived as being successful, 
more of them would be expected. This is like a ‘herd effect, where organisations follow 
actions seen to be successful. However, this was not necessarily sustainable: 
It’s tempting to say that there will be more of them… I think it’s, it’s conceivable 
that if strategic alliances are a visible success in places, yeah, if, if there is just one 
strategic alliance which shows itself to be a success or is perceived to be a success, 
then it’s not impossible that people will try and copy the model simply because they 
think it’s a – it there's – if they think that, that there’s value to be had, that they’ll 
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simply try and capture it themselves, so there could be a kind of a herd effect.  
However that’s not necessarily a permanent or sustainable thing. (Interviewee 6) 
The above excerpt was of particular interest because it suggested that organisations mimic 
each others’ behaviour - a ‘kind of a herd effect’. 
These interviewees’ insights give an interesting view of the motives to enter strategic 
alliances in the future. They aid understanding why strategic alliances will be developed 
despite their perceived level of success. 
Challenges (RQ1-3) 
Some interviewees identified challenges for strategic alliances. These were classified under 
the categories cultural-financial, technological, change, stakeholders-communities and 
economic-political-legal. 
Cultural – Financial (RQ3) 
One interviewee mentioned financial challenges from the viewpoint of strategic alliances 
being a way to make profit from a short-term perspective: 
I mean for me the challenges are mainly… probably financial challenges with 
respect to the way that owners perceive strategic alliances and the short term 
thinking about strategic alliances as being things which are there to… harvest 
money quite quickly. (Interviewee 1) 
Also commented that from an Asian perspective could be different towards a more long 
term view, this suggest difference in cultures, as expressed in the following quotation: 
Strategic alliance being more driven… by Asian interests who might look at these 
types of things and say… actually if we can see good industrial logic, and that good 
industrial logic is going to pay us back in you know decades rather than in a few 
years or quarters then we will go for that. (Interviewee 1) 
 
The quotations above demonstrate that cultural aspects could add tension due to the 
difference in performance expectations in strategic alliances. As part of the process of 
developing alliances, organisations need to discuss and agree common expectations in order 
to decrease this tension.  
Technological (RQ1-3) 
One interviewee thought that strategic alliances would continue to be a hot topic, especially 
because of the size and technological challenges of projects and also as an alternative to 
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growth: 
I saw a lot of these… this is going back fifteen/twenty years ago, it was a very, very 
hot topic.  I think in some parts of the energy sector it still will remain that way.   I 
think especially when it comes to co-development, because the projects are getting 
bigger and bigger or more technologically challenging.  And it will continue to be 
the key weapon for a company is to you know to go out and grow their businesses. 
(Interviewee 5)  
Other interviewees pointed out that, in the downstream, strategic alliances were perceived 
as a necessary evil, especially in technology. Also highlighted was the perception that a 
portfolio of strategic alliances was difficult to manage, as mentioned in the following 
quotation: 
So far as the interaction and closer to the kind of the area where I work mostly now 
which is in the downstream.  If anything I’ve seen some disillusionment with how 
some of these alliances and partnerships work… sometimes they are a necessary 
evil especially in the case of access to technology or things like that.  But so far as 
operating relationship they’ve been perceived I think as no longer the necessary evil 
in that sometimes you have to do it because you really don’t have any other 
recourse. 
But I think nowadays a lot of managers are really quite wary of them.  I think there 
was probably a little bit more optimism about them in the past years than there is 
now.  I believe that is what I perceive in the downstream. 
And I know a number of leading firms you know they have a number of these types 
of relationships and… basically they would like to reduce the number that they have 
sometimes because they are hard to manage. (Interviewee 5) 
Change (RQ2) 
One interviewee highlighted disruptive change as a challenge in the future, not only for 
strategic alliances but also for the energy industry: 
Well disruptive change, which is what I think the industries are going through, the 
last fifteen years and the next fifteen years, is a challenge and it means that some 
strategic alliances that are absolutely the right thing to do today won't be tomorrow 
because something will change and it's no different than, you know, some – if you 
had in the UK a business building coal fire power stations you got disrupted in the 
early two thousands when the Kings North protest meant that it wasn't possible to 
build a new coal fire power station.  It doesn't matter if you were in an alliance or 
in the individual company, that disruptive change happened and I think that's gonna 
be true but I don't think it's particularly prevalent in alliances.  It's just true of the 
energy industry. (Interviewee 10) 
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Stakeholders – Communities (RQ2,3) 
One interviewee pointed out that license to operate would be one of the main challenges. 
There could be a greater number of alliances in countries where licenses were determined 
more by the Government than by the markets – for example, in China, South Korea and 
Russia. This is commented on in the following quotation: 
The licenses to operate, the agreement of society to allow energy companies to 
operate is going to be a significant factor going forward.  That might be that 
countries where the license operators are more determined by a government statue 
than markets will have a significant advantage in forming energy alliances going 
forward. 
Where you choose to operate will have an increasingly large social factor, 
compared to the past. 
But I think we're going to have a bit of a bell curve, where people are very vocal 
around energy activity and energy alliances.  Where the choice exists and they're 
still going to get the energy they want.  As soon as we start getting to a point where 
you have electricity brown outs, or shortage of diesel and gasoline and so forth.  I 
think a lot of those social issues will actually disappear.  Because we are so 
dependant on this energy. 
So I think ten to fifteen years, or twenty years the licensee to operate issues will be 
very significant.  And then after that just getting hold of the energy is going to be 
the driving force. (Interviewee 12) 
Economic, Political and Legal (RQ2,3) 
One interviewee pointed out that the oil price could represent challenges in the allocation of 
rewards, but at the same time this could encourage the development of strategic alliances in 
the search to reduce costs. There would be competition of investment amongst regions with 
political constraints as seen in the issues with Russia and anti-trust hurdles. This is 
expressed in the following quotation: 
If the oil price falls, that’s going to put pressure on cost, and that’s going… to make 
it harder to develop a strategic alliance that gives everyone some reward… on the 
other hand, you could say that the fact that costs are increasing and oil price falling 
is precisely the time where you need a strategic alliance to work out how to do 
things better going forward and cut costs. 
There’s the competition for investment capital… which means… you’ve got to show 
that… this is the right place to invest.  I guess there will be new political shocks that 
we haven’t anticipated, along the lines of the current Russian problems, and there’ll 
certainly be a lot of anti-trust hurdles to jump through. (Interviewee 13)  
The above quotations provide an interesting perspective on the challenges facing the energy 
industry. Oil prices could encourage the development of strategic alliances as a way to 
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optimise resources. Communities are increasingly playing a more important role in the 
development of natural resources, it seems that the dynamics of the process for the 
development of strategic alliances requires a continuous monitoring and analysis of these 
challenges. 
Figure 6-8.- Prospects of strategic alliances 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above figure represents the different views of interviewees, where the consensus of 
opinion was that strategic alliances would continue. The motivation would be 
complementarity - searching for feedstock, financial resources and skills technology. There 
was a perception that in the North Sea the success of a strategic alliance was dependent on 
the success of other alliances -a ‘Domino effect’. Other motivations included risk-sharing, 
strategic and the ‘herd effect’- if an organisation was perceived to be successful in a 
strategic alliance, this could encourage other organisations to follow suit. Interviewees 
referred to future challenges that strategic alliances could face, such a, cultural, financial, 
technological, change, stakeholders, economic, political and legal.  
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Conclusions 
 
This chapter offered a set of interesting findings, which are helpful to improve 
understanding of strategic alliances. The findings provided an insight, from the perspective 
of interviewees, on how external influences impose constraints on the development of 
strategic alliances. This occurs by enforcing certain terms but at the same time encouraging 
development. This can be observed in the case of governments or the configuration of the 
market. Sometimes governments act to enforce partnerships with national companies. This 
dual role is also acknowledged in the literature. 
 
The findings on internal influence from the perspective of the role of Executives and 
Managers allowed me to identify the dilemma of interest faced by those involved in the 
alliance. Parent companies impose constraints on the degree of freedom granted to 
Executives and Managers. However Executives influence the degree of freedom granted at 
the initial stage when the structure of the alliance is designed. The literature studies the 
challenges that managers face in terms of loyalty and the constraints imposed by the parent 
companies. 
 
The findings related to prospects offered a view of the future for strategic alliances. 
Although there was some difference in the individual perceptions of interviewees, there 
was a general consensus that strategic alliances will continue. This assertion is confirmed in 
the findings of both chapter 5 (performance) and chapter 4 (concept and process). Mimetic 
behaviours in the development of strategic alliances were identified in the findings. This 
issue has been studied in the literature - the perception of success could encourage the 
development of strategic alliances. Scenarios-development could be integrated into the 
process of strategic alliances to create common vision and understanding. These findings 
will be further explored in the Discussion chapter following. 
 
The findings chapters presented the five elements and sub elements of the holistic process 
model - Chapter four: Concept (meaning of strategic alliances, types, motives), Process 
(decision to enter strategic alliances, partner selection, alliance portfolio); Chapter five: 
Performance (measurement, problems, critical factors, risk, success and failure); Chapter 
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six: Influence (External, and Executives & Managers influence) and Prospects (Future, and 
challenges). The holistic process model is presented in the following chapter. 
 225 
CHAPTER 7 ‘DISCUSSION’ 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter will interpret and critically evaluate the findings in previous chapters in the 
light of my literature review. It will begin by revisiting the research purpose and questions 
and will summarise key findings.  I will then analyse these findings in light of the literature 
and theoretical framework as discussed in earlier chapters.  I will conclude with the 
research’s contribution to theory and practice and include suggestions for further research.  
 
Research purpose 
 
The aim of this research was to gain an in-depth understanding of the performance of 
strategic alliances in the energy sector. This would be achieved by drawing on a 
comprehensive qualitative study of the perspectives of those involved. 
 
The following research questions (RQ) were posed in Chapter 3 ‘Methodology-Methods’: 
 
RQ1: How and why have strategic alliances been developed in the energy sector? 
RQ2: How and why do strategic alliances succeed or fail?  
RQ3: Why do firms engage in strategic alliances despite low success rates? 
RQ4: How can we create more effective strategic alliances in the energy sector? 
 
 
The findings have been presented in the previous three chapters. The cumulative 
contribution of each chapter demonstrates that the research questions have all been 
addressed. However, chapter four ‘Concept and Process’ focussed more on RQ1; chapter 
five ‘Performance’ was balanced between the four RQs, and chapter six ‘Influence and 
Prospects’ contributed more to RQ1.  
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Summary of Key Findings  
 
In this section I will summarise the key findings of my research. Key findings refer to the 
concepts or themes that emerged from the data analysis and that contribute to advance the 
knowledge and improve the understanding of strategic alliances in the energy sector. I will 
explore how these findings are similar to or are different from other research in this field in 
the following section. Table 7-1 below summarises these key findings,  It is organised in 
four columns: location, key findings, connection and reflections. ‘Location’ refers to the 
section in the findings chapter where greater detail can be found. ‘Key findings’ develops a 
brief narrative; ‘Connection ‘establishes a link between the key findings and the existing 
literature; and ‘Reflection ‘briefly comments on the contribution of the findings.  
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Table 7-1.- Key findings of the research  
Location in 
thesis 
Key findings  Key topics in 
findings 
Connnection with 
literature 
Reflections on the 
connections 
Concept     
Meaning of 
strategic 
alliance (Ch4) 
Diversity was found in the meaning of 
strategic alliance, different 
interpretations, and the relationship 
between meaning and performance. 
Diversity through different 
understandings suggests complexity of 
strategic alliances. 
 
Diversity 
Performance 
Complex 
Same diversity 
(Anderson 1990, Kale 
and Singh 2009, 
Christoffesen 2013, 
Porter 1986, Contractor 
and Lorange 1988, Nippa 
2009, Oliver 1990, 
Glaister and Buckley 
1996) 
Relationship between 
meaning and performance 
Types (Ch4) Dynamics of alliances at other levels 
(industry, country) and their effects on 
performance at the micro level. The 
concern over flexibility, degree of 
freedom and the selection of the type 
of strategic alliance, suggesting a 
dilemma over these elements. The 
development of pilots as a way to 
build trust. 
Other levels, 
flexibility & trust 
Share concern over 
flexibility and degree of 
freedom (Das and Teng 
1999) 
Explore strategic alliances 
at macro-meso level and 
effects  
Motives for 
strategic 
alliances 
(Ch4) 
Theories could explain the motives 
that were identified. Strategic alliances 
are perceived as costly and complex; 
therefore there should be certainty 
when entering a strategic alliance. The 
energy industry is characterised by 
sharing risks, capital costs and by 
being influenced by governments 
because of the sensitivity over 
resources. 
Complex, share 
risk and capital. 
Sensitivity over 
resources and 
government’s 
influence 
 
Same theories could be 
useful to explain the 
motives of findings 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978, Arndt 1979, 
Williamson 1981, Kogut 
1988, Oliver 1990, 
Barney 1991) 
Explore patterns of different 
governments and influence 
over natural resources from 
a soft perspective 
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Location in 
thesis 
Key findings  Key topics in 
findings 
Connnection with 
literature 
Reflections on the 
connections 
Process on decision to enter strategic alliances, select partners and manage a portfolio 
Decision to 
enter a 
strategic 
alliance (Ch4) 
Diversity to make decisions to enter a 
strategic alliance, formal to informal 
processes, sometimes assisted by 
externals to legitimise decisions, this 
could suggest some issues around 
trust. Some elements between size of 
organisations and flexibility to 
accommodate change. The energy 
sector perceived to be more relevant 
for the economies of countries than 
other industries. Internal conflicts (not 
invented here). The need for senior 
involvement along the life cycle of the 
strategic alliance.  
Diversity 
Legitimisation 
and trust. 
Rigidity, 
flexibility and 
change 
Energy sector 
relevance 
Framework for strategic 
options (Devlin and 
Bleackley 1988) 
Flexibility in the process to 
accommodate contexts and 
internal conflicts (not 
invented here) 
Partner 
Selection 
(Ch4) 
Context, hard and soft characterisitics. 
Energy scientific background in the 
industry tends to look for hard 
characteristics.  
Energy scientific 
background and 
soft elements 
 Background of industry and 
soft considerations.  
Portfolio of 
alliances 
(Ch4) 
Diversity in the management of 
portfolios. Tools to manage portfolios 
Diversity Strategies to manage 
portfolios (Wassmer 
2010) 
Some insight into tools to 
manage porfolios 
Measurement of performance 
Measurement 
of 
performance  
(Ch5) 
Measurement of performance is 
difficult, diversity of metrics to deal 
with uncertainty and change and 
context. There is a need to include soft 
metrics (culture) and stakeholders’ 
preferences to measure performance.  
Complexity 
and stakeholders’ 
preferences 
Multi-constituencies 
approach, include 
stakeholders’ 
requirements (Ariño 
2003) 
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Location in 
thesis 
Key findings  Key topics in 
findings 
Connnection with 
literature 
Reflections on the 
connections 
Problems, risk, critical factors, success and failure in strategic alliances 
Partner related 
issues (Ch5) 
Critical for success, capabilities or risk 
of default, more partners more 
complex, vested interest -trust, value 
creation a benefit of partnering despite 
high levels of tension and conflicts 
(highland game week), but complex, 
win-win mind-set 
Trust 
Complex 
Partner and trust, 
capabilities and risk, 
more partners more 
complex vested interest 
and opportunistic 
behaviour. Complexity of 
partnering (Killing 1988,  
Makino and Beamish 
1998, Das and Teng 
1999, Das and Teng 
2001, Beamish and 
Kachra 2004,Beamish 
and Lupton 2009)  
Trust and opportunistic 
behaviour. 
Skills of managers to deal 
with more partners 
Alignment 
(Ch5)  
Differences in sizes and rewards, risk 
approach and the influence on the 
decision making process. A need for 
continuous alignment is critical for 
success. 
Change Dissimilarities among 
partners (Lowen and 
Pope 2008; McCutchen 
et al. 2008; Park and 
Ungson 1997; Saxton 
1997; Yeheskel et al. 
2001), inequity (Bleeke 
and Ernest 1991, Das and 
Teng 2001) 
 
Change (Ch5) Flexible documentation, to 
accommodate change, the industry is 
subject to a high level of volatility, 
plan for exit. Failure could be a 
perception. Change is complex for 
organisations. Need for executive 
endorsement. 
Flexibility 
Failure 
perception. 
Change is 
complex. 
Executive 
endorsement 
Flexibility in 
documentiation and trust. 
Failure is subjective (Das 
and Teng 1999, Van de 
Ven and Walker 1984, 
Gomes-Casseres 1987, 
Ring ad Van de Ven 
1994, Cristoffersen 2013) 
Change is complex. 
Connection with trust. 
Failure subjective 
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Location in 
thesis 
Key findings Key topics in 
findings 
Connnection with 
literature 
Reflections on the 
connections 
Exit (Ch5) The need to plan and agree on exit. An 
alternative to change. Exit is difficult 
if everything was commited to the 
strategic alliance. 
Plan exit. Change Plan for exit (Das and 
Teng 1999, Gulati et al. 
2008) 
 
Legal 
regulatory 
(Ch5) 
Strategies to protect knowledge and 
IP, an implicit connection between 
growth and trust. Strategies for 
protection suggests a lack of trust 
Growth and trust Strategies for protection 
(Bleeke and Ernst 1991, 
Ring and Van de Ven 
1994) 
Balance between trust and 
objectives of organisations 
to growth 
Culture (Ch5) Working in different cultures and a 
process of change of organisations that 
it is critical, therefore leadership and 
skills to manage change are critical. 
Behaviour related with difference in 
culture impact trust. Similar cultures 
and pilots to develop trust. Big 
companies are more rigid; flexibility 
could be an advantage when dealing 
with different cultures. 
Process of 
change, impact on 
trust. Flexibility is 
an advantage 
Culture (Hofstede 
1980,Ring and Van 
deVen 1994, Dacin et al. 
1997, Makino and 
Beamish 1998, Callahan 
and MacKenzie 1999, 
Glaister and Buckley 
1999, Beamish and 
Kachra 2004,  Makino et 
al. 2007                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Kale and Singh 2009, 
Kim and Parkhe 2009, 
Meier 2011, Cummings 
and Holmberg 2012, and 
trust (Robson 2002, 
Nippa et al 2007, Jiang et 
al 2008, Kale and Singh 
2009, Ren et al 2009, 
Gulati 2012, Albers et 
al., 2013. Christoffersen 
2013) 
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Location in 
thesis 
Key findings  Key topics in 
findings 
Connnection with 
literature 
Reflections on the 
connections 
Clarity (Ch5) Critical for success, clarity facilitates 
alignment.  
Critical for 
success. 
Alignment 
  
Stakeholders 
(Ch5) 
A long-term perspective and the 
governments’ influence and political 
risks. The increasing relevance of 
communities in the development of 
strategic alliances  
Long-term 
perspective, 
governments’ and 
communities 
influence 
Stakeholders relevance 
and alliances with them 
(Kale and Singh 2009) 
 
Trust (Ch5) Lack of trust at early stages of the 
strategic alliance could derive in 
failure. Trust was not frequently 
mentioned, but emerged as a 
relationship with other categories. 
Trust and failure Various connections of 
trust (Robson 2002, 
Nippa et al 2007, Jiang et 
al 2008, Kale and Singh 
2009, Ren et al 2009, 
Gulati 2012, Albers et 
al., 2013. Christoffersen 
2013 
Even if it is not explicitly 
mentioned, trust is 
connected with several 
categories of performance. 
Trust facilitates adaptation 
to change 
Leadership 
(Ch5) 
Leadership is critical to manage 
different cultures, stakeholders’ 
interests, align organisations and 
provide clarity to strategic alliances. 
Critical Not too much 
information 
Connections with 
alignment, clarity, culture 
and stakeholders 
Influence: external factors, executives and managers, and skills of managers 
External 
influence 
(Ch6) 
Dual role of the government and 
markets, encouraging strategic 
alliances and at the same time 
constraining terms and conditions. If 
strategic alliances are imposed there 
could be some constraints for the 
partner selection, how does this 
influence performance? Political 
constraints in the form of sanctions 
Influence of 
governments and 
markets, the 
impact of 
performance 
Acknowledgement of the 
dual role (Arndt 1979, 
Porter 1986, Gomes-
Caseres 1987, Contractor 
& Lorange 1988, Das 
and Teng 2001) 
Enforcement of partner 
selection and impact on 
performance 
 
 
232 
Location in 
thesis 
Key findings  Key topics in 
findings 
Connnection with 
literature 
Reflections on the 
connections 
Internal 
influence and 
skills of the 
right people 
(Ch6) 
The choice of governance, the 
flexibility of the selected structure and 
degree of freedom for managers of 
strategic alliances. The dilemma of 
interest of managers, their concerns 
over loyalty and future carreer. The 
executives’ role and the right skills of 
people to manage strategic alliances. 
Flexibility, 
governace, degree 
of freedom. 
Loyalty and 
future. 
Executives’ role. 
Right skills of 
people 
Role of conflict, loyalty, 
trust, and freedom 
required to manage 
alliances  (Killing 1988, 
Bleake and Ernst 1991, 
Ring and Van de Ve 
1994, Fraine and 
Geringer 1995, Li et al. 
2002, Robson 2002, 
Glaister et al. 2003, 
Nippa et al 2007, Jiang et 
al 2008, Kale and Singh 
2009, Ren et al. 2009, 
Gulati 2012, Albers et 
al., 2013. Christoffersen 
2013, Reuer et al. 2014) 
 
Prospects for the future of strategic alliances 
Scenarios 
(Ch6) 
Strategic alliances will continue, role 
of NOCs and communities would 
increase 
Continue, NOCs 
and communities 
New forms of 
cooperation to 
understand stakeholders 
requirements (Kale and 
Singh 2009) 
How does the future 
influence decisions of 
strategic alliances in the 
long term? 
Motives (Ch6) Rational to enter strategic alliances 
was perceived to continue. Mimetic 
behaviour if perception of success but 
this is not sustainable 
Mimetic 
behaviour 
Mimetic behaviour 
(DiMaggio and Powell 
1983, Das 2001, Pfeffer 
2003) 
 
Challenges 
(Ch6) 
Change and stakeholders Change   
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Key findings show that the attributes of the energy industry are perceived to be key in its 
differentiation from other industries. The energy industry has a greater impact on national 
economies. Governments are therefore sensitive about the control of natural resources and try to 
impose a greater influence over the decisions on how to develop these resources. This ultimately 
impacts strategic alliances. The predominantal scientific background of those in the industry 
creates an approach that favours the ‘hard’ elements in developing strategic alliances. However, 
there is also a need to consider ‘softer’ elements, such as the characteristics of partner selection 
and performance measurement. 
 
When exploring the meaning, types, processes, and measurement of strategic alliances, the 
common elements are: diversity in the way people understand strategic alliances, how they make 
decisions and how alliances are managed.  This suggests that dealing with strategic alliances is a 
complex task. This is mainly due to more than one organisation being involved, each with 
different ways of working and individual cultures and also as it is within a dynamic environment 
where change is a constant. In a volatile energy industry, changes in markets impose serious 
challenges for the development of strategic alliances. There is therefore a need to provide tools 
and provide solutions to accommodate change. This could be achieved, for example, by 
providing flexibility to the agreements among partners. Complexity becomes greater when 
managing a portfolio of alliances; therefore tools that can support the management of complexity 
are required. 
 
Performance measurement is complex and diverse; various metrics within a combination of hard 
and soft could be considered. Partner selection, continuous alignment, how to deal with change, 
plan for exit, strategies to protect knowledge and intellectual property rights, managing different 
cultures, clarity and a win-win mindset, considering the stakeholders’ voices, and building and 
maintaining trust are all critical factors that affect performance. Leaders that can face the 
challenges of developing strategic alliances and provide support to manage them are required. 
Failure of strategic alliances could be based on a subjective perception of performance. 
 
Governments and markets play a dual role in relation to strategic alliances. On the one hand they 
can enforce the development of strategic alliances as a way to access specific countries, and on 
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the other they can impose stringent requirements on developing strategic alliances developing 
within their province. Managers of strategic alliances face a dilemma over loyalty to the parent 
company and have some concerns over the future of their career. They expect support and 
endorsement from executives but at the same time require flexibility to manage the strategic 
alliance. This could be constrained by decisions made at early stages in selecting the type, 
structure and governance. Managers need to have particular skills to accomplish their endeavour. 
 
The prediction for the future of strategic alliances is that they will continue and the role of 
national oil companies and communities in their development will increase. Current motivation 
to enter strategic alliances could carry on. The perception of success in strategic alliances could 
create mimetic behaviours in organisations by following the trend in developing strategic 
alliances. However, questions arise over sustainability. The main challenges are concerning how 
to deal with change and stakeholders’ influence (mainly communities) in the development of 
strategic alliances.  
 
Findings and existing literature 
 
In this section, I will elaborate on the connections between the key findings and the existing 
literature.  These are presented in the same sequence as the chapters on findings and are 
illustrated in the following figure. 
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Figure 7-1.- Structure of section findings and current research 
 
 
 
 
The structure above illustrate the elements and subelements that are part of the holistic model 
proposed in this thesis. It is presented in the contribution section of this chapter. 
 
Concept of Strategic Alliances 
Concept is the first element of the holistic model proposed and is divided into meaning, types 
and motives for strategic alliances. 
 
Meaning 
 
Interviewees constructed the term ‘strategic alliances’ in a variety of ways. Some interviewees 
acknowledged as being it a broad concept; this reflects the same diversity that was found in the 
literature (Anderson 1990, Kale and Singh 2009, Christoffesen 2013, Porter 1986, Contractor 
and Lorange 1988, Nippa 2009, Oliver 1990, Glaister and Buckley 1996). The breadth of the 
concept implies subjectivity in the meaning of strategic alliances. This could lead to different 
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understandings among the organisations involved in any single alliance and the hetereogeneity 
gives a sense of uniqueness and complexity. Anand and Khanna (2000) acknowledged this 
complexity by describing alliances as ‘complex organisational forms’ (p. 295). There is, 
therefore, a challenge to anticipate issues whilst managing them. Bamford et al (2003) 
acknowledged the variability and complexity of strategic alliances and recommended reaching 
agreement on the meaning of success, failure and performance measurement on a case-by-case 
basis. 
The diversity and complexity in the meaning of strategic alliances highlights the need to develop 
a common understanding when developing an alliance. This justifies integrating as part of the 
process of analysis to promote conversations amongst those involved in the alliance to reach a 
common view on meaning in order to align behaviours and actions.  
 
Types 
 
The majority of interviewees’ description of the various types of strategic alliances was 
consistent with the descriptions in Das and Teng (2001). Some interviewees acknowledged of the 
development of strategic alliances beyond the organisational level to an industry level opens an 
avenue to consider the wider spectrum where strategic alliances are developed. This relates to 
institutional logics where strategic alliances can be positioned at the micro, meso and macro 
level (Thornton and Ocasio 1999). Gulati and Westphal (1999) suggested that relations at the 
industry level promote and facilitate ties - organisations get to know or recommend others 
through their continuous relationships.  
 
Some interviewees highlighted that the selection of the type of structure is influenced by the 
strategic objectives, the legal compliance and requirements. Some authors acknowledged this, for 
example (Porter 1986). One important element that emerged is the consideration that the 
selection of the structure is also influenced by an expected degreee of freedom for the operations 
of the strategic alliance. Das and Teng (1999) raised this concern in terms of searching for the 
right balance between rigidity and flexibility in the structure. Another aspect that emerged was 
the perception of having freedom in structure selection. This points to the degree of influence of 
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the individual over the organisation and suggests looking at this in the light of institutional 
theory, institutional logics and some issues around agency theory. 
 
Motives 
 
Motives recalled by interviewees can be mapped against the theories reviewed in chapter three, 
Literature Review to explain the drivers for organisations to enter strategic alliances. These are: 
domesticated markets, market attractiveness and organisational power, interorganisational 
exchange behaviour and resource dependency, institutional economics and the resource-based 
view.  
Categories that emerged from the findings (see Chapter 4, section ‘Motives) can be 
accommodated within the theories of motives reviewed within the literature (see Chapter 3, 
section of ‘Theoretical expanations of motives for entering strategic alliances’), as illustrated in 
the following table.  
 
Table 7-2.- Motives in findings and theoretical fit 
Findings’ categories  Theoretical fit 
DM MA& 
OP 
IEB 
&RD 
IOR RBV 
Complementary • Skills & knowledge 
• Resources (people, 
capital) 
  X X  
Access • Markets 
• Technology 
• People 
• Feedstock 
• Knowledge 
X X X X X 
Strategic • Pre-emption 
• Exit 
• Acquisitions 
• Credibility 
 X    
Risks & capital • Share 
• Diversify 
X X  X X 
Positives & Negatives • Opportunities 
• Solve problems 
• Defensive  
 X    
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• Survival 
Value chain • Upstream-feedstock 
• Refining-exit 
strategy 
• Petrochemicals-new 
markets or 
technology 
X X X X X 
* DM= Domesticated Markets, MA&OP= Market Attractiveness and Organisational, IEB&RD= 
Interorganisational Exchange Behaviour and Resource Dependency, IOR= Interoganisational 
Relationships, RBV= Resource Based View 
 
Motives to enter strategic alliances could be explained by different theories, as shown in the 
previouse table. The theoretical fit confirms that findings could be connected with more than one 
theory. This was demonstrated by the motives expressed for entering strategic alliances as 
identified earlier in the literature review.  
One of the findings was related to the perception of strategic alliances being complex and costly. 
Entering a strategic alliance, therefore, requires that the benefits outweigh the costs. Das and 
Teng (1999) argued that the difficulty in managing strategic alliances stems from the fact that, 
besides managing one’s own organisation, involvement in a strategic alliance means you 
additionally have to deal with the partner’s organisation. Also, from a control viewpoint, entering 
a strategic alliance is perceived to have a high level of risk because a parent company has less 
control of the alliance than of its own subsidiaries. 
 
Some interviewees mentioned sharing risk and joint capital investment as motives in developing 
strategic alliances. From a resource view perspective Das and Teng (2001) argued that, by 
sharing risks through strategic alliances, organisations are better equipped to face the 
uncertainties and risks of the environment. This explains the dynamics in the oil industry since 
its origins, where alliances were created in order to share the risks (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003) 
and to accrue capital to develop complex and challenging projects. This is evident in the case of 
oil majors, as shown in the ‘Introduction ‘chapter, for companies such as Shell.  
 
The motives that emerged from the findings and the theoretical fit enlightens our understanding 
(from both a practical and a theoretical perspective) of the reasons for the development of 
strategic alliances, despite their level of perceived success. 
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Process of Strategic Alliances 
 
Process is the second element of the holistic process model. This advances understanding on how 
organisations follow process to decide to enter a strategic alliance, select a partner and develop 
alliance portfolio. 
 
Decision to enter a strategic alliance 
 
Some interviewees described the business options prior to entering a strategic alliance are similar 
to those described by Devlin and Bleackley (1988) as strategic options. One main difference is 
that, while ‘Findings’ included an option of doing nothing, Devlin and Bleackley did not 
consider this.  They did, however, include divestment as an option.  
 
Diversity was found among the descriptions of the processes to enter strategic alliances, with 
some differences in terms of formality. It seems that the bigger the company the more formal it 
is, which could be explained by levels of bureaucracy.  While describing the process in deciding 
to enter a strategic alliance, some interviewees mentioned bringing in external people 
(consultants) to support the decision. This seems to provide some insight as to how organisations 
legitimise their decision-making and also implies issues around trust. Dacin et al. (2007) defines 
legitimacy as ‘the extent to which a firm’s structures and activities appear to conform with social 
norms, values, and expectations of the firm’s economic and social environment’ (p. 171). In this 
sense, and as expressed in the interviews, sometimes consultants were brought in to legitimise 
decisions, even if the organisation had the capability to make the decision itself. 
 
According to one interviewee, strategic alliances in the energy sector are perceived to be 
different from those in other industries because of the importance of natural resources. In line 
with these findings, Duval et al. (2009) claimed that, from a global perspective, petroleum 
resources are a matter of national or public interest.  
 
Some interviewees highlighted the need to keep the strategic fit by having continuous tuning and 
adjustment during the strategic alliance. This reflects the natural dynamics of evolution and 
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change in a strategic alliance, and the need to have a dynamic process framework. This 
framework can be useful in monitoring and identifying changes in the environment and to adjust 
decisions and take action during the life cycle of the alliance.  
 
Partner selection 
 
The topic of partner selection as a relevant part of the strategic alliance process was explored 
with interviewees. The majority of interviewees confirmed its relevance when discussing the 
problems and critical factors associated with performance. The findings of partner selection both 
as a process and as a subcategory in performance emerged; both are presented here. 
 
One interviewee believed that the scientific background of the energy industry influences the 
characteristics desired when selecting a partner. A science-based rationale for partner selection 
was not found in the literature.  
 
Some interviewees identified partner selection as critical for success. Consistent with this, Dacin 
et al. (2007) argued that partner selection is critical to alliance performance.  He also 
acknowledged that partner selection required understanding the needs, motives, and expectations 
of the partners and that there was little research on partner selection. Gomes, Barnes et al. (2014) 
suggested that selection of partners was an area of particular interest to research.  
 
Some interviewees highlighted that previous experience in undertaking alliances was 
acknowledged as a positive characteristic. In line with this, Cristoffersen (2013) found a positive 
correlation between prior relations or experience between partners. This contributes to 
understanding resources and capabilities through previous experience. Trust-building is 
facilitated by the knowledge that they accrue from each other. This highlights the connection 
between partner selection and trust. 
 
Insights from interviewees suggested identifying a set of desirable characteristics of a partner 
where, surprisingly, soft characteristics are highly valuable. This set could inform the analysis 
when selecting a partner in the development of strategic alliances. 
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Portfolio 
 
The responses of the majority of interviewees reflected the diversity of experience in managing a 
strategic alliance portfolio. These highlight, a concern to build the capabilities of the people 
involved, and, the relevance of taking advantage of the learning process. Knowledge 
dissemination among employees involved in the strategic alliance is essential to understanding 
the benefits of these partnerships to the portfolio. In line with these findings, Gulati (1998), 
departing from an embedeness approach, claimed that organisations able to manage a portfolio of 
alliances could develop a competitive advantage. He identified a series of desirable capabilities 
in managing a portfolio, such as: ‘identifying valuable alliance opportunities and good partners, 
using appropriate governance mechanisms, developing interfirm knowledge-sharing routines, 
making requisite relationship-specific asset investments, and initiating necessary changes to the 
partnership as it evolves while also managing partner expectations’ (p.308).  
 
Kale and Singh (2009) identified three essential elements that favour portfolio alliance 
management: previous experience in alliances, having an organizational unit coordinating the 
alliance function, and enhancing the know-how and skill in alliances. The authors found that an 
organizational unit dedicated to the alliance function increases the chances of success.   
  
The majority of interviewees showed that there are different perceptions on how to organise or 
configure a portfolio of alliances. The portfolio could be organised geographically or, as in the 
case of oil and gas companies, in operating or non-operating asssets. Organisations should be 
aware of the competition for resources among alliances in a portfolio and threats to the core 
business of an organisation. In line with this finding, Hoffman (2007) suggested looking 
carefully at the individual purpose of alliances and the potential overlap of benefits. This area 
causes rivalry within alliances. Hoffman added that the configuration of an alliance portfolio 
depends on both the level of resources of an organisation (technical capital, commercial capital, 
and social capital) and on the strategic uncertainty as perceived at executive level, and its related 
strategic decisions.  
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Some interviewees offered insight on the different tools used to manage a portfolio. These 
include risk analysis compliance in order to verify the accomplishment of standards of alliances 
within a portfolio, and audits, which contribute to the need identified by Wassmer (2010) of 
providing tools to manage alliance portfolios.  
 
In their review, Lahiri and Narayanan (2013) found that the size of the alliance portfolio could 
have both positive and negative effects on performance. The benefits are that knowledge and 
information can be exchanged among alliances. However challenges occur if more alliances are 
added to the portfolio. Managers may perceive that diminishing returns accrue as more alliances 
are added to the portfolio. In addition, managers employ selectivity in demonstrating preferences 
across the portfolio in identifying priorities. The literature suggests that alliances not only 
compete for economic resources but also the time to manage the alliance and the distraction of 
the more attractive alliances. Responses from some interviewees showed concerns about 
competition amongst alliances in a portfolio. 
 
From the reflections of the process approach, advancement in the conceptualisation of the 
development of strategic alliances is to integrate as part of the process the analysis of alliance 
portfolio, as presented in the holistic model in the contribution section. 
 
Performance  
 
Perfomance is the third element of the holistic model presented in the contribution section of this 
chapter. Its sub elements are measurement and the findings on problems, risks, critical factors, 
success and failure. This section follows the same structure as the findings chapters. More details 
of these findings are presented in chapter five. 
 
Measurement 
 
Findings from some interviewees showed that the measurement of performance was complex. 
This perception is consistent with the literature. Dussausage and Garrete (1995) contended that 
defining and measuring performance was a complex endeavour. 
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Findings from some interviewees showed that setting metrics for performance required 
considering the perspective of financial institutions or shareholders. However, this could also be 
extended to other stakeholders. Ariño (2003) suggested a multiconstituencies approach in order 
to include the assessment of stakeholders - for example each partner, community, and also host 
governments in the case of a cross-border strategic alliance. In her study, Ariño proposed that as 
they limit partners, the goals of the partners should include the goals of the other stakeholders. 
According to the findings from some interviewees, ‘softer’ issues were identified as critical to 
performance and success. Among these were cultural issues. One interviewee commented that 
research has focussed on ‘hard’ issues, and offered a reflection that they had ommitted to 
consider soft issues when beginning to deal with strategic alliances.  In line with this finding, 
Christoffersen (2013) stated that it was not common to find research which contained a mixture 
of hard and soft metrics, Christoffersen categorised cultural issues under relational conflicts - 
these are measured according to the perception of the partners. He claimed that cultural issues 
had a negative impact on performance. 
The complexity of measurement, the need to consider softer issues, and to take into account 
stakeholders perceptions, offer new viewpoints on how to integrate this aspects as part of the 
process of the development of strategic alliances, beyond the conventional process proposed so 
far, one way is through a more holistic framework, as presented in the holistic model proposed. 
 
Problems, risks, critical factors, failure and success 
 
This section presents the discussion of the key findings of problems, risks, critical factors, failure 
and success. In this discussion, the relationship between categories is going to be identified and 
will be discussed at the end of the section. The findings are presented following the same 
sequence as chapter 5’s findings and is illustrated in the following figure. 
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Figure 7-2.- Structure of findings of problems, risks, critical factors, failure and success 
 
 
 
The relevance of these categories is that they emerged from the experience of individuals in the 
energy industry and could be aspects to review in the process of developing a strategic alliance. 
These categories could be integrated in a holistic process framework, such as the one presented 
in the contribution section of this chapter.  
 
Partner related issues 
Literature has acknowledged that partner selection is a critical stage in the process of a strategic 
alliance (Jiang et al. 2008, Dacin et al. 1997, Cummings and Holmberg 2012). Findings showed 
that amongst the categories that affect performance were issues related to partners and these were 
integrated in figure 5-5 of chapter 5. The details of the sub categories that emerged and their 
connection with the literature are presented below and include partner’s technical and financial 
capabilities, issues related with vested interest and the complexity of partnering. 
 
Partner’s technical and financial capabilities 
Findings showed that some interviewees were concerned about the partner’s capabilites. They 
identified the partner’s capabilities as a source of risk and difficulty. Because of the levels of 
investment in the industry, this finding is critical. Considering the importance and consequences 
of choosing a partner, time should be invested in the selection process. Das and Teng (2001) 
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classified risk as relational risks and performance risks. Performance risk is related to the 
volatility of the market and to the competence of partners. Even when relational risk is absent 
due to full cooperation, a lack of competence can result in issues affecting the performance of the 
alliance. This increases the importance of partnering. 
Issues related with vested interest  
The vested interests of partners at the individual level emerged as a key driver in the accounts of 
some interviewees. Good communication and identification of problems can address issues 
arising from partners’ pursuit of competing interests that depart from agreements, Das and Teng 
(2001) studied this in terms of opportunistic behaviour where organisations and individuals seek 
to achieve their own interests. At the international level, this could be related to cultural issues 
and differences among partners. It increases relational risk, where partners behave in a different 
way than expected. This impacts the level of trust among partners. Trust is one of the values 
which keep a balance in the relationship along the formal lines of agreements. In instances where 
the level of trust is low, implementing detailed contracts and monitoring activities incur an 
increase in costs.   
Complexity of partnering 
Some interviewees perceived partnering as a complex process, with the metaphor of marriage 
frequently applied to suggest that there was no a simple recipe for success.  There was also a 
perception that partnering was more difficult to manage than ‘going it alone’. The complexity of 
strategic alliances increases as the number of partners increase due to the challenge of keeping 
cohesion and involvement among partners. 
 
This finding is in line with Killing (1988), who found that the number of partners increase the 
organisational complexity of an alliance due to the increase in difficulties in the decision-making 
process. The more equal the role of each partner, the more difficult and time-consuming the 
decision making process was found to be. Makino and Beamish reached a similar conclusion 
(1998, cited in Beamish and Lupton 2009, p. 84). They argued that the performance of the 
strategic alliance is greater when there are a smaller number of partners. However, Beamish and 
Kachra (2004) pointed out that most of the research has been focused on the quality rather than 
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the quantity of the partners. The prevalent assumption has therefore been that as the number of 
partners increases the complexity increases; the risk of underperforming therefore increases. 
Thus, in their research, Beamish and Kachra found that the number of partners does not affect 
performance. They argued that the complex environment in which alliances are developed 
requires multiple partnerships. The perception of complexity in the minds of managers makes 
them unwilling to take opportunities. Beamish and Kachra further specified that managers 
needed to be competent in coordinating resources. This reflects the increasing relevance of the 
managers’ skills in the performance of strategic alliances as the number of partners increase. As 
Das and Teng (1999) argued, complexity is related to the learning curve of organisations in 
understanding how to work best with each other.  
 
Alignment 
Difference in interests, objectives, expectations and rewards 
According to some interviewees, a difference in objectives was perceived as the cause of some 
misaligment between partners. However, Das and Teng (1999) suggested that different 
objectives were not necessarily an aspect of concern if these objectives were compatible in terms 
of being able to be achieved simultaneously.  
Some interviewees suggested that differences in expectations could be attributed to differences in 
sizes between partners. Authors that have developed research on dissimilarities among partners 
(such as ‘Alliance experience, age, strategic scope, strategic content, goals, ownership type and 
reputation) found that dissimilarities need to be considered (Lowen and Pope 2008; McCutchen 
et al. 2008; Park and Ungson 1997; Saxton 1997; Yeheskel et al. 2001, cited in Christoffersen 
2013, p. 75). Moreover, Christoffersen (2013) claimed that differences in size have a negative 
impact on performance as size dissimilarities often result in other dissimilarities.  
In line with this, Doz (1988, cited in Christoffersen 2013 p. 75) found that difficulties arise 
between partners of different sizes because of differences in culture, policies on information and 
incentives. Moreover, Beamish and Jung (2005, cited in Christoffersen 2013 p. 75) argued that 
difficulties occur due to differences in systems and protocols. Shenkar and Zeira (1992, cited in 
Li et al 2002, p. 330) argued that diverse expectations could arise from differences in norms and 
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ways of operating, and that the norms of the bigger partner have more likelihood of being 
adopted as the framework to follow. One interesting connection is the relation between culture 
and difficulties resulting from differences in size between partners.  
Doz (1988) found that differences in size could result in issues related with the decision-making 
processs. Larger organisations are more bureaucratic; making decisions takes more time, more 
people are involved, agreements are reached by consensus and decisions are questioned and 
susceptible to change.  
Among the sources of misalignment were the differences in reward. This was identified as a 
potential problem in the findings by one interviewee. It is related to the perception of inequity in 
terms of an imbalance between work and rewards. 
Difference in rewards can bring a sense of inequity. If one partner perceives that there is an 
imbalance between work and rewards, the equity theory of motivation contends that a party that 
feels they are being unfairly treated will try to restore a sense of equity. This could diminish their 
willingness to commit (Das and Teng 2001). Performance can be negatively influenced by 
inequity, because the chances of success of an alliance that is perceived to be unequal are low 
(Bleeke and Ernest 1991). 
The prediction of inequitable situations could be signalled during the formation of the alliance. 
The signals might include dissimilarites among partners, a difficult legal environment and when 
one of the partners does not have options which extend beyond the strategic alliance (Das and 
Teng 2001).  
The challenge is to keep continuous alignment between the parties. This requires that time is 
spent creating the same understanding of expectations and objectives among partners in the 
process of developing a strategic alliance. 
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Change 
 
Change and related issues was a category that emerged frequently with interviewees. In the 
findings, in terms of expectations, the perception of failure, the impact of markets changing, and 
the intrinsic complexity of change for organisations. The connection with existing literature is 
presented below. 
 
Change in expectations, interests and objectives 
 
Accounts showed that one major concern was a change in expectations, interest and objectives. 
Some interviewees believed that flexible agreements were needed to accomodate change and to 
plan for exit. The response to change can differ from partner to partner and also depends on the 
other options available. 
The literature acknowleges that objectives change over time and that the relevance and 
complexity of anticipating potential issues associated with this also changes. Scenario planning 
could be employed to assess the evolution and positions of the partners (Das and Teng 1999), 
and to ‘understand how critical uncertainties in organizational environments might interact in 
surprising ways’ (Bowman et al. 2013, p. 736). 
The flexibility in documentation expressed by one interviewee in the findings is related to the 
level of formality selected for the strategic alliance and the implications of this. Van de Ven and 
Walker (1984, cited in Ring and Van de Ven 1994 p. 108) found that issues among partners were 
related to the level of formality and monitoring. Conflicts emerged if there was excessive 
formality and could result in mistrust among partners. Ariño and De la Torre (1998) suggested 
promoting the development of procedural solutions at early stages in order to prevent conflict in 
the management of the alliance. The idea was to set rules to restore efficiency and equity in the 
relationship and avoid unilateral actions. Ariño and De la Torre believed that by having 
structural rigidity, partners would focus on achieving success.  
Das and Teng (1999) acknowledged that because of the high degree of competitivenes and 
volatility in the markets, flexilibility was relevant to achieving success. At the same time, the 
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authors recoginised the challenge in finding the right balance between formality and flexibility. 
High levels of flexibility could result in opportunistic behaviour; a sound level of structural 
rigidity could prevent this behaviour and help to strenghten the relationship. 
Change as a perception of failure 
A significant and interesting finding that emerged from the data of some interviewees was the 
subjective and dynamic nature of the perception of the failure of a strategic alliance. Some 
interviewees believed that just because an alliance comes to an end does not necessarily mean it 
has failed.  Changes in objectives and interests were perceived as natural in the process of 
creating, maintaining and ending an alliance. 
Subjectivity is related to the way performance is measured. Some studies have used stability 
measures to assess performance, among them exit from markets, changes in equity and contracts, 
takeovers and termination of alliances. However, stability measures do not necessarily reflect the 
success of a strategic alliance. For instance, an alliance that has a good performance could be an 
interesting acquisition target. If it is, therefore, more convenient for the partner to sell the 
alliance this does not mean that the alliance was a failure (Cristoffersen 2013). Sometimes the 
strategic alliance could be planned as an equity play and this does not necessarily equate to 
failure (Gomes-Casseres 1987). On the other hand, small failures are perceived to have great 
potential for learning from experience, more so than even successes or major failures (Eisenhardt 
and Martin 2000). 
Change and markets 
 
Accounts from some interviewees in the findings reflect the dynamics of the market in the 
industry. Particulary in the oil industry, changes could encourage the development of alliances or 
a continuous recalibration and adjustment to the new environment.  
In line with this finding, Hoffman (2007) suggested three strategies - adapting, shaping and 
stabilising- are available for firms to face the challenges of uncertain environments through 
alliances, the adapting strategy (probing alliances) refers to broadening the resource base and 
looking for strategic flexibility. This could be achieved in the search for new opportunities, 
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making selective investments, for instance contractual alliances with local partners. The shaping 
strategy (core exploration alliances) is achieved by pursuing the strategic interests of the 
organisation in order to shape the environment. Examples of this type are new technology 
alliances or alliances focusing on improving product lines. The stabilising strategy (explotation 
alliances) aims to commercialise resources and capabilities. This can be achieved through long-
term supply contracts, distribution and sales alliances, or in alliances among competitors. A 
combination of these alliances was defined as multiple alliances, where this hybrid strategy is 
appropriate in an environment with high uncertainty.  
In the oil and gas industry, the variability of the price has implications on the relationship 
between host countries and companies exploring and producing hydrocarbons -  mostly through 
a strategic alliance. Host countries and companies allocate the economic benefits and risks by 
agreeing on the economic and fiscal provisions that will govern their relationship. They take the 
context and assumptions about the future into consideration, including the anticipated price of 
the commodity. If the price changes this could create an imbalance in the expected risks and 
rewards for the parties. Duval et al (2009) therefore suggested that host countries and companies 
should work towards including  self-adjusting fiscal provisions in their agreements. These would 
avoid the modification of their original fiscal agreement during their relationship and also 
maintain a balance between risks and rewards if the environment changes.  
The complexity of change  
 
One of the challenges of change is related to its complexity in the organisations involved in a 
strategic alliance. This is because each partner has to align with the other and work in a different 
way compared with their traditional manner of doing things. Each organisation has their own 
processes and systems, as reflected in the findings. Zucker (1977 cited in Ring and Van de Ven 
1994) explained this, arguing that withing organisations, formal and even informal processes that 
are institutionalised are difficult to change. It seems that expectations of change could be 
heightened when dealing with more than one organisation, as in the case of strategic alliances.  
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Exit 
 
The majority of interviewees in the findings showed that exit is a relevant aspect to consider 
when developing a strategic alliance. This category should be considered as a compulsory theme 
to discuss with partners involved in the process of developing a strategic alliance. A series of 
strategies were suggested: exit should be considered as a natural process in the strategic alliance, 
however sometimes this was overlooked and exit could be seen as an alternative to change. In 
light of this, Das and Teng (1999) suggested that exit clauses allow partners to leave the alliance 
when the market conditions change. The exit clauses should clearly identify what each party 
receives in case of termination or change in the relationship. The benefit of exit provisions is that 
they could diminish the likelihood of becoming embroiled in long and exhaustive disputes. 
Gulati et al. (2008) suggested promoting early discussions among partners on dissolution of the 
alliance and making an agreement on several exit clauses linked with contingencies. In that way, 
when the contingency occurs the exit clause and terms are activated in accordance with the 
nature of the circumstances. 
 
Legal-Regulatory problems and risks  
Technology and intellectual property issues 
Some interviewees pointed out the issues related to technology and intellectual property as a 
major concern. When conducting business in other countries, one of the main risks is to lose 
control over IP and technology. Strategies could be developed in order to protect technology and 
IP, such as to keep control over the process, provide a second-best technology, keep knowledge 
outside operations and keep developing technological advancements at a constant pace.  
The literature acknowledges that IP and technology are critical in the development of strategic 
alliances. Strategies to protect IP and technology have been identified, such as centralising 
contact points between the alliance and partners and sharing the highest costs and co-ordinating 
staff. By doing this dependance among partners increases, making it more difficult to avoid 
working together and strenghtening the ties (Bleeke and Ernst 1991).  
The need to protect technology and IP through contracts and strategies implies that issues 
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concerning the level of trust exist. Organisations act to protect technology and IP through 
guarantees, insurance mechanisms, laws and increasing their transaction costs (Ring and Van De 
Ven 1994). This highlights an interesting aspect that could contribute towards understanding 
why organisations enter into strategic alliances despite having concerns about losing control over 
technology and IP. It seems that the benefits of developing a business opportunity through 
strategic alliances offset the transaction costs related with protecting technology and IP by 
contractual means. There could also be an indication of the connections between risk aversion, 
trust and the search for growth. 
Culture 
 
Different organisatonal cultures 
 
Accounts from some interviewees in the findings showed the challenges that strategic alliances 
face when dealing with different cultures. Organisations have to face a process of change in 
order to accomodate different values and ways of working. If this accommodation is not 
achieved issues around alignment and conflict among partners could arise. 
 
Within the literature, the theme of culture has been studied in two dimensions - national cultural 
distance and organisational cultural distance. Hofstede (1980 cited in Christoffersen 2013 p. 75) 
defined national cultural distance as the ‘dissimilarities in beliefs, values, practices and 
behaviours shared by members of a nation’. Most authors agreed that national cultural distance 
‘incresases the risks of mistrust, misunderstandings, miscommunication and managerial 
conflicts’ (Glaister and Buckley 1999; Kim and Parkhe 2009; Makino et al. 2007, cited in 
Christoffersen 2013, p. 75). Makino and Beamish (1998) found that cultural distance was a 
major problem, identifiable in strategic alliances that failed. Contrary to this, from a resource-
based view approach, Beamish and Kachra (2004) suggested that cultural distance brings 
resource diversity and complementarity. These elements could increase the chances and potential 
of value creation.  
 
Meier (2011) found that in alliances pursuing the transfer of knowledge, differences in cultures 
could result in issues of communication among partners due to differences in languages, beliefs 
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and attitudes. These issues could be overcome if organisations were willing to be flexible and 
invest time and resources to improve their understanding of other cultures.  
Dealing with cultural issues 
Suggestions from some interviewees in the findings on dealing with cultural issues included 
running pilots to minimise risk exposure.  
When becoming involved with partners for the first time, it is better to start with informal deals 
that do not represent high levels of risk. If deals prove to be beneficial, further commitment 
could be made. This is a way to built trust. If partners rely on each other there are potential 
decreases in transaction costs due to a lower need for legal protection (Friedman and Alford 
1991, Van de Ven 1976, cited in Ring and Van de Ven 1994 p. 101). Killing (1988) suggested 
that starting with simpler alliances was also a way to develop a long-term relationship and could 
be a first step in developing more complex alliances. 
Other ways to build relationships are by embarking on alliances and setting specific milestones. 
Once achieved, this allows further commitments to take place and could be agreed via short-term 
recurrent contracts (Das and Teng 1999).  
Clarity 
In the findings, some interviewees cited that clarity is critical to success and that it facilitates 
alignment between partners. The metaphor of marriage was used to demonstrate that when there 
is clarity and alignment there is no need to look at the contracts. Kent (1991) suggested that 
clarity of purpose could have an effect on the performance of an alliance.  
Stakeholders 
 
Some interviewees highlighted the relevance of stakeholders (mainly government and 
communities) in the development of strategic alliances. Kale and Singh (2009) contended that 
society is increasingly attentive to the way firms serve the interests of their stakeholders. 
Because of the importance of communities, there is a new category of alliance developing with 
non-governmental organisations in order for firms to better understand the needs of 
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communities. Authors acknowledged that there is little research in this area. 
Trust 
 
According to some interviewees in the findings, a lack of trust in early stages could result in a 
strategic alliance failure. Despite trust not being mentioned frequently in the interviewes, issues 
related to trust were connected with other categories affecting performance. This has been 
discussed previously.  
Kale and Singh (2009) believed that developing trust in the post-formation stages of the strategic 
alliance was critical to success. This is because it facilitates the exchange of information, 
provides a perception of more certainty and increases the willingness of partners to adapt to a 
change in circumstance. This ultimately facilitates the relationship among partners. 
Leadership 
A perception that the role of the leaders was critical to manage different cultures, stakeholders’ 
interest, align organisations and to provide clarity to strategic alliances was pointed out by one 
interviewee in the findings. This was important because it showed a connection between 
leadership, alignment and clarity. Li et al. (2002) argued that effectiveness in top management 
teams is critical to success because there are sizeable challenges in dealing with strategic 
alliances in the international context - such as difference in cultures, ways of managing and 
dealing with different objectives. Kent’s (1991) study suggested maintaining leadership in the 
development of alliances ensures a better communication process. He furthermore offered that 
being more sensitive to stakeholders increases the probability of success. It seems that more 
research on the leadership and management of alliances is needed. 
Influence 
 
The following findings relate to influence. Greater detail can be found in Chapter six, preceding. 
An advancement derived from the process approach taken in this thesis is to integrate the 
external and internal influence in the development of strategic alliances as part of the process.  
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External 
 
External influence plays an important role in the development of strategic alliances. Some 
interviewees in the findings highlighted the dual role of both government and markets. 
Governments on the one hand encourage the development of strategic alliances, while, on the 
other, constrain terms and conditions for their development. China and Egypt were provided as 
examples. Gomes-Casseres (1987) claimed that goverments in some countries have imposed 
restrictions on foreign investment, encouraging the development of a strategic alliance as a mode 
of entry. This seems to apply to the energy industry - countries that are starting to develop their 
natural resources create national oil companies to be a compulsory partner in agreements with 
other companies.  Uganda is a recent example (Development 2015). At the same time, political 
sanctions in some countries impose constraints on companies from certain nationalities in 
developing strategic alliances. Iran and Russia were mentioned in conjunction with this. 
 
Markets could also play a dual role and the case of Japan was mentioned by one interviewee in 
the findings. This example has been cited in the literature as a domesticated market - ‘the 
somewhat derogatory term “Japan, Inc.” is used to denote a complex system of domesticated 
markets. This system is charged with stimulating exports while subsidising domestic producers 
and barring imports of manufactured goods. The core of the Japanese trade system is the “silk 
curtain”- the intricate, fine-spun networks of manufacturers, middlemen, bankers, and 
government agencies’ (Arndt 1979 p. 71). 
 
It seems that this dual role could have an effect on the performance of strategic alliances. If 
partners are selected as a requirement from governments rather than on their characteristics, it 
could offer a research opportunity on how compulsory partnerships affect performance in 
strategic alliances. 
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Internal (Executives & Managers) 
 
The majority of respondents in the findings showed that executives could influence the 
performance of strategic alliances in various ways, such as support and endorsement and in 
selecting the right people to manage the alliance.  
Li et al. (2002) found that some authors had studied the challenges facing top management 
teams. These challenges included dillemas of loyalty, commitment and organisational identity 
and are mainly due to having to deal with a complex system with different cultures and 
expectations. This has been studied with social identity theory, considering both the satisfaction 
of the person and the effectiveness of the organisation. It becomes more complex for strategic 
alliances because more that one organisation is involved. Studies have been developed regarding 
loyalty to the parent or the alliance. These studies have produced different results. Li et al found 
that some authors argued that managers are more commited to the alliance than to the parent, 
however Fraine and Geringer (1995) found the opposite. According to Li et al, there is a need to 
conduct more research on how this plays out when more than two partners are involved. It was 
suggested that less conflict could occur due to a dilution in the identity strength of just two 
partners, thus decreasing the stress for managers. 
The degree of freedom of managers emerged from some respondents in the findings as another 
constraint. This is interesting because, during pre-formation stages of the alliance, a structure is 
selected that might constrain the future management of the alliance. Authors who have studied 
this include Glaister et al (2003). They acknowledged that managers of strategic alliances are 
constrained by the parents. Reuer et al (2014) argued that boards delegate more to local strategic 
alliance managers in international strategic alliances because of the uncertainty and lack of 
knowledge in the environment. Bleake and Ernst (1991) claimed that a requirement for alliances 
to work is to provide enough resources, to appoint a person in charge who can be trusted and to 
give him freedom to accomplish the endeavour. Killing (1988) added that if freedom is 
constrained the chances of failure increase.  
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Exploring how the internal and external contexts shape the development process of strategic 
alliances from a process approach with interviewees advanced the understanding of how the 
internal and external influence impacts the performance of strategic alliances (Pettigrew 1997) 
 
Skills 
 
There were a variety of thoughts in the findings regarding the difference in skills between a 
manager of an organisation and a manager of an alliance. The literature is in line with the belief 
that managers of strategic alliances require different skills. Killing (1988) argued that managers 
of alliances required these different skills because tasks and processes are more complex when 
more that one organisation is involved. Gulati (2012) claimed that for alliances to be successful, 
managers should have ‘political skills, legal expertise, diplomacy, and psychological acumen’ (p. 
532). 
 
The findings outline a set of skills that are desirable for a manager in the energy industry. This 
offers new points of view on the need for soft skills despite the rational leanings of decision 
makers in the industry. 
 
Prospects for the future of strategic alliances 
 
Scenarios, motives and challenges 
 
The majority of respondents in the findings suggested that strategic alliances would continue 
where the role of national oil companies could increase benefits derived from pursuing an 
internationalisational strategy and enhancing competitiveness. The rational for entering strategic 
alliances would be similar where a herd effect could be anticipated; if strategic alliances are 
perceived to be successful, more companies would pursue their development. However, the 
sustainability of this is questionable. Challenges are related to culture and different financial 
expectations, technology and the difficulty in managing portfolios, disruptive change, and 
stakeholders (especially communities having a louder voice in the development of strategic 
alliances). 
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Das (2001) found that decisions to enter strategic alliances could be influenced by mimetic 
behaviours. Pfeffer (2003) claimed that competition increases the pressure of imitating other 
organisations’ strategies. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) claimed that organisations tend to mimic 
organisational models that are perceived to be successful. 
 
The perception of the future of strategic alliances is influenced by the context and believes in the 
initial stages. This departs from the idea that ‘the legacy of the past is always shaping the 
emerging future’ (Pettigrew 1997 p. 339). Scenario development is an aspect which could be 
integrated as part of the process of strategic alliance development as a way to create common 
understanding and vision of the future and challenges that a strategic alliance might face. This is 
considered in the holistic process model presented in the contribution section of this chapter. 
 
Contribution 
 
According to Corley & Gioia (2011 p.17), ‘theory reveals what we otherwise had not seen, 
known or conceived… that new theory allows to see profoundly, imaginatively, 
unconventionally into phenomena we thought we understood’, that scientific utility ‘is perceived 
as an advance that improves conceptual rigor or the specificity of an idea and/or enhances its 
potential to be operationalized and tested’ and practical utility because ‘theory can be directly 
applied to the problems practicing managers…face’ (Corley and Gioia 2011, p18). My research 
is positioned in the upper quadrants of Figure 7.3, which relate to revelation for science and for 
practice. This is because it takes a cultural and process theory approach to work and develops a 
holistic multiperspective process model to understand and enhance the performance of strategic 
alliances. Process theory contributed to looking at how strategic alliances are developed through 
the lens of those with strategic alliance experience in the energy sector. By using process theory, 
temporal progressions of activities were incorporated as elements to explain and understand 
strategic alliances (Langley, Smallman et al. 2013). The narrative surrounding strategic alliances 
can also aid an understanding of their performance by constructing cultural visions among 
different individuals who has been involved in their development (Reichie et al 2010, Giorgi et al 
2015). This research also has practical implications in preventing problems and suggesting 
possible solutions to make strategic alliances work more effectively in the energy sector. 
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Figure 7-3.- Theoretical Contribution 
 
Source:  Adapted from Corley & Gioia  (2011)  
My research applied new theories and approaches in the field of strategic alliances. It is accepted 
that the development and implementation process is more complex in this field because there is 
more than one organisation involved. External factors and individuals from different 
organisations can influence the performance of the strategic alliance. From the standpoint of 
practice, the energy industry has been using strategic alliances and it would seem that this use is 
going to increase in the future. Therefore, this research’s enhanced understanding provides 
insight that could be useful to improve managerial practice. In the following sections the 
contribution is explained in more detail. 
A second contribution is that this research provides a holistic approach, from the perspective of 
those with experience, to understanding the performance of strategic alliances in the energy 
sector. A holistic perspective means that it integrates the early and most recent concerns of 
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researchers from a process approach, it incorporates the external and internal influences, the 
environment and the prospects for the future of strategic alliances. This is achieved through the 
integration of the key elements of strategic alliances, such as meaning, types and motives, how 
decisions are made to enter a strategic alliance, the selection of a partner, portfolio of alliances, 
the internal and external influences and looking at the future and challenges of strategic 
alliances. I will now elaborate on the contribution to practice and theory and explain the 
multiperspective process dynamic model that is developed integrating the key elements of this 
research. 
 
Contribution to theory 
 
• Provides research that takes a cultural and process theory approach to understand and 
enhance the performance of strategic alliances. 
• Increases the number of qualitative studies in the field and provides specific research to 
understand the performance of strategic alliances in the energy industry.  
• Provides a model that could be used to integrate the various theoretical approaches used 
by researchers in the field. These researchers are concerned about the fragmentation of 
research on strategic alliances. 
• The research design of this study could be replicated in other areas of the extractive 
industry in order to develop comparisons and a learning process of experiences.  
• This research has highlighted additional elements in contributing to the understanding of 
alliances at the portfolio level (Wassmer 2010). 
 
Contribution to practice 
 
• Provides managerial practice with an understanding of the problems associated with 
strategic alliances in the energy sector from the perspective of individuals with 
experience in the field. 
• This model contributes to the advancement of the models already developed. This is 
achieved by incorporating the external and internal influences and data categories that 
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emerged from the findings. It acknowledges additional factors that are of concern in the 
energy industry and considers the future for strategic alliances as part of the analysis.  
• It is useful as a guide to design the strategic alliance and also to direct the pre-formation, 
formation and implementation process by looking at the variables that can influence the 
performance of strategic alliances.  
• It could be applied as a reference in the process of pursuing acquisitions (Kale and Singh 
2009). 
 
The following section provides detail of the proposed conceptual dynamic model of strategic 
alliances.  
 
Conceptual holistic dynamic multi-perspective process model of strategic alliances 
 
The final contribution of this research is the holistic conceptual dynamic multi-perspective 
process model of strategic alliances that is built from the cultural and process theory approach. It 
integrates the theoretical approach, the literature review, the findings of this research, and my 
personal experience in the field.  
 
The model is illustrated in the following figure.  
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Figure 7-4.- Conceptual holistic dynamic multi-perspective process model of strategic alliances 
 
 
 
 
The conceptual holistc dynamic multi-perspective process model has theoretical and practical 
implications. It integrates and organises the themes that were considered in the research: concept, 
process, performance, influence and prospects of strategic alliances. The arrows represent an 
iterative process that travels in both directions and demonstrate the influence of:  
1. External and internal factors in the definition of concept and meaning of the alliance, the type 
of structure to be selected, motives and rationale to enter the alliance;  
2. Process, decision to enter a strategic alliance, and management of alliance portfolio;  
3. Performance, measurement of strategic alliances, problem identification, risks, critical factors, 
failure and success assisted by the categories that emerged from the findings;  
4. Prospect of the strategic alliances that is influenced by perceptions of performance and at the 
same time perceptions influence the other elements and the external and internal factors.  
The conceptual dynamic multi-perspective process model could be expanded to inform the 
interrelationships among multiple organisations involved in a strategic alliance. Process theory 
enables understanding of how strategic alliances emerge, change and unfold over time, and the 
reasons for their evolution (Langley 1999; Langley et al. 2013); this contribute to understanding 
the performance of strategic alliances. The following figure illustrate this. 
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Figure 7-5.- Expanded Conceptual holistic dynamic multi-perspective process model  of strategic 
alliances 
 
 
 
 
 
From a theoretical perspective, the model could be used to incoportate the theoretical approaches 
that have been used to study strategic alliances in academia so far. This model provides a range 
of new insights, particularly in the pre-alliance stage, for further research and theoretical 
development.  
 
For example theories and approaches identified in the literature are illustrated in the following 
table. There is the opportunity to add other elements of the model with their theoretical 
approaches used so far. 
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Table 7-3.- Theories & approaches of strategic alliances in the literature 
Topic Theories/approaches 
Motives Domesticated markets, market attractiveness and organisational power 
(transaction cost, strategic behaviour and organisational theory), 
interorganisational Exchange behaviour and resource dependency, 
inteorganisational relationships, resource based view (Arnd 1979, Kogut 
1988, Williamson 1981, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, Oliver 1990, Barney 
1991)  
Internal 
influence 
Institutional theory, logics, agency theory, social identity; (Nippa 2007, 
Thornton et al. 2012, Li et al. 2002); 
Portfolio of 
alliances 
Social network theory, organizational learning in general, 
exploration/exploitation framework, resource-based view of the firm, 
dynamic capabilities, knowledge-based view, relational view, evolutionary 
economics, transactions cost economics, agency theory, contingency theory, 
coevolutionary perspective, contract theory, real options, and resource 
dependency theory (Wassmer 2010),  
 
From a practical perspective, I can see that the model could be utilised in the formation and post-
formation stages of a strategic alliance by a company or companies interested in developing a 
strategic alliance. This would assist in reaching a common understanding of the factors around 
the development and implementation of a strategic alliance. Discussions could be augmented 
through the use of the diagrams developed in the findings chapters.  
 
The model has a flow where an organisation begins by defining the concept of the strategic 
alliance in terms of meaning, type of structure, motives. This is followed by the decision to enter 
a strategic alliance, selection of partner, evaluation of their portfolio in terms of coherence and 
congruence with other alliances. It considers taking internal and external influences into account 
in the design of the governance of the alliance, also considering the environment and prospects. 
Here, scenario planning could be used not only for one organisation but also for all the 
organisations involved as a way to create a shared vision. This analysis has been informed by 
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rich insights from highly experienced respondents. The schematic representation of the findings 
offers models, guidelines and prescriptions for the creation and management of strategic 
alliances in the energy sector.  
 
This model is dynamic. It can therefore be applied to all the stages of alliance: pre-formation, 
formation, implementation and also as a retrospective model for analysis on performance. The 
model can thus contribute to managerial practice. 
 
Limitations and further research 
 
Limitations 
 
I discussed the findings with one of my interviewees, and with other individuals with experience 
in strategic alliances, and received positive feedback on its contribution to practice. If more time 
were available, further discussions with other interviewees could take place to fine-tune the 
model. 
 
Access to information is another limitation. Information on details and perceptions of people 
working in strategic alliances are not available in the public arena. It is also challenging to 
engage participants. This was commented on by one of the interviewees in an informal 
conversation when talking about the research and people who might be interested. One of the big 
challenges is to convince people to share their thoughts on this topic. This information is 
considered commercially sensitive and the energy industry seems to be generally closed to the 
scrutiny of researchers.  
 
Related to access to information is the limitation of the sample size. A qualitative study takes 
intensive use of resources and it takes time to identify participants, therefore a big sample size is 
not possible. The objective was to get as many participants as possible within a specific 
timeframe. Nevertheless a small sample facilitated obtaining in-depth accounts of the experience 
of people in the development of strategic alliances in the energy sector. The cumulative and 
multidisciplinary perspective of the interviewees allowed a rich and detailed data content. 
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Futher Research 
 
The field of strategic alliances is a fascinating area of research, mainly because more than one 
organisation is involved. This departs from conventional understanding on how a single 
organisation behaves. I share the view of Olk (2006) that there is more work to be done in the 
area of understanding performance; the following are some opportunities that I have identified 
for further research and would build on the research I have developed.  
 
As discussed previously, the conceptual dynamic multi-perspective process model developed 
with this research offers opportunities to enhance the understanding of strategic alliances. It 
could be used as a framework in the development of strategic alliances and could be tested 
empirically in a longitudinal case as a way to to build a more general theory (Ring and Van de 
Ven 1994, Hong et al 2009). It could then be reviewed to integrate other important features that 
may have been ommited in this work. 
 
The research design of the qualitative study developed could be applied to other industries and 
within similar sectors in the extractive industry. For example, in mining to develop comparisons 
between findings in order to identify how the performance of strategic alliances is influenced by 
sectors that share some commonality. 
 
Some links emerged amongst the categories influencing the performance of strategic alliances. 
These links could be reviewed in order to interpret their connections and test them. 
 
The area of alliance portfolio has been identified requiring further study. This provided some 
insight on how alliance portfolios are developed in the energy sector. However, more research is 
indeed required due to the importance of the portfolio in the performance of an organisation. 
 
There was a belief held that the scientific background of the energy industry influences the 
characteristics expected in the selection of a partner. I did not find, in the literature reviewed, any 
evidence that the science-based nature of the industry influenced the criteria used to select 
partners. 
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Leadership was identified as critical in the management of different cultures, stakeholders’ 
interests, alignment of organisations to provide clarity in strategic alliances. However, the topic 
of leadership in strategic alliances requires further research as I was not able to locate much 
literature in this area. 
 
External influence imposed by governments on the dynamics of strategic alliances is an area that 
could be pursued in further research. Governments can influence the selection of partners and, 
considering selection of partners as critical, it would be interesting to develop research on 
constraints in partner selection and their effect on the performance of strategic alliances.  
 
The influence of stakeholders in the development of strategic alliances is increasing, especially 
as the role of communities gathers impetus. It seems that more research is required in order to 
understand the needs of communities and their influence on the performance of strategic 
alliances. 
 
Conclusions 
 
The energy industry is perceived differently from other industries. This is due to the relative 
importance of countries in terms of natural resources and because of the scientific culture typical 
within the industry. These two factors have implications on the way strategic alliances are 
perceived from internal and external viewpoints. From an external perspective, governments take 
more care and pay more attention as to how actors work in the development of the industry. In 
most instances where a government participates in the development of the resources, it is directly 
through a national company in a strategic alliance, through regulation or requiring companies to 
partner with local companies. This gives rise to a question as to which kind of role should a 
government play and how. It seems that a case-by-case approach should be applied, as every 
country is different in terms of their natural resources, development of the industry, economic 
wealth and technology. As this is a commodities industry, price influences the bargaining power 
of governments and companies, influences co-operation among them and consequently 
influences the development of strategic alliances. 
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The findings and literature share the view that each strategic alliance is unique; there is no single 
definition. There are, however, different types of strategic alliance and this could contribute to 
thinking about strategic alliances as complex. In a dynamic and uncertain environment there is a 
need for flexibility and the capacity to adapt to accomodate change. The selection of the type of 
strategic alliance influences the degree of freedom in their management. This points to the 
degree of influence of the individual over the organisation and suggests looking at this while 
considering institutional theory, institutional logics and issues around agency theory.  
 
Diversity is present in the decision-making process as to whether or not to enter a strategic 
alliance. There are also elements of legitimacy and trust raised by bringing people outside 
organisations in to make decisions. The fact that complexity increased as the number of partners 
increased was highlighted in the findings. However, different positions were taken in the 
literature. Some authors argued that complexity was not relevant, but positioned the skills of 
managers as key to managing alliances with a greater number of partners. Findings provided 
some insight and tools on how to manage an alliance portfolio and concurred with the literature 
in terms of the competition of alliances over resources. More research is needed in this area.  
 
The measurement of performance is complex and requires a multiperspective approach including 
softer metrics and taking stakeholders’ preferences into consideration. Partnering is multifaceted; 
managing more than one organisation is difficult because of differing cultures and ways of 
working. A sense of equity as regards rewards for each partner impacts performance. Change is 
natural, expectations, interests and objectives shift; failure could be a perception; and change is 
complex. Exit could be an option in pursuing change and terms of exit should be agreed in 
advance. Several exit clauses to be linked with contingencies were suggested. Trust was a 
category infrequently mentioned; however, it emerged in relation to other categories. Leadership 
is key to the performance of strategic alliances - it seems that there is an opportunity to develop 
further research in this area. 
 
Managers in alliances are constrained by the structure selected for the alliance. They face a 
dilemma over loyalty to the parent organisation, have some concerns about the future of their 
career and expect endorsement from the executives, who influence the alliance. This influence 
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stems from their decisions on the structure and the people selected to manage the alliance. 
Therefore, the skills of managers are important to enhance performance. The expectation is that 
strategic alliances are going to continue to be a favoured option for strategic development. The 
drivers for entering strategic alliances will continue to strengthen and we will witness increasing 
participation by community stakeholder groups.  
 
My contribution lies in taking a cultural and process theory approach to develop a conceptual 
holistic dynamic multi-perspective process model of strategic alliances, integrating the 
theoretical approach, the literature review, the findings of this research and my personal 
experience in the field. The model consolidates and organises the themes that were considered by 
the research and provides a framework to analyse strategic alliances and understand 
performance. This model departs from the conventional models of strategic alliances by 
integrating other elements that impact alliances’ performance. This research has practical 
implications for preventing problems and posing possible solutions to make strategic alliances in 
the energy sector work more effectively.  
There were some limitations on time and access to information. Further research is suggested 
and opportunities to test the model proposed in a longintudinal study. There is much work to be 
done in the area of strategic alliances and this thesis provides a foundation for ongoing research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
270 
CHAPTER 8 ‘CONCLUSION’ 
 
 
Economical, technological, information, social and political factors are driving 
organisations to pursue different forms in order to respond more quickly to a dynamic and 
changing environment. Internationalising firms are strengthening internal networks among 
functions, divisions, countries and regions in order to speed the transfer of knowledge and 
skills. Organisations are investing in alliances and other partnerships to compete through 
co-operation (Pettigrew, Massini et al. 2000). Co-operative strategies are a means to 
creating strategic change; the influence of strategic alliances is expected to continue 
(Harrigan 1988; Harrigan 2015). 
Strategic alliances are regarded as a new form of organisation in some industries, and the 
pace of growth in the last decades has been significant. (Das and Teng 1999; Ernst 2003; 
Kale and Singh 2009). In the energy sector, strategic alliances are not new (Kent 1991). 
This sector, especially within the petroleum industry, has been characterised as a high-risk 
industry. This is due to either the technical challenges embedded in the nature of the 
activity or because of the geopolitical issues related with to location of natural resources. 
To face the challenges of this industry, strategic alliances have been employed since the 
outset (Yergin 2012). Their development is exptected to increase (Van Grondelle 2012, 
World National Oil Companies Conference 2013). Despite their popularity, however, the 
failure rate for strategic alliances in most industries is high (Dacin, Hitt et al. 1997; Das and 
Teng 1999; Langfield Smith 2008; Walter, Lechner et. Al 2008; Kale and Singh 2009; 
Gulati, Wohlgezozen et al. 2012).  
Strategic alliances were considered as hybrid organisations, that is, those which involve 
resources or governance structures from at least two organisations (Borys and Jemison). 
This makes them more complex to manage than a single organisation due to differences in 
culture, language, ways of working and expectations (Ring and Van de Ven 1994, Li et al. 
2002). 
The findings and literature suggest each strategic alliance is unique - there is no a single 
definition. There are different types of strategic alliance and this could contribute to 
viewing strategic alliances as complex. In a dynamic and uncertain environment there is a 
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need for flexibility and the capacity to adapt and accommodate change. The selection of the 
type of strategic alliance influences the degree of freedom to manage them. This highlights 
the degree of influence of the individual over the organisation and suggests considering this 
in the light of institutional theory, institutional logics and agency theory.  
 
As shown in the literature, different schools of thought have presented various explanations 
of the motives for organisations to enter into strategic alliances. Earlier researchers 
grounded this in economic benefit and reduction of risk. Some others cited the benefits of 
maintaining freedom as a reason not to enter a strategic alliance, relegating such alliances 
as a second best option. Others argued that international cooperation and benefits such as 
market development and return of investment were important for their development, also 
mentioning some government mandates enforcing cooperation. My study fits with these 
schools of thoughts and shows that, in the energy industry, the arguments of all these 
schools of thought emerged in the findings. On the one hand they highlighted the benefits 
of developing strategic alliances and on the other identified the internal and external 
influence on performance - sometimes encouraging development and in other instances 
imposing constraint. 
 
Measurement of performance was also found to be complex and requires a multiperspective 
approach including softer metrics and taking in consideration stakeholders’ preferences. 
Partnering is complex; managing more than one organisation is difficult because they have 
different cultures and ways of working, the sense of equity on rewards for each partner 
impact performance. Change is natural and complex, expectations, interests and objectives 
shift and failure could be merely a perception. 
Managers in alliances are constrained by the structure selected for the alliance, they face a 
dilemma over loyalty to the parent organisation, have some concerns about their career 
future, and expect endorsement from executives, who influence alliance through their 
decisions on the structure and the selection of people to manage the alliance, therefore 
skills of managers are important to enhance performance. The likelihood is that strategic 
alliances, and the rationale for implanting them, is going to continue to be relevant. The 
increasing participation of communities in these complex business decisions is also an 
important factor for consideration.  
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The significance of this study is that it makes four contributions to the literature, theory and 
practice on strategic alliances in the energy sector. Firstly, I took a cultural and process 
theory approach to understand the performance of strategic alliances, how and why they 
succeed or fail (Reichie et al 2010; Langley et al. 2013; Giorgi et al 2015).  As a second 
contribution, this research integrated hitherto fragmented literature on strategic alliances 
and provided new data, through the lens of experienced practitioners in the energy sector, 
on how strategic alliances are developed.  Thirdly, it provided an agenda for future research 
into strategic alliances from an institutional perspective.  The fourth contribution was the 
provision of a multi-perspective process framework that will assist practitioners in 
managing strategic alliances in the energy sector. 
From a practical perspective, this framework could be used in the formation and post-
formation stages of a strategic alliance. It would be invaluable to an organisation interested 
in developing a strategic alliance or to various organisations together in order to reach a 
common understanding of the issues around the development and implementation of a 
strategic alliance. Discussions could be assisted through the use of the diagrams developed 
in the findings’ chapters.  
 
The framework has a flow where an organisation starts defining the concept in terms of 
meaning, type of structure and motives. This is followed by the decision-making stage in 
entering a strategic alliance - selection of partner, looking at their portfolio in terms of 
coherence and congruence with other alliances. The framework considers looking at 
internal and external influences to design the governance of the alliance and also takes 
account of environmental factors. Scenario planning could be used here, not only for one 
organisation, but also for all the organisations involved as a way to create a shared vision of 
possible future scenarios. The data analysis contained in this thesis has facilitated the 
development of a strategic alliance process model. This is made dynamic through the 
inclusion of guidelines and detailed insights extracted from depth interviews conducted 
with highly experienced managers from the energy sector.  
 
This dynamic framework can be used in all stages of the alliance - pre-formation, 
formation, throughout the implementation stage and also as a retrospective model for 
analysis on performance, thus contributing to managerial practice. 
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Not having a common understanding of a strategic alliance makes it more complex to 
manage and measure its performance. It is advisable, whenever entering a strategic alliance, 
to set and agree the meaning of that strategic alliance: what the alliance is and what it is 
not. At the same time, this heterogeneity of meaning helps us to understand that the 
experience of developing a strategic alliance is unique. It can be said that ‘whenever you 
have seen a strategic alliance you have seen just one’.  
 
Restrictions imposed by governments or international organisations prevent the 
development of strategic alliances or limit the areas where certain companies can develop 
business. However, at the same time, governments play a dual role by encouraging the 
development of strategic alliances as the only access to natural resources in their countries. 
They also sometimes constrain the selection of partners which is a critical aspect to the 
performance of strategic alliances.  Stakeholders, and especially communities, are 
increasing their influence in the development of strategic alliances. 
 
Alliance portfolio is an area that requires greater attention. Organisations which follow 
fashions and take mimetic behaviours on the basis that strategic alliances are the way to do 
business need to be careful. The time and resources involved in managing strategic 
alliances could be high and could distract from core business. The challenge is, therefore, to 
find the right balance of the number of alliances that could improve the performance of an 
organisation as a whole.  
 
It is suggested that the development of strategic alliances is an incremental process of 
learning and reflection. There is no prescriptive method of developing strategic alliances.  
The managerial mindset required needs to be adaptive while the imperative to maintain 
alignment is upheld.  
 
This PhD journey started in September 2012 and has been a very interesting process. I 
started the journey with several questions and ideas in the field of strategic alliances. These 
were refined in the years that I have been involved in developing alliances. A further 
challenge was to understand the academic world and the requirements that are imposed to 
develop a PhD.  
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This was a process that developed my skills for independent research by looking at the 
tools and sources available to understand, conceptualise and implement a research design 
based in a qualitative approach. Applying this to the energy industry, where words are not 
subjectively interpreted, demanded a different sensitivity from my scientific-engineer 
background. I needed to develop the strategies to engage participants in the study and 
present the progress of my research to different audiences. For instance as a guest lecturer I 
received questions and comments that were useful to advance my research up to this stage.  
 
There is more work and further research to be done in the field of strategic alliances; I 
anticipate that this thesis will be a stepping-stone to developing the research agenda that 
could advance our understanding of the performance of strategic alliances.  
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APPENDICES  
Chapter 3 
Appendix 3-1.- Research questions development process details 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question Topic Social Research Purpose
What is going to happen in the future with Strategic alliances in the energy sector? Change Understand
What are possible solutions to make Sas perform better?? Change Understand
Why strategic alliances are important in the energy sector? Concept Understand
What is a strategic alliance? Concept Understand
What are the types of strategic alliances? Concept Understand
What are the pros and cons of each type of strategic alliance?? Concept Understand
What is the process to develop a strategic alliance in a company? (Is it different between private-private vs private-state
companies?) (Look for flexibility) Decision Understand
How is assessed the convenience to develop a SA? Decision Understand
How are decisions made for the different stages of the SA? Decision Understand
How are decisions made to enter or not into a strategic alliance? Decision Understand
How is considered the context (economical, political, social…) when developing a SA? (Look at the relation with Host-
Governments) Influence Understand
What are the external constraints that influence their perspective? Influence Understand
How can people involve in Strategic alliances help to make them better? Influence Understand
Why do companies enter into strategic alliances? Motives Understand
Which are the motives to get into a strategic alliance? Motives Understand
What is the criteria to partner? (or develop project/business alone) Partner Understand
How is developed the selection of a partner? Partner Understand
What are the main characteristics for selecting a partner? Partner Understand
How are performance indicators established and measured? (Can they change over time?) Performance Understand
Why do strategic alliances succeed or fail? Performance Understand
What are the risks of strategic alliances?? Performance Understand
How to measure performance of a strategic alliance? Performance Understand
What are the critical factors while developing a strategic alliance? Performance Understand
What factors are the main determinants of success or failure? Performance Understand
How many stages in the strategic alliance process are considered? Process Understand
How is conducted the learning process during the operation of a SA? Process Understand
How is this learning process transferred to other SAs in the company? How and when? Process Understand
How is a portfolio of SAs managed? Process Understand
What are the main problems in a Strategic alliance? Process Understand
What are the main challenges?? Process Understand
How is the communication process developed in the SAs? Process Understand
How is the decision process developed? Process Understand
How is taken in consideration the natural evolution and change of the SAs in the contracts? Process Understand
How is organised a company to analyse/assess strategic alliances? (Do the company has a special area in charge of the strategic
alliance process or is it hired a third party?) Structure Understand
How is structured the company (upstream, downstream) is there a difference in the way SAs are developed among the different
business units??) Structure Understand
How is designed the structure of a strategic alliance? (at different stages) Structure Understand
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Appendix 3-2.- Participant information Sheet 
TITLE OF PROJECT: 
 
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES IN THE ENERGY SECTOR; 
‘UNDERSTANDING PERFORMANCE AMONG STRATEGIC 
ALLIANCES IN THE ENERGY SECTOR FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF 
PROCESS THEORIES OF CHANGE’ 
 
 
INVITATION TO TAKE PART IN A RESEARCH STUDY 
 
You are being asked to take part in a research study, the purpose of which is to understand 
performance among strategic alliances in the energy sector by collecting the experiences and 
perspectives of key individuals working or who have worked in strategic alliances in the sector. I 
am a PhD candidate from the University of Dundee, sponsored by Pemex (The National Oil 
Company from Mexico).  My supervisors are Professor Graeme Martin and Doctor Ian Robson. 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project.  Please read this information sheet carefully 
before deciding whether or not to participate.  If you decide to participate a consent form is 
attached, please complete it and return it to me (directly, by post or electronically). However, if you 
decide not to take part I thank you for considering my request.  
 
PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH STUDY 
 
Strategic alliances are a method of collaboration among energy firms that is becoming increasingly 
popular. However, the failure rate for such collaborations is high, sometimes estimated at 70%.  
Despite this, the reasons for failure are not well understood. Thus, the purpose of this research is to 
help fill this gap by investigating factors underlying failure and success among strategic alliances as 
understood by those who have been involved in one way or another in these collaborations. 
 
Your participation would assist me greatly in achieving the purpose of this research. Participation in 
this study is voluntary and you would not receive any remuneration or reward. However, it will also 
be of benefit to you because you will have access to the findings from this project. 
 
Participants have been selected to take part in the study on the basis that they have been directly 
involved in a strategic alliance in the energy sector. You have been invited on the basis that you are 
or have been deeply involved with strategic alliances.  
 
TIME COMMITMENT 
 
You will be asked to take part in an interview, face to face or by telephone/Skype, and/or focus 
group, which will take between 1-2 hours at a convenient location to be determined. 
  
The purpose of the interview is to gain an in depth understanding of your experiences, positive and 
negative about participating in strategic alliances, whereas the focus groups would be used to follow 
up on key themes arising from individual interviews concerning strategic alliances, this would be 
done at a later stage of this project. The focus group would be developed among members of the 
same organization, and could have as many as 8 participants. You would be given the option of 
participating in one of them or both (interview and/or focus group). 
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TERMINATION OF PARTICIPATION 
 
You may decide to withdraw from the research study at any time without explanation.  
 
RISKS 
 
I am unaware of any risks for you in this study, but I invite you to raise any concerns you have 
directly with me. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY/ANONYMITY 
 
The researcher will take notes of the meetings, and will audio tape them, but the tapes will be used 
only to confirm the notes taken. A Transcriptions Service use by the School would make the 
transcriptions. Notes, tapes and transcriptions will be stored securely in password-protected 
computer, and will be destroyed after the conclusion of the project. 
 
The data we collect do not contain any personal information about you. Everything that you say 
during the interview and/or focus group would be kept anonymous.  
No one will link the data you provided to your identity and name. 
 
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT THIS RESEARCH STUDY 
 
I will be glad to answer your questions about this study at any time.  
 
If you have any questions about this research, either now or in the future, please feel free to contact 
either myself or my Supervisors: 
 
Joaquin Figueroa Gallardo 
Carnegie Building 
University of Dundee 
Nethergate 
Dundee  
DD1 4HN 
j.r.figueroagallardo@dundee.ac.uk 
Professor Graeme Martin 
Carnegie Building 
University of Dundee 
Nethergate 
Dundee  
DD1 4HN 
G.Martin@dundee.ac.uk 
Dr Ian Robson 
Carnegie Building 
University of Dundee 
Nethergate 
Dundee  
DD1 4HN 
I.Robson@dundee.ac.uk 
The University Research Ethics Committee of the University of Dundee has reviewed and approved this 
research study. 
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Appendix 3-3.- Informed Consent Form 
TITLE OF PROJECT: STRATEGIC ALLIANCES IN THE ENERGY 
SECTOR, ‘UNDERSTANDING PERFORMANCE AMONG STRATEGIC 
ALLIANCES IN THE ENERGY SECTOR FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF 
PROCESS THEORIES OF CHANGE’ 
 
Strategic alliances are a method of collaboration that is becoming more popular. However, the 
success rate for such collaborations is not high.  Moreover the reasons for relative failure are not 
well understood, particularly in the energy sector. The purpose of this research is to understand 
factors related to performance among strategic alliances in the energy sector by collecting the 
experiences and perspectives of managers and other core employees in developing strategic 
alliances in this sector. 
 
I have been given a copy of the research project on ‘Strategic Alliances in the Energy Sector’ 
information sheet, explaining this research project and its different types it is carrying out, and 
giving a named contact for the work going on in my area. 
 
I understand the purpose of the research is to gain an understanding of the performance of strategic 
alliances in the energy sector.  
 
I am willing to participate in: an interview / a focus group  (Circle as appropriate) 
 
I understand that the purpose of the interview is to gain a in depth understanding of my experience, 
positive and negative about participating in strategic alliances, whereas the focus groups would be 
used to follow up on key themes arising from individual interviews concerning strategic alliances. 
The focus group would be developed among members of my organization, and could have as many 
as 8 participants. 
 
I understand that participation on this research is voluntary and that I would not receive any 
remuneration or reward. 
 
I understand that I will not be identified in any reports, papers or other documents produced in 
relation to this project. I understand that if I wish, I can take part in this research but not be 
identified by name. 
 
I understand that I can withdraw my consent to participate at any time. 
 
I understand that I will be given information about the outcomes of the project on request from the 
researchers who invited me to participate. 
 
In particular, I understand that the researcher will take notes of the meetings, and will audio tape 
them, but the tapes will be used only to confirm the notes taken. A Transcription Service use by the 
School would make the transcriptions. Notes, tapes and transcriptions will be stored securely in 
password-protected computer, and will be destroyed after the conclusion of the project. 
 
I understand that the researcher might use extracts of the interviews in publications or in his thesis 
on the basis that no individual will be identified in the text. Therefore:  
I agree  o  or  disagree o   on this. (tick as appropriate) 
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I agree to participate in this basis, and I understand that this consent form will be stored securely 
and separately form the tapes and notes of the meetings I attend. 
 
By signing below you are agreeing that you have read and understood the Participant Information 
Sheet and that you agree to take part in this research study.  
 
 
 
 
_________________________________                 _________________ 
 
 
Participant’s name & signature   Date 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________   
Joaquin Rafael Figueroa Gallardo  
Signature of person obtaining consent  
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Appendix 3-4.- Interview briefing 
TITLE OF PROJECT: 
	
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES IN THE ENERGY SECTOR; ‘UNDERSTANDING 
PERFORMANCE AMONG STRATEGIC ALLIANCES IN THE ENERGY SECTOR 
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF PROCESS THEORIES OF CHANGE’ 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project. 
 
The interview would take the form of a semi-structured session (between 1-2 hours). The 
most important aspect of the interview is to have your opinion, understanding and 
experience in the development of Strategic Alliances, without bias from other inputs being 
gathered for the project, or from existing theory in this area. Questions that could be 
addressed include the following: 
 
• What is the meaning of strategic alliance to you? 
• Which are the motives to get into a strategic alliance? 
• Are there any external constraints that influence their perspective? 
• How are decisions made to enter or not into a strategic alliance?  
• Which are the main characteristics for selecting a partner? 
• How do you manage an alliance portfolio? 
• How to measure performance of a strategic alliance? 
• What are the main issues/problems/risks with strategic alliances? 
• Which are the critical factors while developing a strategic alliance? 
• Which factors are the main determinants of success or failure?  
• How can executives and managers influence these factors? 
• How do you see the future for strategic alliances in the energy sector?  
  
If during the interview you can mention some examples/cases would be highly beneficial. 
 
Once again, thanks for your interest in this project. 
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Appendix 3-5.- University of Dundee Research Ethics Committee approval 
 
 
 
 
